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Law 106-554), and the Information Quality Act guidelines issued by the Department of Energy pur-
suant to Section 515.  The CCSP Interagency Committee relies on Department of Energy certifica-
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vision is to provide decision support tools for differentiating and evaluating response strategies. Scenario-based analysis is one
such tool. The scenarios in this report explore the implications of alternative stabilization levels of anthropogenic greenhouse
gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere, and they explicitly consider the economic and technological foundations of such response op-
tions. Such scenarios are a valuable complement to other scientific research contained in the twenty-one CCSP Synthesis and
Assessment Products. The companion to the research reported here, Global-Change Scenarios: Their Development and Use, explores
the broader strategic frame for developing and utilizing scenarios in support of climate decision making.
STUDY DESIGN
The scenarios in this report were developed using integrated assessment models (IAMs). These analysis capabilities integrate
computer models of socioeconomic and technological determinants of the emissions of GHGs with models of the natural sci-
ence of Earth system response, including the atmosphere, oceans, and terrestrial biosphere. Three IAMs were applied in the
scenario development: 
• The Integrated Global Systems Model (IGSM) of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Joint Program on the Science
and Policy of Global Change.
• The Model for Evaluating the Regional and Global Effects (MERGE) of GHG reduction policies developed jointly at Stan-
ford University and the Electric Power Research Institute.
• The MiniCAM Model of the Joint Global Change Research Institute, a partnership between the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory and the University of Maryland.
Each modeling group first produced a reference scenario under the assumption that no climate policies are imposed beyond cur-
rent commitments, namely the 2008-12 first period of the Kyoto Protocol and the U.S. goal of reducing reduce GHG emissions
per unit of its gross domestic product by 18% by 2012. The resulting reference cases are not predictions or best-judgment fore-
casts but scenarios designed to provide clearly defined points of departure for studying the implications of alternative stabi-
lization goals. As instructed in the Prospectus for the study, the modeling teams used model input assumptions they considered
meaningful and plausible. The resulting reference scenarios provide insights into how the world might evolve without additional
efforts to constrain GHG emissions, given various assumptions about principal drivers of these emissions such as population
increase, economic growth, land and labor productivity growth, technological options, and resource endowments.
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INTRODUCTION
This and a companion report constitute one of twenty-one Synthesis and
Assessment Products called for in the Strategic Plan for the U.S. Climate
Change Science Program. These studies are structured to provide high-level,
integrated research results on important science issues with a particular
focus on questions raised by decision-makers on dimensions of climate
change directly relevant to the U.S. One element of the CCSP’s strategic
Executive Summary
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Each modeling group then produced four addi-
tional stabilization scenarios framed as depar-
tures from its reference scenario. The
stabilization levels are common across the mod-
eling groups and are defined in terms of the
total long-term effect on the Earth’s heat bal-
ance of the combined effect of the primary an-
thropogenic GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO2),
nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4), hydroflu-
orocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs),
and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). The potential for
climate-related controls on other human emis-
sions, such as aerosols and their precursors, was
not incorporated into the stabilization con-
straints, although the participating models rep-
resent the emissions of many of these
substances. With the exception of these stabi-
lization levels, and a common hypothesis about
the sharing among nations of the mitigation
task, there was no direct coordination among
the modeling groups either in the assumptions
underlying the reference scenario or the precise
paths to stabilization. 
The results drawn from the simulations were se-
lected to provide insight into questions such as
the following:
• What emissions trajectories over time are
consistent with meeting the four stabiliza-
tion levels, and what are the key factors that
shape them?
• What energy system characteristics are con-
sistent with each of the four alternative sta-
bilization levels, and how might these
characteristics differ among stabilization
levels?  
• What are the possible economic conse-
quences of meeting each of the four alterna-
tive stabilization levels?
With its focus on reducing emissions to meet
various stabilization levels the study does not
explore climate damages that might be avoided
or ancillary benefits (such as lower air pollu-
tion) of emissions reduction. Thus, though the
scenarios provide a useful input to climate-re-
lated decision making they address only one of
several components of a cost-benefit analysis of
climate policy. In addition , although these sce-
narios incorporate new thinking on GHG emis-
sions and possible mitigation paths they were
not designed to span the full range of possible
futures or to provide an uncertainty analysis of
key forces. They are intended, rather, to enhance
understanding of the implications of different
ways that the future might evolve without as-
signing likelihoods to outcomes.
POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS
There are many potential applications of sce-
narios of this form, and to facilitate their use the
numerical results are provided in a companion
data set. Possible users include climate model-
ers and the science community; those involved
in national public policy formulation; managers
of Federal research programs; state and local
government officials who face decisions that
might be affected by climate change and miti-
gation measures; and individual firms, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, and members of the
public. Insights from the scenarios may be used
directly as inputs to the decision-making
processes, or the scenarios may serve as inputs
to further analyses in support of climate deci-
sion making. A sample of possible further
analyses would include the following:
• The scenarios can provide a basis for study
of the climate implications of alternative sta-
bilization levels, as an input to climate 
models, and then to follow-on studies of po-
tential climate impacts. 
• The scenarios can serve as a point of depar-
ture for exploring possible technology cost
and performance goals, using information
from the scenarios on energy prices and
technology deployment levels.
• The scenarios can provide a foundation for
analysis of the non-climate environmental
implications of new energy sources at large
scale.
• The scenarios could serve as an input to a
more complete analysis of the economic ef-
fects of stablizing and the different radiative
forcing levels, such as indicators of con-
sumer impact in the U.S.
• The scenarios can be applied in comparative
mode, extending the lessons to be learned
from the three models in this research to
those to be gained from scenarios developed
using different approaches.
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The varied clientele for these scenarios and the
variety of questions they might inform implies
a highly diverse set of possible needs, and no
single scenario exercise can hope to fully sat-
isfy all of them. Therefore these scenarios likely
will stimulate further questions and the demand
for more detailed analysis, some of which might
be satisfied by further scenario development
from models like those used here, but others de-
manding detail that can only be provided with
alternative modeling and analysis techniques.
Several characteristics of these scenarios make
them particularly valuable for these and other
types of applications. One advantage is the up-
date of economic and technology data and as-
sumptions and the use of improved scenario
development tools. It has been over a decade
since the last emissions scenario development
project of the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) – its Special Report on
Emissions Scenarios (SRES) – and over five
years since the subsequent CO2 stabilization
scenarios in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Re-
port. Over this time, substantial advances have
been made in both economic and natural sci-
ence components of the IAMs used to simulate
the various scenarios. A second advance of this
research is its all-gas approach. Many other sta-
bilization scenarios have focused on CO2 with
little attention to other human influences. The
scenarios presented here consider stabilization
in terms of the combined effect of all six cate-
gories of GHGs listed earlier so that the full
range of policy options is considered simulta-
neously. Finally, there is great advantage in the
simultaneous application to the task, and paral-
lel presentation of results, by three independent
modeling groups, applying IAMs each of which
has its own special strengths. Comparison of
scenarios across the models provides useful in-
sights into the role of key assumptions, the
realms of most fruitful technology development,
and aspects of the natural science (particularly
the carbon cycle) that have a substantial effect
on the difficulty of the stabilization task.
SCENARIO HIGHLIGHTS 
The report and supporting database provide
many details of the implications for the U.S. and
global economy, with particular focus on the en-
ergy sector, for the reference conditions and the
four levels of possible atmospheric stabilization.
Highlights of the picture that is found there in-
clude the following:
In the reference scenarios, economic and en-
ergy growth, combined with continued fossil
fuel use, lead to changes in the Earth’s radia-
tion balance that are three to four times that al-
ready experienced since the beginning of the
industrial age. By 2100, primary energy con-
sumption increases from over 3 to nearly 4
times 2000 levels as economic growth outpaces
improvements in the efficiency of energy use.
Non-fossil energy use grows from over 4 to al-
most 9 times over the century, but this growth is
insufficient to supplant fossil fuels as the major
source of energy. As a result, global CO2 emis-
sions more than triple between 2000 and 2100,
and emissions are rising at the end of the
twenty-first century in all three reference sce-
narios. Combined with the effects of non-CO2
GHGs, the increase in anthropogenic radiative
forcing from preindustrial levels is substantial.
In the stabilization scenarios, CO2 emissions
peak and decline during the twenty-first century
or soon thereafter. Emissions of non-CO2
GHGs are also reduced. The timing of GHG
emissions reductions varies substantially across
the four radiative forcing stabilization levels.
Under the most stringent stabilization levels,
CO2 emissions begin to decline immediately or
within a matter of decades. Under the less strin-
gent stabilization levels, CO2 emissions do not
peak until late in the century or beyond, and they
are 1½ to over 2½ times today’s levels in 2100.
In the stabilization scenarios, GHG emissions
reductions require a transformation of the
global energy system, including reductions in
the demand for energy (relative to the reference
scenarios) and changes in the mix of energy
technologies and fuels. This transformation is
more substantial and takes place more quickly
at the more stringent stabilization levels. Fossil
fuel use and energy consumption are reduced in
all the stabilization scenarios due to increased
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consumer prices for fossil fuels. Use of shale
oil, tar sands, and synthetic fuels from coal are
greatly reduced or, under the most stringent sta-
bilization levels, eliminated. Across the stabi-
lization scenarios, CO2 emissions from electric
power generation are reduced at relatively lower
prices than CO2 emissions from other sectors,
such as transport, industry, and buildings. Emis-
sions are reduced from electric power by in-
creased use of technologies such as CO2 capture
and storage, nuclear energy, and renewable en-
ergy. Other sectors respond to rising GHG
prices by reducing demands for fossil fuels;
substituting low- or non-emitting energy
sources such as bioenergy and low-carbon elec-
tricity or hydrogen; and applying CO2 capture
and storage where possible.
Substantial differences in GHG emissions prices
and associated economic costs arise among the
modeling groups for each stabilization level.
These differences are illustrative of some of the
unavoidable uncertainties in long-term scenar-
ios. Among the most important factors influ-
encing the variation in economic costs are: (1)
differences in assumptions – such as those re-
garding economic growth over the century, the
behavior of the oceans and terrestrial biosphere
in taking up CO2, and opportunities for reduc-
tion in non-CO2 GHG emissions – that deter-
mine the amount that CO2 emissions that must
be reduced to meet the radiative forcing stabi-
lization levels; and (2) differences in assump-
tions about technologies, particularly in the
second half of the century, to shift final demand
to low-carbon sources such as biofuels and low-
carbon electricity or hydrogen, in transportation,
industrial, and buildings end uses. All other
things being equal, scenarios with more low-cost
technology options and lower required emissions
reductions have lower economic costs.
FOLLOW-ON EFFORTS 
Generating scenarios is not a once-and-for-all
activity. The scenarios in this report represent
but one step in a long process of research and
assessment, continuing an over 20-year tradition
of research and analysis in the climate area.
They will need to be updated as knowledge ad-
vances and conditions change. Indeed, the re-
search presented here suggests several areas of
potentially fruitful research:
• Analysis of the sensitivity of results to as-
sumptions about the cost, performance and
environmental issues surrounding key tech-
nologies such as nuclear power, carbon cap-
ture and storage, and biofuels. 
• Consideration of scenarios based on differ-
ent assumptions than used here about the
way that the burdens of emissions mitigation
may be shared among nations and over time.
• Expansion and improvement of analysis of
human land use and the terrestrial carbon
cycle.
• Inclusion of other anthropogenic emissions
that affect the Earth’s heat balance, such as
the different types of aerosols, and the effect
of the tropospheric ozone (another GHG)
that results from urban air pollution. 
• Addition of uncertainty analysis and con-
sideration of decision-making under these
conditions.
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Highlights of the Report
In the reference scenarios, economic and energy growth, combined with continued fossil fuel use, lead to changes in the
Earth’s radiation balance that are three to four times that already experienced since the beginning of the industrial age. By
2100, primary energy consumption increases from over three to nearly four times 2000 levels as economic growth outpaces
improvements in the efficiency of energy use. Non-fossil energy use grows from over four to almost nine times over the
century, but this growth is insufficient to supplant fossil fuels as the major source of energy. As a result, global CO2
emissions more than triple between 2000 and 2100, and emissions are rising at the end of the twenty-first century in all
three reference scenarios. Combined with the effects of non-CO2 GHGs, the increase in anthropogenic radiative forcing
from preindustrial levels is substantial.
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HIGHLIGHTS OF THE REPORT
Background
This report presents research from Synthesis and Assessment Product 2.1a
of the Climate Change Science Program (CCSP), Scenarios of Greenhouse
Gas Emissions and Atmospheric Concentrations. The scenarios in this research
product were designed to stabilize the influence of a suite of greenhouse
gases (GHGs) – carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O),
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) – on the Earth’s radiation balance, meas-
ured in terms of radiative forcing. Four radiative forcing stabilization levels are considered. The resulting atmospheric con-
centrations of the largest single contributor, CO2, are roughly 450, 550, 650 and 750 parts per million by volume (ppmv).
Responding to the Prospectus for this research product (CCSP 2005), this report focuses on (1) GHG emissions trajecto-
ries, (2) global and U.S. energy system implications, and (3) economic implications of stabilization.
This research was conducted using computer-based research tools known as integrated assessment models. Three model-
ing groups each independently developed a reference scenario, in which all climate policies were assumed to expire in 2012,
and then developed four stabilization scenarios as departures from their respective reference scenarios. Idealized emissions-
reduction measures – designed to achieve emissions reductions wherever, whenever, and using whichever GHG was most
cost effective – were imposed to limit GHG emissions and meet the four radiative forcing stabilization levels. Evidence from
previous literature suggests that if less idealized measures were employed to stabilize radiative forcing, the costs could be
substantially higher. Further, this research considers only the costs of stabilization; it does not consider the benefits of po-
tential climate change avoided or of possible ancillary benefits of emissions reduction, such as reduced air pollution.
The scenarios in this report are not predictions or best-judgment forecasts from the modeling groups. Rather, they consti-
tute new research intended to advance understanding of the forces that lead to GHG emissions and that shape opportuni-
ties to stabilize GHG concentrations and radiative forcing. Although the future is uncertain and the scenarios are strongly
dependent on many underlying assumptions, this research provides useful insights for those engaged in climate-related de-
cision making.
Technical Summary
6The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Technical Summary
In the stabilization scenarios, CO2 emissions
peak and decline during the twenty-first century
or soon thereafter. Emissions of non-CO2
GHGs are also reduced. The timing of GHG
emissions reductions varies substantially across
the four radiative forcing stabilization levels.
Under the most stringent stabilization levels,
CO2 emissions begin to decline immediately or
within a matter of decades. Under the less strin-
gent stabilization levels, CO2 emissions do not
peak until late in the century or beyond, and
they are 1½ to over 2½ times today’s levels 
in 2100.
In the stabilization scenarios, GHG emissions
reductions require a transformation of the
global energy system, including reductions in
the demand for energy (relative to the reference
scenarios) and changes in the mix of energy
technologies and fuels. This transformation is
more substantial and takes place more quickly
at the more stringent stabilization levels. Fossil
fuel use and energy consumption are reduced in
all the stabilization scenarios due to increased
consumer prices for fossil fuels. Use of shale
oil, tar sands, and synthetic fuels from coal are
greatly reduced or, under the most stringent sta-
bilization levels, eliminated. Across the stabi-
lization scenarios, CO2 emissions from electric
power generation are reduced at relatively lower
prices than CO2 emissions from other sectors,
such as transport, industry, and buildings. Emis-
sions are reduced from electric power by in-
creased use of technologies such as CO2 capture
and storage (CCS), nuclear energy, and renew-
able energy. Other sectors respond to rising
greenhouse gas prices by reducing demands for
fossil fuels; substituting low- or non-emitting
energy sources such as bioenergy and low-car-
bon electricity or hydrogen; and applying CCS
where possible.
Substantial differences in GHG emissions
prices and associated economic costs arise
among the modeling groups for each stabiliza-
tion level. These differences are illustrative of
some of the unavoidable uncertainties in long-
term scenarios. Among the most important fac-
tors influencing the variation in economic costs
are: (1) differences in assumptions – such as
those regarding economic growth over the cen-
tury, the behavior of the oceans and terrestrial
biosphere in taking up CO2, and opportunities
for reduction in non-CO2 GHG emissions – that
determine the amount that CO2 emissions must
be reduced to meet the radiative forcing stabi-
lization levels; and (2) differences in assump-
tions about technologies, particularly in the
second half of the century, to shift final demand
to low-carbon sources such as biofuels and low-
carbon electricity or hydrogen, in transportation,
industrial, and buildings end uses. All other
things being equal, scenarios with more low-cost
technology options and lower required emissions
reductions have lower economic costs.
BACKGROUND
The Strategic Plan for the U.S. Climate Change
Science Program (CCSP 2003) noted that
“…sound, comprehensive emissions scenarios
are essential for comparative analysis of how
climate might change in the future, as well as
for analyses of mitigation and adaptation op-
tions.” The Plan includes Product 2.1, Scenarios
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Atmospheric
Concentrations and Review of Integrated Sce-
nario Development and Application, which con-
sists of two parts. This report presents the
scenario development component (Product
2.1A); the review of scenario methods (Product
2.1B) is the subject of a separate report 
(CCSP  2007). 
Guidelines for producing these scenarios were
set forth in a Prospectus, which specified that
the new scenarios focus on alternative levels of
atmospheric stabilization of the radiative forc-
ing from the combined effects of a suite of the
main anthropogenic GHGs. The Prospectus also
set forth criteria for the facilities to be used in
the analysis. Scenarios developed using three
models that meet the Prospectus conditions are
reported here.
The scenarios in this report are intended as one
of many inputs to public and private discussions
regarding climate change and what to do about
it, and they may serve as a point of departure
for further CCSP and other analyses that might
inform these discussions in the future. The pos-
sible users of these scenarios are many and di-
verse. They include climate modelers and the
science community; those involved in national
public policy formulation; managers of Federal
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research programs; state and local government
officials who face decisions that might be af-
fected by climate change and mitigation meas-
ures; and individual firms, non-governmental
organizations, and members of the public. Such
a varied clientele implies an equally diverse set
of possible needs, and no single scenario exer-
cise can hope to fully satisfy all of these needs.
Each of the three modeling groups participating
in this research first developed a no-climate pol-
icy scenario – referred to as a reference scenario
– which serves as baseline for development of
alternative scenarios with emissions control.
Each modeling group then developed four con-
trol scenarios leading to stabilization of radia-
tive forcing at four alternative levels. The
resulting scenarios provide insight into ques-
tions such as the following:  
• What emissions trajectories over time are
consistent with meeting the four alternative
stabilization levels, and what are the key fac-
tors that shape them?
• What energy system characteristics are con-
sistent with each of the four alternative sta-
bilization levels, and how might these
characteristics differ among stabilization
levels?  
• What are the possible economic conse-
quences of meeting each of the four alterna-
tive stabilization levels?
Although each of the models used to develop
these scenarios represents the world as a set of
interconnected nations and multi-nation re-
gions, as specified in the Prospectus, this report
focuses on the U.S. and world characteristics of
the scenarios.
With the exception of the stabilization levels
themselves and a common hypothesis about in-
ternational burden sharing, there was no direct
coordination among the modeling groups either
in the assumptions underlying the reference sce-
nario or the precise path to stabilization. Fur-
thermore, the scenarios were not designed to
span the full range of possible futures, and no
explicit uncertainty analysis was called for. Al-
though the future is uncertain and the scenarios
depend on many underlying assumptions, this
research illuminates a range of possible future
developments and provides useful insights 
for those engaged in climate-related decision
making.
Scenario research such as this continues a tradi-
tion of research and analysis that has gone on for
over 20 years. This work will be continued and
refined as the field advances, new information
becomes available, and decision makers raise
new questions and issues. Similar work is con-
ducted by modeling groups in Europe and Asia.
The scenarios developed here add to this larger
body of scholarship and should be viewed as one
additional piece of information in an ongoing
and iterative process of scenario development.
MODELS USED TO DEVELOP THE
SCENARIOS
The Prospectus for this research set out the fol-
lowing criteria for participating models: they
must (1) be global in scale, (2) be capable of
producing global emissions totals for desig-
nated GHGs, (3) represent multiple regions, (4)
be capable of simulating the radiative forcing
from these GHGs and substances, (5) have tech-
nological resolution capable of distinguishing
among major sources of primary energy (e.g.,
renewable energy, nuclear energy, biomass, oil,
coal, and natural gas) as well as between fossil
fuel technologies with and without carbon cap-
ture and storage systems, (6) be economics-based
and capable of simulating macroeconomic cost
implications of stabilization, and (7) look for-
ward at least to the end of the twenty-first cen-
The scenarios in this report do not con-
stitute a cost-benefit analysis of climate
policy. They focus exclusively on the is-
sues associated with reducing emissions to
meet various stabilization levels; they do
not consider the damages avoided through
stabilization or ancillary benefits that
could be realized by emissions reductions,
such as reductions in local air pollution.
Thus, although the scenarios should serve
as a useful input to climate-related deci-
sion making, they address only one of sev-
eral components of a benefit-cost analysis
of climate policy.
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tury. In addition, modeling groups were re-
quired to have a track record of publications in
professional, refereed journals, specifically in
the use of their models for the analysis of long-
term GHG emission scenarios. 
Application of these criteria led to the selection
of three models: 
• The Integrated Global Systems Model
(IGSM) of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology’s Joint Program on the Science
and Policy of Global Change
• The Model for Evaluating the Regional and
Global Effects (MERGE) of GHG reduction
policies developed jointly at Stanford Uni-
versity and the Electric Power Research In-
stitute.
• The MiniCAM Model of the Joint Global
Change Research Institute, a partnership be-
tween the Pacific Northwest National Labo-
ratory and the University of Maryland.
Each of these models has been used extensively
for climate change analysis. The roots of each
extend back more than a decade, during which
time features and details have been refined,
modified, and added. Research using each has
appeared widely in peer-reviewed publications.
APPROACH
As directed by the Prospectus, each of the three
modeling groups produced one reference sce-
nario and four stabilization scenarios, for a total
of 15 scenarios. First, the reference scenarios
were developed under the assumption that no
climate policy would be implemented beyond
the set of policies currently in place (e.g., the
Kyoto Protocol and the U.S. carbon intensity
goal, each terminating in 2012 because goals
beyond that date have not been identified). Each
modeling group developed its own reference
scenario. The Prospectus required only that each
reference scenario be based on assumptions be-
lieved by the participating modeling groups to
be meaningful and plausible. Each of the three
reference scenarios is based on a different set of
assumptions about how the future might unfold
without additional climate policies. These as-
sumptions are not intended as predictions or
best-judgment forecasts of the future by the re-
spective modeling groups. Rather, they repre-
sent possible paths that the future might follow
to serve as a platform for examining how emis-
sions might be reduced to achieve stabilization.
Each group then produced four stabilization
scenarios by constraining the models to achieve
four alternative radiative forcing levels. Stabi-
lization was defined in terms of the total long-
term radiative impact of a suite of GHGs
including CO2, N2O, CH4, HFCs, PFCs, and
SF6. These are the gases enumerated in the U.S.
goal to reduce the intensity of GHG emissions
relative to gross domestic product (GDP) as
well as the Kyoto Protocol. Other substances
with radiative impact, such as gases controlled
under the Montreal Protocol, carbon monoxide
(CO), ozone (O3), and aerosols were not in-
cluded in the radiative forcing levels.
The four radiative forcing stabilization scenar-
ios were developed so that the combined radia-
tive forcing from these GHGs since
preindustrial times was constrained to no more
than 3.4 W/m2 for Level 1, 4.7 W/m2 for 
Level 2, 5.8 W/m2 for Level 3, and 6.7 W/m2 for
Level 4. Because radiative forcing was defined
relative to preindustrial times, it includes the
Preindustrial
Concentration
(1750)
Current
Concentration
(1998)
Contribution to
Radiative Forcing,
(W/m2,1750 to1998)
CO2 278 ppmv 365 ppmv 1.46  
CH4  700 ppbv 1745 ppbv 0.48  
N2O 270 ppbv 314 ppbv 0.15  
HFCs, PFCs, SF6 0 various ≈ 0.02  
Total — — ≈ 2.1  
Source: IPCC 2001.
Table TS.1.
Greenhouse Gas
Concentrations
and Forcing.
Concentrations of
GHGs have increased
since 1750
(preindustrial), altering
the radiative energy
budget of the Earth’s
climate system.
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roughly 2.1 W/m2 of radiative forcing from
these substances that had already occurred from
1750 to 1998 (Table TS.1).
These radiative forcing stabilization levels were
chosen so that the associated CO2 concentra-
tions would be roughly 450 ppmv, 550 ppmv,
650 ppmv, and 750 ppmv after accounting for
the contributions to radiative forcing from the
non-CO2 GHGs (Table TS.2). If these CO2 con-
centrations were achieved exactly, the radiative
forcing from CO2 would be less than the radia-
tive forcing stabilization levels because of the
allowance for additional forcing from the non-
CO2 GHGs. Thus, the radiative forcing stabi-
lization levels should not be interpreted as the
“CO2–equivalent” levels associated with the ap-
proximate CO2 concentrations in Table TS.2.
Because the stabilization exercises sought least-
cost reductions among the gases, any corre-
spondence between radiative forcing levels and
CO2 concentrations is necessarily approximate
and differs among modeling groups because of
differences in the treatment of the forces that in-
fluence emissions of GHGs, possibilities for
emissions reductions, and tradeoffs between re-
ductions among GHGs.
OVERVIEW OF THE SCENARIOS
This section provides an overview of the sce-
narios. The three reference scenarios are dis-
cussed in the next section, followed by a
discussion of the twelve stabilization scenarios,
four from each modeling group.
Reference Scenarios
The difficulty of achieving any specified level
of atmospheric stabilization depends heavily on
the emissions that would occur absent actions
to address GHG emissions. In other words, the
reference scenario strongly influences the sta-
bilization scenarios. If the reference scenario
has inexpensive fossil fuels and high-economic
growth, then larger changes to the energy sector
and other parts of the economy may be required
to stabilize radiative forcing. On the other hand,
if the reference scenario shows lower economic
growth and emissions, and perhaps increased
exploitation of non-fossil sources even in the
absence of climate policy, then the effort re-
quired to stabilize radiative forcing will not be
as great. 
Energy production, transformation, and con-
sumption are central features in all of these sce-
narios, although non-CO2 gases and changes in
land use also make a significant contribution to
aggregate GHG emissions. Demand for energy
over the coming century will be driven by eco-
nomic growth and will also be strongly influ-
enced by the way that energy systems respond
to depletion of resources, changes in prices, and
improvements in technology. Demand for en-
ergy in developed countries remains strong in
all the scenarios and is even stronger in devel-
oping countries, where millions of people seek
greater access to commercial energy. These de-
velopments strongly influence the emissions of
GHGs, their disposition, and the resulting
change in radiative forcing in the reference sce-
narios. 
Table TS.2.
Radiative Forcing
Stabilization Levels
(W/m2 from
preindustrial) and
Approximate
Resulting CO2
Concentrations
(ppmv).  The radiative
forcing levels were
constructed so that the
CO2 concentrations
resulting from
stabilization of total
radiative forcing, after
accounting for radiative
forcing from the non-
CO2 GHGs, would be
roughly 450 ppmv, 550
ppmv, 650 ppmv, and
750 ppmv. 
Total Radiative
Forcing from
GHGs in this
Research (W/m2)
Approximate
Contribution to
Radiative Forcing
from non-CO2
GHGs (W/m2) 
Approximate
Contribution 
to Radiative
Forcing from
CO2 (W/m2) 
Corresponding
CO2
Concentration
(ppmv)  
Level 1 3.4 0.8 2.6 450  
Level 2 4.7 1.0 3.7 550  
Level 3 5.8 1.3 4.5 650  
Level 4 6.7 1.4 5.3 750  
Year 1998 ≈ 2.1 0.65 1.46 365  
Preindustrial (1750) — — — 278
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The three reference scenarios show the impli-
cations of this increasing demand and the im-
proved access to energy, with the ranges
reflecting the variation among the scenarios
from the three modeling groups. Global primary
energy consumption rises substantially in all
three reference scenarios, from about 400 EJ/yr
in 2000 to between roughly 1275 EJ/yr and
1500 EJ/yr in 2100 (Figure TS.1). U.S. primary
energy consumption also grows substantially,
about 1¼ to 2½ times present levels by 2100
(Figure TS.2). Primary energy growth occurs
despite continued improvements in the effi-
ciency of energy use and energy production
technologies. For example, the U.S. energy in-
tensity – the ratio of primary energy consump-
tion to economic output – declines 60% to 75%
between 2000 and 2100 across the three refer-
ence scenarios.
All three reference scenarios include an even-
tual reduction in the consumption of conven-
tional oil resources. However, in all three, a
range of alternative fossil-based resources, such
as synthetic fuels from coal and unconventional
oil resources (e.g., tar sands and oil shales), are
available and become economically viable. Fos-
sil fuels provided almost 90% of global primary
energy in the year 2000, and they remain the
dominant energy source in the three reference
scenarios throughout the twenty-first century,
supplying 70% to 80% of total primary energy
in 2100.
Figure TS.1. Global Primary Energy Consumption Across Reference Scenarios (EJ/yr).  Global primary energy
consumption rises in all three reference scenarios, from about 400 EJ/yr in 2000 to between roughly 1275 EJ/yr and 1500 EJ/yr in 2100.
Dependence on conventional oil resources gradually decreases. However, a range of alternative fossil-based resources, such as synthetic
fuels from coal and unconventional oil resources (e.g., tar sands and oil shales) are available and become economically viable. Fossil fuels
provided almost 90% of global primary energy consumption in the year 2000, and they remain the dominant energy source in the three
reference scenarios throughout the twenty-first century, supplying 70% to 80% of primary energy in 2100. Non-fossil fuel energy use
grows over the century in all three reference scenarios. The range of contributions in 2100 is from 250 EJ/yr to 450 EJ/yr – an amount
equaling roughly one-half to a little over global primary energy
consumption today. [Notes. i. Oil consumption includes that derived
from tar sands and oil shales, and coal consumption includes that used
to produce synthetic liquid and gaseous fuels.  ii. Primary energy
consumption from nuclear power and non-biomass renewable
electricity are accounted for at the average efficiency of fossil-fired
electric facilities, which vary over time and across scenarios. This long-
standing convention means that, all other things being equal, increasing
efficiency of fossil-electric energy lowers the contribution to primary
energy from these sources.]
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However, non-fossil fuel energy use also grows
over the century in all three reference scenarios.
Contributions to primary energy consumption
in 2100 range from 250 EJ to 450 EJ – an
amount equaling roughly ½ times to a little over
global primary energy consumption today. De-
spite this growth, these sources never supplant
fossil fuels, although they provide an increasing
share of the total, particularly in the second half
of the century.
Consistent with the characteristics of primary
energy consumption, global and U.S. electricity
production continues to rely on coal, although
the contribution of coal varies among the refer-
ence scenarios (Figure TS.3 and Figure TS.4).
The contribution of renewable and nuclear en-
ergy varies considerably in the different refer-
ence scenarios, depending on resource
availability, technology, and non-climate policy
considerations. For example, global nuclear
generation in the reference scenarios ranges
from about 1½ times current levels (if non-cli-
mate concerns such as safety, waste, and prolif-
eration constrain its growth as is the case in one
reference scenario), to an expansion of almost
an order of magnitude assuming relative eco-
nomics as the only constraint.
In the reference scenarios, oil and natural gas
prices rise through the century relative to year
2000 levels, whereas coal and electricity prices
remain relatively stable. It should be empha-
sized, however, that the models used in this 
research were not designed to simulate short-
term, fuel-price spikes, such as those that 
occurred in the 1970s, early 1980s, and more re-
cently in 2005. Thus, price trends in the scenarios
should be interpreted as multi-year averages.
As a combined result of all these influences,
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and
Figure TS.2. U.S. Primary Energy Consumption Across Reference Scenarios (EJ/yr).  U.S. primary energy
consumption rises in all three reference scenarios, to roughly 1¼ to 2½ times present levels by 2100. This growth occurs despite
continued improvements in the efficiency of energy use and production. U.S. energy intensity declines 60% to 75% between 2000 and
2100 in the reference scenarios. [Notes. i. Oil consumption includes
that derived from tar sands and oil shales, and coal consumption
includes that used to produce synthetic liquid and gaseous fuels.  
ii. Primary energy consumption from nuclear power and non-biomass
renewable electricity are accounted for at the average efficiency of
fossil-fired electric facilities, which vary over time and across scenarios.
This long-standing convention means that, all other things being equal,
increasing efficiency of fossil-electric energy lowers the contribution to
primary energy from these sources.]
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Figure TS.3. Global Electricity Production Across Reference Scenarios (EJ/yr).  Global electricity production grows to
over four times production levels in 2000 in all the reference scenarios. Global electricity production shows continued reliance on coal,
although this contribution varies among the reference scenarios. The contribution of renewable energy and nuclear power varies
considerably among the reference scenarios, depending on
assumptions about resource availability, technology, and non-
climate policy considerations. For example, global production of
electricity from nuclear power in the reference scenarios ranges
from about 1½ times current levels (if non-climate concerns
such as safety, waste, and proliferation constrain its growth as is
the case in one reference scenario), to an expansion of almost an
order of magnitude assuming relative economics as the only
constraint.
industrial processes in the reference scenarios
increase from approximately 7 gigatonne car-
bon per year (GtC/yr) in 2000 to between 22.5
GtC/yr and 24.0 GtC/yr in 2100; that is, roughly
3 to 3½ times current levels (Figure TS.5).
(Note that one tonne C is equivalent to 3.67
tonnes CO2. See Box 3.2 for more on converting
between units of carbon and units of CO2.) 
It is instructive to see how emissions are divided
between industrialized countries (Annex 1) and
developing countries (Non-Annex 1). Develop-
ing country emissions overtake those of devel-
oped countries in the 2020 to 2030 timeframe
in the reference scenarios (Figure TS.6). This
suggests the difficulty of stabilizing radiative
forcing without developing-country participa-
tion. Indeed, even if developed countries were
to reduce their emissions to zero, global involve-
ment would still be necessary for stabilization.
The capacity of the ocean to absorb CO2 differs
among the three models. The ocean is a major
sink for CO2, and the rate at which the oceans
take up CO2 generally increases in the reference
scenarios as concentrations rise early in the cen-
tury. However, processes in the ocean can slow
this rate of increase at high concentrations late
in the century. Ocean uptake in the three refer-
ence scenarios is roughly 2 GtC/yr in 2000, ris-
ing to about 5 GtC/yr to 11 GtC/yr by 2100. The
three ocean models behave more similarly in the
stabilization scenarios; for example, the differ-
ence in ocean uptake between models, is less
than 1 GtC/yr in 2100 under the most stringent
stabilization level.
Two of the three participating models include
sub-models of the exchange of CO2 with the ter-
restrial biosphere, including the net uptake by
plants and soils and the emissions from defor-
estation. In the reference scenarios from these
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modeling groups, the terrestrial biosphere acts
as a small annual net sink (less than 1 GtC/yr)
in 2000, increasing to an annual net sink of
roughly 2 GtC/yr to 3 GtC/yr by the end of the
century. The third modeling group assumed a
zero net exchange. Changes in emissions from
terrestrial systems over time in the reference
scenarios reflect assumptions about human ac-
tivity (including a decline in deforestation) as
well as increased CO2 uptake by vegetation as a
result of the positive effect of CO2 on plant
growth. There remains substantial uncertainty
about this carbon fertilization effect and its evo-
lution under a changing climate. 
Although this Technical Summary focuses on
the most important anthropogenic GHG, CO2,
the scenarios considered a number of other
GHGs (CH4 , N2O SF6, PFCs, and HFCs),
which are emitted from various sources, in-
cluding agriculture, waste management, bio-
mass burning, fossil fuel production and
consumption, and a number of industrial activ-
ities. Future global anthropogenic emissions of
CH4 and N2O vary widely among the reference
scenarios, ranging from flat or declining emis-
sions to increases of 2 to 2½ times present 
levels. These differences reflect differing as-
sumptions about technological opportunities
and about whether current emissions rates will
be reduced significantly for non-climate rea-
sons, such as air pollution control and/or higher
natural gas prices that would further stimulate
the capture of CH4 emissions for its fuel value.
Increases in emissions from the global energy
system and other human activities lead to higher
atmospheric GHG concentrations and radiative
forcing. These increases are moderated by nat-
ural biogeochemical removal processes. As a re-
sult, GHG concentrations rise substantially over
the century in the reference scenarios. By 2100,
CO2 concentrations range from about 700 ppmv
to 900 ppmv, up from 365 ppmv in 1998. CH4
concentrations in 2100 range from 2000 ppbv to
4000 ppbv, up from 1745 ppbv in 1998, and N2O
concentrations in 2100 range from about 375
ppbv to 500 ppbv, up from 314 ppbv in 1998.
As a result, radiative forcing in 2100 ranges
from 6.4 W/m2 to 8.6 W/m2 from preindustrial,
up from a little over 2 W/m2 today. The non-CO2
Figure TS.4. U.S. Electricity Production Across
Reference Scenarios (EJ/yr).  Continued dependence on
coal for electricity generation is a feature of all three reference
scenarios, with the degree of dependence varying among
scenarios. Differences in the use of nuclear power reflect
differing assumptions about the degree to which issues of safety,
waste, and proliferation constrain its growth.
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Figure TS.5. Global Emissions of CO2 from Fossil
Fuels and Industrial Sources [CO2 from land-use
change excluded] Across Reference Scenarios
(GtC/yr). Global emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel combustion
and other industrial sources, mainly cement production, increase
over the century in all three reference scenarios. By 2100
emissions reach 22.5 GtC/yr to 24.0 GtC/yr.
Figure TS.6. Global Emissions of Fossil Fuel and Industrial CO2 by Annex I and Non-Annex I Countries Across
Reference Scenarios (GtC/yr). Emissions of fossil fuel and
industrial CO2 from the Non-Annex I countries exceed those
from the Annex I countries in all three reference scenarios by
2030 or earlier. Non-Annex 1
emissions continue to grow rapidly in
two of the reference scenarios, such
that their emissions are on the order
of twice the level of Annex I by 2100.
Emissions do not continue to diverge
in the third reference scenario, due in
part to relatively slower economic
growth in Non-Annex I regions, faster
growth in Annex I, and increased
emissions in Annex I as they become
producers and exporters of shale oil, tar
sands, and synthetic fuels from coal.
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GHGs account for about 20% to 25% of radiative
forcing by the end of the century (Figure TS.7).
Stabilization Scenarios
Important assumptions underlying the stabi-
lization scenarios include the flexibility that ex-
ists in a policy design, as represented by the
modeling groups, to seek out least cost options
for emissions control regardless of where they
occur, what substances are controlled, or when
they occur. This set of conditions is referred to
as where, what, and when flexibility. Equal mar-
ginal costs of abatement among regions, across
time (taking into account discount rates and the
lifetimes of substances), and among substances
(taking into account their relative warming po-
tential and different lifetimes) will, under spec-
ified conditions, lead to least-cost abatement.
Each modeling group applied an economic in-
strument that priced GHGs in a manner consis-
tent with the group’s interpretation of where,
what and when flexibility. The economic char-
acteristics of the scenarios therefore assume a
policy designed with the intent of achieving the
required reductions in GHG emissions in a
least-cost way. Key implications of these as-
sumptions are that: (1) all nations proceed to-
gether in restricting GHG emissions from 2012
and continue together throughout the century,
and that the same marginal cost is applied
across sectors (where flexibility); (2) the mar-
ginal cost of abatement rises over time based on
each modeling group’s interpretation of when
flexibility, with the effect of linking emissions
mitigation efforts over the time horizon of the
scenarios; and (3) stabilization of radiative forc-
ing is achieved by combining control of all
GHGs, with differences in how modeling
groups compared them (what flexibility). 
Although these assumptions are convenient for
analytical purposes, to gain an impression of the
implications of stabilization, they are idealized
versions of possible outcomes. For the abate-
ment costs in these scenarios to be representa-
tive of actual abatement costs would require,
among other things, that a negotiated interna-
tional agreement include these flexibility mech-
anisms. Failure in that regard could have a
Figure TS.7. Radiative Forcing by Gas Across
Reference Scenarios (W/m2 from preindustrial).
CO2 accounts for 75% to 80% of the radiative forcing in 2100 in
the three reference scenarios. Total radiative forcing in 2100 from
all the GHGs considered in this research ranges from about 6.4
W/m2 to 8.6 W/m2.
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substantial effect on the difficulty of achieving
any of the stabilization levels considered in this
research. For example, a delay in the participa-
tion of some large countries would require
greater effort by the others, and policies that im-
pose differential burdens on different sectors
without mechanisms to allow for equalizing
marginal costs across sectors can result in a
many-fold increase in the cost of any environ-
mental gain. Therefore, it is important to view
these result as scenarios under specified condi-
tions, not as predictions or best-judgment fore-
casts of the most likely outcome within the
national and international political system. Fur-
ther, none of the scenarios considered the extent
to which variation from these least-cost rules
might be improved upon given interactions with
existing taxes, technology spillovers, or other
non-market externalities. 
If the developments in the three reference sce-
narios were to occur, concerted efforts to reduce
GHG emissions would be required to stabilize
radiative forcing at the levels considered in this
research. Such limits would shape technology
deployment throughout the century and have
important economic consequences. The stabi-
lization scenarios demonstrate that there is no
single technology pathway consistent with a
given level of radiative forcing. Furthermore,
there are other possible pathways than those
considered in this research. 
Stabilization of radiative forcing at the levels
examined in this research would require a sub-
stantially different energy system globally, and
in the U.S., than what emerges in the reference
scenarios. The degree and timing of change in
the global energy system depends on the level at
which radiative forcing is stabilized (Figure
TS.8 and Figure TS.9). The lower the radiative
forcing stabilization level, the larger the scale
of change in the global energy system relative to
the reference scenario required over the coming
Figure TS.10  Global Emissions of CO2 from Fossil and other Industrial Sources Across Scenarios (GtC/yr).  
The tighter the constraint on radiative forcing, the faster carbon emissions must decline from those in the reference scenarios. This is
because the stabilization level defines a long-term carbon budget;
that is, the remaining amount of carbon that can be emitted in
the future. The gradual deflection of the emissions from the
reference reflects the assumption of when flexibility, with carbon
prices rising gradually. Under the most stringent radiative forcing
stabilization levels, CO2 emissions begin to decline immediately
or within a matter of decades. Under less stringent radiative
forcing stabilization levels, CO2 emissions do not peak until late
in the century or beyond, and they are 1½ to over 2½ times
today’s levels in 2100. 
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century and the sooner those changes would
need to occur.
Across the stabilization scenarios, the energy
system relies more heavily on non-fossil energy
sources, such as nuclear, solar, wind, biomass,
and other renewable energy forms, than in the
associated reference scenarios. The stabilization
scenarios differ in the degree to which these
technologies are deployed, depending on as-
sumptions about: technological improvements;
the ability to overcome obstacles, such as inter-
mittency in the case of solar and wind power, or
safety, waste, and proliferation issues in the case
of nuclear power; and the policy environment
surrounding these technologies. Energy con-
sumption, while still higher than today’s levels,
is lower in the stabilization scenarios than in the
reference scenarios.
CCS is widely deployed in the stabilization sce-
narios because each modeling group assumed
that the technology can be successfully devel-
oped and that concerns about storing large
amounts of carbon do not impede its expansion.
Removal of this assumption would make the
stabilization levels more difficult to achieve and
would lead to greater demand for low-carbon
sources such as renewable energy and nuclear
power, to the extent that growth of these other
sources is not otherwise constrained.
Significant fossil fuel use continues across the
stabilization scenarios, because stabilization al-
lows for some level of carbon emissions through
2100, and because of the presence of CCS tech-
nology in all the stabilization scenarios.
Increased use is made of biomass energy crops
in all the stabilization scenarios, the contribu-
tion of which is ultimately limited by competi-
tion with agriculture and forestry. One modeling
group examined the importance of valuing ter-
restrial carbon similarly to the way fossil fuel
carbon is valued in stabilization scenarios. It
was found that important interactions between
large-scale deployment of commercial bioen-
ergy crops and land use occurred to the detri-
ment of unmanaged ecosystems when no
economic value was placed on carbon in terres-
trial systems.
Across the stabilization scenarios, the scale of
the emissions reductions required relative to the
reference scenario increases over time, with the
bulk of emissions reductions taking place in the
second half of the century. But emissions re-
ductions occur in the first half of the century in
every stabilization scenario (Figure TS.10).
The 2100 time horizon of this research limited
examination of the ultimate stabilization re-
quirements. Further reductions in CO2 emis-
sions after 2100 would be required in all of the
stabilization scenarios, because stabilization of
radiative forcing at any of the levels considered
in this research requires human emissions of
CO2 in the long term to be essentially halted.
Despite the fact that much of the carbon emis-
sions will eventually make its way into oceans
and terrestrial sinks, some will remain in the at-
mosphere for thousands of years. Only CCS can
allow continued burning of fossil fuels. Higher
radiative forcing limits can delay the point in
time at which emissions must be reduced toward
zero, but this requirement must ultimately 
be met.
Fuel sources and electricity generation tech-
nologies change substantially, both globally and
in the U.S., in the stabilization scenarios com-
pared to the reference scenarios. There are a va-
riety of technological options in the electricity
sector that reduce carbon emissions in these sce-
narios (Figure TS.11 and Figure TS.12).
By the end of the century, electricity produced
by conventional fossil technology that freely
emits CO2 is reduced in the stabilization sce-
narios relative to reference scenarios. Electric-
ity production from technologies that emit CO2
varies substantially with the stabilization level;
in the most stringent stabilization scenarios,
electricity production from these technologies
is reduced toward zero.
The economic effects of stabilization are sub-
stantial in many of the stabilization scenarios,
although much of this cost is borne later in the
century. As noted earlier, each of the modeling
groups assumed that a global policy was imple-
mented after 2012, with universal participation
by the world’s nations, and that the time path of
reductions approximated a least-cost solution.
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These assumptions of where, when, and what
flexibility lower the economic consequences of
stabilization relative to what they might be with
other implementation approaches. 
The stabilization scenarios follow a pattern
where, in most scenarios, the carbon price rises
steadily over time (Table TS.3), providing an op-
portunity for the energy system to adjust grad-
ually. Although the general shape of the carbon
price trajectory over time is similar across the
models, the carbon prices vary substantially
across the models. For example, for the less
stringent stabilization levels two of the model-
ing groups produced scenarios with carbon
prices of $10 or below per tonne of carbon in
2020, with carbon prices rising to roughly $100
per tonne in 2020 at the most stringent stabi-
lization level. The scenarios from the third mod-
eling group show higher initial carbon prices in
2020, ranging from around $20 for the least
stringent stabilization level to over $250 for the
most stringent stabilization level. (Note that
$100/tonne C is equivalent to $27/tonne CO2.
See Box 3.2 for more on converting between
units of carbon and units of CO2.)
These differences in carbon prices, along with
other model features, lead to similar variation
in the costs of stabilization. Under the most
stringent radiative forcing stabilization level, for
example, gross world product (aggregating
country figures using market exchange rates) is
reduced in 2050 by around 1% in the scenarios
from two of the modeling groups and approxi-
mately 5% in the scenario from the third. In
2100 it is reduced by less than 2% in two of the
scenarios and over 16% in the third.
The variation in carbon prices and reductions in
gross world product is attributable to many fac-
tors, but two are most prominent. First, the
amount that CO2 emissions must be reduced to
achieve stabilization differs between the sce-
narios from the different modeling groups
(Table TS.4), because of differing assumptions
regarding economic growth and other factors
that determine emissions in the reference sce-
2020 ($/tonne C) 2030 ($/tonne C)
Stabilization
Level IGSM MERGE MiniCAM IGSM MERGE MiniCAM
Level 4 $18 $1 $1 $26 $2 $2
Level 3 $30 $2 $4 $44 $4 $7
Level 2 $75 $8 $15 $112 $13 $26
Level 1 $259 $110 $93 $384 $191 $170
2050 ($/tonne C) 2100 ($/tonne C)
Stabilization
Level IGSM MERGE MiniCAM IGSM MERGE MiniCAM
Level 4 $58 $6 $5 $415 $67 $54
Level 3 $97 $11 $19 $686 $127 $221
Level 2 $245 $36 $69 $1,743 $466 $420
Level 1 $842 $574 $466 $6,053 $609 $635
Table TS.3. Carbon
Prices at Various
Points in Time for
the Stabilization
Scenarios
Table TS.4. Cumulative Emissions
Reductions from the Reference Scenarios
Across Models in the Stabilization Scenarios
(GtC through 2100)
IGSM MERGE MiniCAM
Level 4 472 112 97
Level 3 674 258 267
Level 2 932 520 541
Level 1 1172 899 934
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narios; levels of CO2 uptake by the oceans and
terrestrial biosphere; and availability of control
for non-CO2 GHGs. 
Second, the modeling groups chose different as-
sumptions regarding the technologies available
for emissions reductions, particularly in the sec-
ond half of the century. Most prominent are dif-
ferences in assumptions about technologies to
shift final energy demand to low-carbon sources
such as biofuels and low-carbon electricity or
hydrogen, in transportation, industrial and
buildings end uses. The differences in techno-
logical assumptions among the modeling
groups is reflected in the relationship between
carbon prices and percentage abatement (Fig-
ure TS.13), a form of marginal abatement cost
curve, for the three models in 2050 and 2100.
The scenarios from the three modeling groups
exhibit very similar behavior through 2050, but
different assumptions about technological op-
tions lead to a divergence among the models 
by 2100. 
In all of the scenarios, emissions reductions in
electric power sector come at relatively lower
prices than in other sectors (e.g. buildings, in-
dustry, and transport) so that the electricity sec-
tor is essentially decarbonized in the most strin-
gent scenarios from all three modeling groups
(Figure TS.14). At somewhat higher cost, other
sectors can respond to rising carbon prices by
reducing demands for fossil fuels, applying
CCS technologies where possible, and substi-
tuting low-carbon energy sources such as bioen-
ergy and low-carbon electricity or hydrogen.
The amount of electricity used per unit of total
primary energy increases in all of the stabiliza-
tion scenarios (Figure TS.15), but those scenar-
ios with the highest relative use of electricity
tend to exhibit lower stabilization costs in part
because of the larger role of decarbonized
power generation. Assumptions regarding costs
and performance of technologies to facilitate
these adjustments, particularly in the post-2050
period, play an important role in determining
stabilization costs.
The assumption of when flexibility links ele-
ments of each stabilization scenario through
time. This in turn means that in addition to near-
term technology availability, differences in as-
sumptions about technology in the post-2050
period are reflected in near-term emissions re-
ductions and GHG prices.
Figure TS.13. Relationship Between Carbon Price and Percentage Emissions Reductions in 2050 and 2100.
The relationship between carbon price and percentage reduction in emissions is similar among the models in 2050. In 2100, the
relationship between carbon price and percentage reduction in emissions diverges across the models, due in large part to different
assumptions regarding the technologies available to facilitate emissions reductions late in the century. [Note. CO2 emissions vary across the
reference scenarios from the three modeling groups, so that
similar percentage reductions, as shown in this figure, imply
differing levels of total emissions reduction.]
$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
$1,400
$1,600
$1,800
$2,000
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Percentage Emissions Reduction
$/
to
nn
e 
C
 (
20
00
$)
$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
$1,400
$1,600
$1,800
$2,000
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Percentage Emissions Reduction
$/
to
nn
e 
C
 (
20
00
$)
2050 2100
IGSM_Level 1
IGSM_Level 2
IGSM_Level 3
IGSM_Level 4
MERGE_Level 1
MERGE_Level 2
MERGE_Level 3
MERGE_Level 4
MINICAM_Level 1
MINICAM_Level 2
MINICAM_Level 3
MINICAM_Level 4
28
The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Technical Summary
Figure TS.14. Percentage of World Electricity
Production from Low- or Zero-Emissions
Technologies Across Scenarios (percentage).  All
three modeling groups assumed sufficient technological options
to allow for substantial reductions in carbon emissions from
electricity production. Options include fossil power plants with
CCS, nuclear power, and renewable energy such as hydroelectric
power, wind power, and solar power. In all of the Level 1
scenarios, the electricity sector is almost fully decarbonized by
the end of the century.
Constraints on GHG emissions also affect fuel
prices. Generally, producer prices for fossil
fuels fall as demand for them is depressed by
the stabilization measures. Consumers of fossil
fuels, on the other hand, pay for fuel plus a car-
bon price if the CO2 emissions are freely re-
leased to the atmosphere (Table TS.5). There-
fore, consumer costs of energy rise with more
stringent stabilization levels in these scenarios.
Non-CO2 gases play an important role in shap-
ing the degree of change in the energy system.
Scenarios that assume relatively better per-
formance of technologies for reducing non-CO2
emissions allow a given radiative forcing stabi-
lization level to be met with greater radiative
forcing from CO2 and, all other things being
equal, less extensive changes to the energy sys-
tem. Differences in GHG concentrations among
the three models reflect differences in assumed
mitigation opportunities for non-CO2 GHGs rel-
ative to CO2. For example, lower CH4 and N2O
emissions in the scenarios from one of the mod-
eling groups reflects a greater market penetra-
tion of technologies that reduce CH4 and N2O
emissions with positive profits even in the ref-
erence scenario, and significant abatement in
the stabilization scenarios. With lower levels of
CH4 and N2O than is the case in the scenarios
As noted earlier, the overall cost 
levels are strongly influenced by the 
idealized policy scenario that has 
all countries participating from the start,
the assumption of where flexibility, an ef-
ficient pattern of emissions reductions
over time, and integrated reductions in
emissions of the different GHGs.  As-
sumptions in which policies are imple-
mented in a less efficient manner would
lead to higher costs. Thus, these scenar-
ios should not be interpreted as 
applying beyond the particular condi-
tions assumed.
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Figure TS.15. Ratio of Global Electricity Production to Primary Energy Consumption Across Scenarios. 
Efforts to constrain CO2 emissions result in increased use of electricity as a fraction of total primary energy in the scenarios from all
three modeling groups. This is because all three modeling groups
assumed lower-cost technology options for reductions in
emissions from electricity production than for substitution away
from fossil fuels in direct uses such as transportation. The
scenarios from two of the modeling groups (MERGE and
MiniCAM) generally include greater electrification than the
scenarios from the third modeling group (IGSM). Greater
opportunities to electrify reduce the economic impacts of
stabilization. [Note. Primary energy consumption from nuclear power
and non-biomass renewable electricity are accounted for at the
average efficiency of fossil-fired electric facilities, which vary over time
and across scenarios.]
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Fuel Base Cost ($2005) Added Cost ($) Added Cost (%)
Crude Oil ($/bbl) $60.0 $12.2 20%
Regular Gasoline
($/gal) $2.39 $0.26 11%
Heating Oil ($/gal) $2.34 $0.29 12%
Wellhead Natural
Gas ($/tcf) $10.17 $1.49 15%
Residential Natural
Gas ($/tcf) $15.30 $1.50 10%
Utility Coal 
($/short ton) $32.6 $55.3 170%
Electricity (c/kWh) 9.6¢ 1.76¢ 18%
Source:  Bradley et al. 1991, updated with U.S. average prices for the 4th quarter 
of 2005 as reported in DOE 2006.
Table TS.5. Relationship Between a
$100/tonne Carbon Price and Fuel
Prices. (In most cases, stabilization
depresses producer prices and so the
percentage rise in the fuel cost seen by
consumers would be less than indicated here.
The change in producer price is highly
scenario- and model-dependent.)
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CO2 Short-Lived F-gases
Long-Lived F-gasesN2O
CH4
Figure TS.16.  Total Radiative Forcing in 2100 Across
Scenarios (W/m2 from preindustrial).  CO2 is the main
contributor to radiative forcing in the year 2100 in all of the
scenarios. The opportunities to reduce control emissions from
non-CO2 GHGs influence the CO2 emissions reductions required
to meet a given radiative forcing stabilization level. At any
stabilization level, scenarios with lower contributions to radiative
forcing from non-CO2 GHGs allow for greater radiative forcing
from CO2.
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from the other two modeling groups, higher lev-
els of CO2 are still consistent with the overall
radiative forcing levels (Figure TS. 16).
Achieving stabilization of atmospheric GHGs
poses a substantial technological and policy
challenge. It would require important transfor-
mations of the global energy system. The cost
and feasibility of such a goal depends on the
evolution of technology and its ability to over-
come existing limits and barriers to adoption,
and it depends on the efficiency and effective-
ness of the policy instruments employed to
achieve stabilization. These scenarios provide a
means to gain insight into the challenge of sta-
bilization and the implications of technology.
USING THE SCENARIOS 
AND FUTURE WORK
The scenarios in this report are intended as one
of many inputs to public and private discussions
regarding the threat of climate change, and they
are also intended to serve as a point of depar-
ture for further CCSP and other analyses. A
range of such analyses are possible. For exam-
ple, the scenarios could be applied as the basis
for assessing the climate implications of alter-
native stabilization levels, and then follow-on
studies of potential climate impacts. They might
also be used in studies exploring possible tech-
nology cost and performance goals, using infor-
mation from the scenarios on energy prices and
technology deployment levels. Similarly, the sce-
narios might inform analyses of the non-climate
environmental implications of implementing po-
tential new energy sources at a large scale. An-
other possibility is that the scenarios could serve
as an input to a more complete analysis of the
economic effects of stabilizing at the different
radiative forcing levels, such as indicators of
consumer impact in the U.S. (The reader is re-
minded, however, that these effects do not in-
clude the benefits that alternative stabilization
levels might yield in reduced climate change risk
or ancillary effects, such as effects on air pollu-
tion). The scenarios could also be compared
against past and future scenarios analyses.
The scenarios in this report represent but one
step in a long process of research and assess-
ment, and the scenarios and their underlying
models will benefit from further work. The re-
view process has identified at least five differ-
ent areas that hold the promise of potentially
fruitful research: (1) technology sensitivity
analysis, (2) consideration of non-idealized pol-
icy architectures, (3) expansion and improve-
ment of the land use and terrestrial carbon cycle
linkages to the energy and economic model
components, (4) inclusion of other radiatively-
important substances such as emissions affect-
ing tropospheric ozone and aerosols, and (5)
decision-making under uncertainty. These needs
for additional research and analysis are elabo-
rated in Chapter 5. 
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INTRODUCTION
The Strategic Plan for the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP 2003) calls for the prepara-
tion of 21 synthesis and assessment products. Noting that “sound, comprehensive emissions sce-
narios are essential for comparative analysis of how climate might change in the future, as well as
for analyses of mitigation and adaptation options,” the Plan includes Product 2.1, Scenarios of Green-
house Gas Emissions and Atmospheric Concentrations and Review of Integrated Scenario Development
and Application. This report presents the scenarios created in the scenario-development compo-
nent of Product 2.1; the review of scenario methods is the subject of a separate report (CCSP
2007). The guidelines for the development of these scenarios are set forth in the Final Prospectus
for Synthesis and Assessment Product 2.1 (CCSP 2005). Consistent with the Prospectus and the na-
ture of the climate change issue, these scenarios were developed using long-term models of global
energy-agriculture-land-use-economy systems coupled to models of global atmospheric compo-
sition and radiation.
This report discusses the overall design of scenarios (Chapter 1); describes the key features of the
participating models (Chapter 2); presents and compares the newly prepared scenarios (Chapters
3 and 4); and discusses emerging insights from these new scenarios, the uses and limitations of the
scenarios, and avenues for further research (Chapter 5). Scenario details are available in a sepa-
rate data archive.
The scenarios in this report are intended as one of many inputs to public and private discussions
regarding climate change and what to do about it, and they may also serve as a point of departure
for further Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) and other analyses that might inform these
discussions in the future. The possible users of these scenarios are many and diverse. They include
climate modelers and the science community; those involved in national public policy formulation;
managers of Federal research programs; state and local government officials who face decisions
that might be affected by climate change and mitigation measures; and individual firms, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, and members of the public. Such a varied clientele implies an equally di-
verse set of possible needs, and no single scenario research product can hope to fully satisfy all of
these needs. The Prospectus for this research highlighted three particular areas in which the sce-
narios might provide valuable insights:
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• Emissions Trajectories. What emissions tra-
jectories over time are consistent with meet-
ing the four stabilization levels, and what are
the key factors that shape them?
• Energy Systems. What energy system char-
acteristics are consistent with each of the
four alternative stabilization levels, and how
might these characteristics differ among sta-
bilization levels?  
• Economic Implications. What are the possi-
ble economic consequences of meeting each
of the four alternative stabilization levels? 
It should be emphasized that there are issues of
climate change decision making that these sce-
narios do not address. For example, they were
not designed for use in exploring the role of
aerosols in climate change. Also, they lack the
regional detail that may be desired for many as-
pects of local or regional decision-making. 
Three analytical models, all meeting the criteria
set forth in the Prospectus, were used in prepar-
ing the new scenarios. As also directed in the
Prospectus, fifteen scenarios are presented in
this document, five from each of the three mod-
eling groups. First, each group produced a
unique reference scenario based on the as-
sumption that no climate policy would be im-
plemented either nationally or globally beyond
the current set of policies in place (e.g., the
Kyoto Protocol and the President’s greenhouse
gas emissions intensity target for the U.S.).
These reference scenarios were developed in-
dependently by the modeling groups, so they
provide three separate visions of how the future
might unfold across the globe over the 21st cen-
tury without additional climate policies.1
Each group then produced four additional sta-
bilization scenarios, which are departures from
each group’s reference scenario. The Prospec-
tus specified that stabilization levels, common
across the groups, be defined in terms of the
total long-term radiative impact of the suite of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) that includes carbon
dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane
(CH4), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluoro-
carbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).
This radiative impact is expressed in terms of
radiative forcing associated with increases from
preindustrial concentrations of this suite of
GHGs (Box 1.1).
Although stabilization is defined in terms of 
radiative forcing, the stabilization levels were
constructed so that the resulting CO2 concen-
trations, after accounting for radiative forcing
from the non-CO2 GHGs, would be roughly 450
parts per million by volume (ppmv), 550 ppmv,
650 ppmv, and 750 ppmv. The radiative forcing
limits therefore are higher than the forcing from
CO2 alone at these concentrations. Based on this
requirement, the four stabilization levels were
chosen as 3.4 watts per meter squared (W/m2)
(Level 1), 4.7 W/m2 (Level 2), 5.8 W/m2 (Level
3), and 6.7 W/m2 (Level 4). In comparison, ra-
diative forcing relative to preindustrial levels for
this suite of gases stood at roughly 2.1 W/m2 in
1998. Details of these stabilization assumptions
are elaborated in Section 1.3 and Chapter 4.
The production of emissions scenarios consis-
tent with these stabilization goals required
analysis beyond the study of the emissions
themselves because of physical, chemical, and
biological feedbacks within the Earth system.
Scenarios focused only on emissions of GHGs
and other substances generated by human ac-
tivity (anthropogenic sources) can rely exclu-
sively on energy-agriculture-economic models
that represent human activity and the emissions
In addition, the scenarios in this report do
not constitute a cost-benefit analysis of
climate policy. They focus exclusively on
the issues associated with reducing emis-
sions to meet various stabilization levels;
they do not consider the damages avoided
through stabilization or ancillary benefits
that could be realized by emissions re-
ductions, such as reductions in local air
pollution. Thus, although the scenarios
should serve as a useful input to climate-
related decision making, they address only
one of several components of a benefit-
cost analysis of climate policy.
1 Although there are many reasons to expect that the
three reference scenarios would be different, it is worth
noting that the modeling groups met periodically dur-
ing the development of the scenarios to review progress
and to exchange information.  Thus, while not adhering
to any formal protocol of standardization, the three ref-
erence scenarios are not entirely independent.
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that result. However, relating emissions paths to
concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere re-
quires models that account for both anthro-
pogenic and natural sources as well as the sinks
for these substances.
Models that attempt to capture these complex
interactions and feedbacks must, because of
computational limits, use simplified represen-
tations of individual components of the Earth
system. These simplified representations are
typically designed to mimic the behavior of
more complex models but cannot represent all
of the elements of these systems. Thus, while
the scenario research undertaken here uses
models that represent both the anthropogenic
sources (the global energy-industrial-agricultural
economy) and the Earth system processes
(ocean, atmosphere, and terrestrial systems), it
is not intended to supplant detailed analysis of
these systems using full scale, state-of-the-art
models and analytic techniques. Rather, these
scenarios provide a common point of departure
for more complex analyses of individual com-
ponents of the Earth system as it is affected by
human activity. These might include detailed
studies of sub-components of the energy sector,
regional scenarios of climate change using
three-dimensional general circulation models
(GCMs) and further downscaling techniques,
and assessment of the implications of climate
change under various stabilization goals for eco-
nomic activity and natural ecosystems.
The remainder of this chapter is organized into
four sections. Section 1.2 provides an overview
of scientific aspects of the climate issue as
background for interpretation of these scenar-
ios. Section 1.3 then presents the research de-
sign with a focus on the characteristics of the
stabilization scenarios to be investigated in
Chapter 4. Section 1.4 briefly discusses how
scenarios of this type have been used to exam-
ine the climate change issue and the intended
uses and limits of the new scenarios, focusing
on interpretation of these scenarios under con-
ditions of uncertainty. Section 1.5 provides a
guide to the structure of the remaining chapters.
BACKGROUND: HUMAN
ACTIVITIES, EMISSIONS,
CONCENTRATIONS, AND
CLIMATE CHANGE
Materials that influence the Earth’s radiation
balance come in various forms, and most have
natural as well as anthropogenic sources. Some
are gases which remain in the atmosphere from
days to millennia, trapping heat. They are
known as GHGs because, while transparent to
incoming short-wave radiation (the visible spec-
trum that people commonly perceive as light),
they capture and reflect back to Earth long-wave
radiation, thus increasing the temperature of the
lower atmosphere. These naturally occurring
GHGs, plus clouds and water vapor (the most
important GHG of all), are responsible for cre-
ating a habitable climate on Earth. Without
them, the average temperature at the Earth’s sur-
face would be colder than it is today by roughly
55°F (~30°C). 
GHGs are not the only influences on the Earth’s
radiative balance. Other gases such as oxides of
nitrogen (NOx) have no direct greenhouse ef-
fect, but they are components of the atmos-
pheric chemistry that determine the lifetime of
some of the heat-trapping GHGs and are in-
volved in the reactions that produce tropos-
pheric ozone, another GHG. Aerosols
(non-aqueous particles suspended in air) may
have positive or negative effects, depending on
their relative brightness. Some present a white
surface and reflect the sun’s energy back to
space; others are black and absorb solar energy,
adding to the solar warming of the atmosphere.
Aerosols also have an indirect effect on climate
in that they influence the character and lifetime
of clouds, which have a strong influence on the
radiation balance and on precipitation. Humans
also alter the land surface, changing its reflec-
tive properties, and these changes can have cli-
mate consequences with effects most
pronounced at a local scale (e.g., urban heat is-
lands) and regional levels (e.g., large-scale
changes in forest cover). In addition, the climate
itself has positive and negative feedbacks, such
as the decrease in global albedo that would result
from melting land and sea ice or the potential re-
lease of GHGs, such as CH4 from wetlands. 
36
The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 1 - Introduction and Overview
Climate policy concerns are driven by the fact
that emissions from human activities (mainly
combustion of fuels and biomass, industrial ac-
tivities, and agriculture) are increasing the at-
mospheric concentrations of these substances.
Climate policy discussions have focused heav-
ily on CO2, CH4, N2O, and a set of fluorine-con-
taining industrial chemicals – SF6 and two
families of substances that do not exist naturally,
hydrogenated halocarbons (including hy-
drochlorofluorocarbons [HCFCs] and HFCs)2
and PFCs. Some of these substances remain in
the atmosphere for decades (CH4 and most
HFCs), others for about 100 years (CO2 and
N2O), and some for thousands of years (PFCs
and SF6). 
Other naturally occurring substances whose lev-
els have also been greatly enhanced by human
activities remain in the atmosphere for days to
months. With such short lifetimes, they are not
well mixed in the atmosphere, so their effects
have a regional pattern as well as global conse-
quences. These substances include aerosols
such as black carbon and other particulate mat-
ter; sulfur dioxide, which is the main precursor
of the reflecting aerosols; and other gases such
as volatile organic compounds, nitrogen diox-
ide, other oxides of nitrogen, and carbon
monoxide. All are important components of at-
mospheric chemistry. 
This suite of substances with different radiative
potency and different lifetimes in the atmos-
phere presents a challenge in defining what is
meant by atmospheric stabilization. Specifica-
tion in terms of quantities of the substances
themselves is problematic because there is no
simple way to add them together in their natural
units, such as tonnes or ppmv. Thus, a mean-
ingful metric is needed to combine the effects
of different GHGs.
One approach is to define stabilization in terms
of some ultimate climate measure, such as the
change in the global average temperature. One
drawback of such measures is that they interject
large uncertainties into the consideration of sta-
bilization because the ultimate climate system
response to added GHGs is uncertain. Climate
models involve complex and uncertain interac-
tions and feedbacks, such as increasing levels
of water vapor, changes in reflective polar ice,
cloud effects of aerosols, and changes in ocean
circulation that determine the ocean’s uptake of
CO2 and heat. 
For the design of these scenarios, the Prospec-
tus called for an intermediate, less uncertain
measure of climate effect. The Prospectus di-
rected that stabilization “be defined in terms of
the radiative forcing resulting from the long-
term combined effects of carbon dioxide (CO2),
nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4), hydroflu-
orocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs),
and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).” Radiative forc-
ing (Box 1.1) is a measure of the instantaneous
imbalance in the radiative energy budget of the
Earth’s climate system (energy in versus energy
out) resulting from an externally imposed per-
turbation such as increasing GHG concentra-
tions. It is measured in terms of W/m2 at the
Earth’s shell and a positive value means a warm-
ing influence. For these scenarios, radiative
forcing is measured against the concentrations
of the GHGs considered in this research in
preindustrial times, taken to be 1750.
Figure 1.1 shows estimates of how increases in
GHGs, aerosols, and other changes have influ-
enced radiative forcing since 1850. The GHGs
considered in these scenarios are collected in
the left-most bar and together they have had the
biggest effect, with CO2 being the largest of this
group. Increased tropospheric ozone has also
had a substantial warming effect. The reduction
in stratospheric ozone has had a slight cooling
effect. Changes in aerosols have had both
warming and cooling effects. Aerosol effects are
highly uncertain because they depend on the na-
ture of the particles; how the particles are dis-
tributed in the atmosphere; and the
concentrations of the particles, which are not as
well understood as the GHGs. Land-use change
and its effect on the reflectivity of the Earth’s
surface, jet contrails and changes in high-level
(cirrus) clouds, and the natural change in inten-
sity of the sun have also had effects. 
Another important aspect of the climate effects
of these substances, not captured in the W/m2
2 For simplicity, all hydrogenated halocarbons will be
referred to as HFCs in the subsequent text.  The green-
house gas methyl chloroform is often also grouped
along with HFCs and HCFCs.
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measure, is the persistence of their influence on
the radiative balance – a characteristic discussed
in Box 1.2. The W/m2 measure of radiative forc-
ing accounts for only the effect of a concentra-
tion in the atmosphere at a particular instant.
The GHGs considered here have influences that
may last from a decade or two (e.g., the influ-
ence of CH4) to millennia, as noted earlier.
An important difference between GHGs and
most of the other substances in Figure 1.1 is
their long lifetimes. In contrast to GHGs,
Most of the Sun’s energy that reaches the Earth is absorbed by the oceans and land masses and ra-
diated back into the atmosphere in the form of heat or infrared radiation. Some of this infrared en-
ergy is absorbed and re-radiated back to the Earth by atmospheric gases, including water vapor, CO2,
and other substances. As concentrations of GHGs increase, there are direct and indirect effects on
the Earth’s energy balance. The direct effect is often referred to as a radiative forcing, a subset of a
more general set of phenomena referred to as climate forcings. The National Research Council
(NRC 2005) offers the following set of definitions:
Factors that affect climate change are usefully separated into forcings and feedbacks. … A climate forc-
ing is an energy imbalance imposed on the climate system either externally or by human activities. Ex-
amples include changes in solar energy output, volcanic emissions, deliberate land modification, or
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, aerosols, and their precursors. A climate feedback is an
internal climate process that amplifies or dampens the climate response to an initial forcing. An exam-
ple is the increase in atmospheric water vapor that is triggered by an initial warming due to rising car-
bon dioxide (CO2) concentrations, which then acts to amplify the warming through the greenhouse
properties of water vapor. …
Climate forcing: An energy imbalance imposed on the climate system either externally or by human ac-
tivities.
• Direct radiative forcing: A climate forcing that directly affects the radiative budget of the Earth’s
climate system; for example, added carbon dioxide (CO2) absorbs and emits infrared radiation. Di-
rect radiative forcing may be due to a change in concentration of radiatively active gases, a change
in solar radiation reaching the Earth, or changes in surface albedo. Radiative forcing is reported in
the climate change scientific literature as a change in energy flux at the tropopause, calculated in units
of watts per square meter (W/m2); model calculations typically report values in which the stratosphere
was allowed to adjust thermally to the forcing under an assumption of fixed stratospheric dynamics.
• Indirect radiative forcing: A climate forcing that creates a radiative imbalance by first altering
climate system components (e.g., precipitation efficiency of clouds), which then almost immediately
lead to changes in radiative fluxes. Examples include the effect of solar variability on stratospheric
ozone and the modification of cloud properties by aerosols.
• Nonradiative forcing: A climate forcing that creates an energy imbalance that does not imme-
diately involve radiation. An example is the increasing evapotranspiration flux resulting from agricul-
tural irrigation.
For purposes of this report, the radiative forcing stabilization levels are defined in terms of the di-
rect radiative forcing caused by increases from preindustrial concentrations of CO2, CH4, N2O,
PFCs, HFCs, and SF6. The indirect radiative effects are not included in calculating whether the ra-
diative forcing stabilization level levels are met, nor are the direct radiative effects (positive or neg-
ative) of other substances such as ozone, CFCs, or aerosols, although emissions of these substances
and their radiative and climatic effects are part of these integrated system models.
BOX 1.1  Radiative Forcing
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aerosols remain in the atmosphere only for a
few days to a couple of weeks. Once an aerosol
emission source is eliminated, its effect on ra-
diative forcing disappears very quickly. Tropos-
pheric ozone lasts for a few months. Moreover,
relatively short-lived substances are not well
mixed in the atmosphere. Levels are very high
near emissions sources and much lower in other
parts of the world, so their climate effect has a
different spatial pattern than that of long-lived
substances. The regional differences and much
shorter lifetimes of non-GHG substances make
comparisons among them more difficult than
among GHGs. The radiative effects of these
substances also subject to more uncertainty, as
shown in Figure 1.1.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The broad elements of the research design for
these scenarios are set forth in the Prospectus,
including (1) selection of models, (2) guidance
to the modeling groups for development of a
reference scenario, and (3) guidance for the de-
velopment of stabilization scenarios. 
The atmospheric lifetime concept is more appropriate for CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 than it
is for CO2. These non-CO2 gases are destroyed via chemical processes after some time in the at-
mosphere. In contrast, CO2 is constantly cycled between pools in the atmosphere, the surface layer
of the ocean, and vegetation, so it is (for the most part) not destroyed. Very slow processes lead to
some removal of carbon from oceans, vegetation, and the atmosphere as calcium carbonate. Also,
over long geological periods, carbon from vegetation is stored as fossil fuels, which is a permanent
removal process as long as the fossil fuels are not burned to produce energy. 
Although the lifetime concept is not strictly appropriate for CO2 (see Box 2.2 in Chapter 2), the
molecules in a kilogram of emissions can be thought of as residing in the atmosphere, exercising their
radiative effect, for around 100 years. This approximation allows a rough comparison with the other
gases: CH4 at 12 years, N2O at 114 years, and SF6 at 3200 years. HFCs are a family of gases with
varying lifetimes from less than a year to over 200 years; those predominantly in use now have life-
times mostly in the range of 10 to 50 years. Similarly, the PFCs have various lifetimes, ranging from
2,600 to 50,000 years.
The lifetimes are not constant, as they depend to some degree on other Earth system processes.
The lifetime of CH4 is the most affected by the levels of other pollutants in the atmosphere.
BOX 1.2  Atmospheric Lifetimes of Greenhouse Gases
Figure 1.1.
Estimated
Influences of
Atmospheric
Gases on Radiative
Forcing, 1750-
Present. Source:
IPCC 2001
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Model Selection
The Prospectus set forth the model capabilities
required to develop the desired stabilization sce-
narios. As stated in the Prospectus, participat-
ing models must:
1. Be global in scale
2. Be capable of producing global emissions
totals for, at a minimum, CO2, N2O, CH4,
HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 that may serve as in-
puts to global GCMs, such as the National
Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR)
Community Climate System Model and the
Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory
climate model
3. Be capable of simulating the radiative forc-
ing from CO2, N2O, CH4, HFCs, PFCs, 
and SF6
4. Represent multiple regions 
5. Have technological resolution capable of
distinguishing among major sources of pri-
mary energy (e.g., renewable energy, nuclear
energy, biomass, oil, coal, and natural gas)
as well as between fossil fuel technologies
with and without CO2 capture and storage
(CCS) systems
6. Be economics based and capable of simu-
lating macroeconomic cost implications of
stabilization
7. Look forward to the end of the century 
or beyond. 
In addition, the Prospectus required that the
modeling groups have a track record of publi-
cations in professional, refereed journals,
specifically in the use of their models for the
analysis of long-term GHG emission scenarios.
Selection by these criteria led to the three mod-
els used in this research: (1) The Integrated
Global Systems Model (IGSM) of the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology’s Joint Program
on the Science and Policy of Global Change; (2)
the Model for Evaluating the Regional and
Global Effects of GHG reduction policies
(MERGE), developed jointly at Stanford Uni-
versity and the Electric Power Research Institute;
and (3) the MiniCAM Model of the Joint Global
Change Research Institute, which is a partner-
ship between the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory and the University of Maryland. 
Each of these models has been used extensively
for climate change analysis. The roots of each
extend back more than a decade, during which
time features and details have been added.
Analyses using each have appeared widely in
peer-reviewed publications. The features of the
models are described in Chapter 2 with refer-
ences to publications and reports that provide
complete documentation.
These models fall into a class that has come to
be known as Integrated Assessment Models
(IAMs). There are many ways to define IAMs
and to characterize the motivations for develop-
ing them (IPCC 1996). A particularly appropri-
ate definition of their primary purposes,
provided by Parson and Fisher-Vanden (1997),
is “evaluating potential responses to climate
change, structuring knowledge and characteriz-
ing uncertainty, contributing to broad compara-
tive risk assessments, and contributing to
scientific research.”  
Development of Reference
Scenarios
As required by the Prospectus, each participat-
ing modeling group first produced a reference
scenario that assumes no policies specifically
intended to address climate change beyond im-
plementation of any existing policies to the end
of their commitment periods, including the
Kyoto Protocol and the policy of the U.S. to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions intensity by
18% by 2012. For purposes of the reference sce-
nario (and for each of the stabilization scenar-
ios), it was assumed that these policies are
successfully implemented through 2012 and
their goals are achieved. (This assumption could
only be approximated within the models be-
cause their time steps did not coincide exactly
with the period from 2002 to 2012. However,
such approximation is a minor consideration as
slight differences in emissions for a few years
have little impact on long term concentrations.)
As directed by the Prospectus, after 2012 these
existing climate policies expire and are not re-
newed or replaced. This is not a prediction or a
best-judgment forecast, but a scenario designed
to provide a clearly defined point of departure
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for illuminating the implications of alternative
stabilization goals. The paths toward stabiliza-
tion are implemented to start after 2012 as dis-
cussed further in the following section. The
reference scenarios and assumptions underlying
them are detailed in Chapter 3.
The reference scenarios serve two main pur-
poses. First, they provide insight into how the
world might evolve without additional efforts to
constrain GHG emissions, given various as-
sumptions about principal drivers of the econ-
omy, energy use, and emissions. These
assumptions include those concerning popula-
tion increase, land and labor productivity
growth, technological options, and resource en-
dowments. These forces govern the supply and
demand for energy, industrial goods, and agri-
cultural products – the production and con-
sumption activities that lead to GHG emissions.
The reference scenarios are a thought experi-
ment in that they assume that even as emissions
increase and climate changes nothing is done to
reduce emissions. The specific levels of GHG
emissions and concentrations are not predeter-
mined but result from the combination of as-
sumptions made.
Second, the reference scenarios serve as points
of departure for analysis of the changes brought
about by stabilization of radiative forcing, and
the underlying assumptions have a large bear-
ing on the characteristics of the stabilization
scenarios. For example, all other things being
equal, the lower the economic growth and the
higher the availability and competitiveness of
low-carbon energy technologies in the reference
scenario, the lower will be the GHG emissions
and the easier it will be to reach stabilization.
On the other hand, if a reference scenario as-
sumes that fossil fuels are abundant, and fossil
fuel technologies will become cheaper over time
while low- or zero-carbon alternatives remain
expensive, the scenario will show consumers
having little reason to conserve, adopt more ef-
ficient energy equipment, or switch to non-fos-
sil sources. Under such a reference scenario,
emissions will grow rapidly, and stronger eco-
nomic incentives will be required to achieve sta-
bilization.
Finally, the Prospectus specified that the model-
ing groups develop their reference scenarios in-
dependently3, applying meaningful and plausible
assumptions for key drivers.  Similarities and dif-
ferences among the reference scenarios are use-
ful in illustrating the uncertainty inherent in
long-run treatment of the climate challenge. At
the same time, with only three participating mod-
els, the range of scenario assumptions produced
does not span the full range of possibilities.
Development of the Stabilization
Scenarios
Although the model groups were required to in-
dependently develop their modeling assump-
tions, the Prospectus specified that a common
set of four stabilization targets be used across
the participating models. Also, whereas much
of the literature on atmospheric stabilization fo-
cuses on concentrations of CO2 only, an impor-
tant objective of this research was to expand the
range of coverage to include other GHGs. Thus,
the Prospectus required that the stabilization
levels be defined in terms of the combined ef-
fects of CO2, N2O, CH4, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6.
This suite of GHGs forms the basis for the U.S.
GHG-intensity-reduction policy, announced by
the President on February 14, 2002; it is the
same set subject to control under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. These gases are included in the left-most
bar of Figure 1.1. The stabilization targets spec-
ified in the Prospectus explicitly omit the
aerosol, ozone, land surface, and other effects
shown in Figure 1.1, which may be influenced
by measures taken to achieve the stabilization
goal. Table 1.1 shows the change in concentra-
tion levels for these gases from 1750 to 2000.
The left-most bar in Figure 1.1 shows radiative
forcing of roughly 2.4 W/m2 compared with a
sum of 2.1 W/m2 in Table 1.1. The difference
exists because Figure 1.1 includes roughly 0.3
W/m2 of forcing from chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) not in Table 1.1. CFCs, important in the
historical data, are already being phased out
under the Montreal Protocol because of their
stratospheric ozone-depleting properties, so
they are not expected to be a significant source
of additional increased forcing in the future. The
HFCs, which do not contribute to stratospheric
ozone depletion, were developed as substitutes
3 See footnote 1.
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for the CFCs, but are of concern because of
their radiative properties. Table 1.2 shows the
specific radiative forcing targets chosen.
As noted earlier, the Prospectus instructed that
the stabilization levels be constructed so that the
CO2 concentrations resulting from stabilization
of total radiative forcing, after accounting for
radiative forcing from the non-CO2 GHGs,
would be roughly 450 ppmv, 550 ppmv, 650
ppmv, and 750 ppmv. This correspondence was
achieved by (1) calculating the increased radia-
tive forcing from CO2 at each of these concen-
trations, (2) adding to that amount the radiative
forcing from the non-CO2 gases from 1750 to
present, and (3) adding an estimate of the
change in radiative forcing from the non-CO2
GHGs under each of the stabilization levels.
Each of the models represents the emissions and
abatement opportunities of the non-CO2 gases
somewhat differently and takes a different ap-
proach to representation of the tradeoffs among
them, so an exact correspondence between over-
all radiative forcing and CO2 levels that would
fit all three models was not possible. 
The Prospectus also specified that, beyond the
implementation of any existing policies, the sta-
bilization scenarios should be based on univer-
sal participation by the world’s nations. This
guidance was implemented by assuming a cli-
mate regime with simultaneous global partici-
pation in emissions mitigation and in which the
marginal costs of emission controls are equal-
ized across countries and regions. Under this as-
sumption, known as where flexibility, emissions
will be reduced where it is cheapest to do so re-
gardless of their geographical location. One im-
portant implication of this assumption is that the
stabilization scenarios produce estimates of sta-
bilization costs that are systematically lower
than what might be expected in a world in which
some major countries remain out of an emis-
sions mitigation regime for an extended period
of time, some economies use more costly regu-
latory mechanisms, or emissions mitigation
regimes within nations are incomplete either in
terms of GHG or sectoral coverage. On the
other hand, possible ancillary benefits, tax in-
teraction effects, or effects of carbon policies on
technical change were not considered, which in
Table 1.1. Greenhouse
Gas Concentrations
and Forcing. 
Concentrations of GHGs
have increased since 1750
(preindustrial), altering the
radiative energy budget of
the Earth’s climate system.
Preindustrial
Concentration
(1750)
Current
Concentration
(1998)
Contribution to
Radiative Forcing,
(W/m2, 1750 to 1998)
CO2 278 ppmv 365 ppmv 1.46
CH4 700 ppbv 1745 ppbv 0.48
N2O 270 ppbv 314 ppbv 0.15
HFCs, PFCs, SF6 0 various ≈ 0.02 
Total — — ≈ 2.1
Source: IPCC 2001.
Total 
Radiative
Forcing from
GHGs (W/m2)
Approximate
Contribution to
Radiative Forcing
from non-CO2
GHGs (W/m2)
Approximate
Contribution to
Radiative Forcing
from CO2 (W/m2)
Corresponding
CO2
Concentration
(ppmv)
Level 1 3.4 0.8 2.6 450
Level 2 4.7 1.0 3.7 550
Level 3 5.8 1.3 4.5 650
Level 4 6.7 1.4 5.3 750
Year 1998 ≈ 2.1 0.65 1.46 365
Preindustrial
(1750) — — — 278
Table 1.2. Radiative
Forcing Stabilization
Levels (W/m2) and
Approximate CO2
Concentrations
(ppmv).  The radiative
forcing levels were
constructed so that the CO2
concentrations resulting from
stabilization of total radiative
forcing, after accounting for
radiative forcing from the
non-CO2 GHGs, would be
roughly 450 ppmv, 550 ppmv,
650 ppmv, and 750 ppmv.
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some cases can lower costs. These issues are
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
In addition, the Prospectus required that stabi-
lization be defined as long term. Because of the
inertia in the Earth system, largely attributable
to the ocean, perturbations to the climate and at-
mosphere have effects for thousands of years.
Economic models have little credibility over
such timeframes. The Prospectus, therefore, in-
structed that the participating modeling groups
report scenario information only up through
2100. Each group then had to address how to
relate the level in 2100 to the long-term goal.
The chosen approaches were generally similar,
but with some differences in implementation.
This and other details of the stabilization sce-
nario design are addressed more completely in
Chapter 4. 
INTERPRETING SCENARIOS:
USES, LIMITS, AND
UNCERTAINTY
Emissions scenarios have proven to be useful
aids to understanding climate change, and there
is a long history of their use (see Box 1.3). Sce-
narios are descriptions of future conditions,
often constructed by asking what if questions,
such as what if events were to unfold in a par-
ticular way?  Informal scenario analysis is part of
almost all decision making. For example, fami-
lies making decisions about big purchases, such
as a car or a house, might plausibly construct a
scenario in which changes in employment forces
them to move. Scenarios addressing major pub-
lic-policy questions perform the same purpose,
helping decision makers and the public to un-
derstand the consequences of actions today in
the light of plausible future developments. 
Models assist in creating scenarios by showing
how assumptions about key drivers, such as
economic and population growth or policy op-
Emissions scenarios that describe future economic growth and energy use have been important
tools for understanding the long-term consequences of climate change. They were used in assess-
ments by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in 1983 and by the Department of Energy in 1985
(NAS 1983, US DOE 1985). Previous emissions scenarios have evolved from simple projections
that extrapolated a 1% per year increase in CO2 emissions to scenarios that incorporate assump-
tions about population, economic growth, energy supply, and controls on GHG emissions and CFCs
(Leggett et al. 1992, Pepper et al. 1992). They played an important role in the reports of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 1991, IPCC 1992, IPCC 1996). The IPCC Special Re-
port on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (Nakicenovic et al. 2000) was the most recent major effort
undertaken by the IPCC to expand and update earlier scenarios. This set of scenarios was based
on storylines of alternative futures, updated with regard to the variables used in previous scenar-
ios and with additional detail on technological change and land use. 
The Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) has been an important venue for intercomparison of emissions
scenarios and IAMs. The EMF, managed at Stanford University, includes participants from academic,
government, and other modeling groups from around the world. It has served this role for the en-
ergy-modeling community since the 1970s. Individual EMF studies run over a course of about two
years, with scenarios designed by the participants to provide insight into the behavior of the par-
ticipating models. Scenarios are often published in the peer-reviewed literature. A recent study, EMF
21, focused on multi-gas stabilization scenarios (de la Chesnaye and Weyant 2006). 
BOX 1.3  Emissions Scenarios and Climate Change
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tions, lead to particular levels of GHG emis-
sions. Model-based scenario analysis is de-
signed to provide quantitative estimates of
multiple outcomes and to assure consistency
among them that is difficult to achieve without
a formal structure. Thus, a main benefit of such
model simulation of scenarios is that they en-
sure basic accounting identities: the quantity de-
manded of fuel is equal to the quantity supplied,
imports in one region are balanced by exports
from other regions, cumulative fuel used does
not exceed estimates of the available resources,
and expenditures for goods and services do not
exceed income. The approach complements
other ways of thinking about the future, ranging
from formal uncertainty analysis to narratives.
Also, such model analyses offer a set of macro-
scenarios that users can build on, adding more
detailed assumptions about variables and deci-
sions of interest to them. 
The possible users of these scenarios are many
and diverse, and a single scenario research prod-
uct cannot hope to provide the details needed by
all potential users or to address their specific
questions. Thus, these scenarios are an initial set
offered to potential user communities. If suc-
cessful, they will generate further questions and
the demand for more detailed analysis, some of
which might be satisfied by further scenario de-
velopment from models like those used here,
but more often demanding detail that can only
be provided with other modeling and analysis
techniques. As such, this effort is one step 
in an ongoing and iterative process of producing
and refining climate-related scenarios and sce-
nario tools. 
Although the required long-term perspective de-
mands scenarios that stretch into the distant fu-
ture, any such scenarios carry with them
considerable uncertainty. Inevitably, the future
will hold surprises. Scientific advances will be
made, new technologies will be developed, and
the direction of the economy will change, mak-
ing it necessary to reassess the issues examined
here. The Prospectus called for development of a
limited number of scenarios, without a formal
treatment of likelihood or uncertainty, requiring
as noted earlier, only that the modeling groups
use assumptions that they believe to be mean-
ingful and plausible. Formal uncertainty analysis
has much to offer and could be a useful addi-
tional follow-on or complementary research task.
Here, however, the range of outcomes from the
different modeling groups help to illustrate, if in-
completely, the range of possibilities.
The scenarios developed here take the best in-
formation available now and assess what it may
mean for the future. Any such research, however,
will necessarily be incomplete and will not fore-
see all possible future developments. The best
planning must prepare for changes in course later
as new information becomes available.
REPORT OUTLINE
Chapter 2 of this report provides an overview of
the three models used in development of the
scenarios. Chapter 3 describes the assumptions
about key drivers in each of the models and re-
ports the reference scenarios. Chapter 4 pro-
vides greater detail on the design of the
stabilization scenarios and then presents these
scenarios. Chapter 5 provides concluding ob-
servations, including possible avenues for addi-
tional research.
The chapters seek to show how the models and
the assumptions used by the modeling groups
to develop the scenarios differ and, to the degree
possible, to relate where these differences mat-
ter and how they shape the scenarios. The mod-
els have their own respective areas of focus, and
each offers its own reasonable representation of
the world. The authors have distilled general
conclusions common to the scenarios generated
by the three modeling groups, while recognizing
that other plausible representations could well
lead to quite different scenarios. The scenarios
are presented primarily in the figures. Associ-
ated with the report is a database with quantita-
tive information available for those who wish to
further analyze and use these scenarios. A de-
scription of the database, directions for use, and
its location can be found in the appendix.
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OVERVIEW OF THE MODELS
The computer models used in this research are referred to as integrated assessment models be-
cause they combine, in an integrated framework, the socioeconomic and physical processes and
systems that define the human influence on, and interactions with, the global climate. They inte-
grate computer models of socioeconomic and technological determinants of the emissions of
GHGs and other substances influencing the Earth’s radiation balance with models of the natural
science of Earth system response, including those of the atmosphere, oceans, and terrestrial bios-
phere.  Although they differ in their specific design objectives and details of their mathematical
structures, each of these IAMs was developed for the purpose of gaining insight into economic
and policy issues associated with global climate change.
To create scenarios of sufficient depth, scope, and detail, a number of model characteristics were
deemed critical for development of these scenarios. The criteria set forth in the Prospectus for
this research led to the selection of three IAMs: IGSM, MERGE, and MiniCAM. These three are
among the most detailed models of this type of IAM, and each a has long history of development
and application.
• IGSM of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Joint Program on the Science and Policy
of Global Change is an Earth system model that comprises a multi-sector, multi-region eco-
nomic component and a science component, including a two-dimensional atmosphere, a three-
dimensional ocean, and a detailed biogeochemical model of the terrestrial biosphere (Sokolov
et al. 2005). Because this research focuses on new emissions scenarios, elements of the scenar-
ios emerging from the economic model component of IGSM, the Emissions Prediction and Pol-
icy Analysis (EPPA) model (Paltsev et al. 2005), are featured in the discussion below. EPPA is
a recursive-dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the world economy and
greenhouse-relevant emissions, solved on a five-year time step. Previous applications of IGSM
and its EPPA component system can be found at http://web.mit.edu/globalchange. 
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• MERGE was developed jointly at Stanford
University and the Electric Power Research
Institute (Manne and Richels 2005). It is an
inter-temporal general equilibrium model of
the global economy in which the world is di-
vided into nine geopolitical regions. It is
solved on a ten-year time step. MERGE is a
hybrid model, combining a bottom-up rep-
resentation of the energy supply sector with
a top-down perspective on the remainder of
the economy.1 Savings and investment de-
cisions are modeled as if each region
maximizes the discounted utility of its
consumption, subject to an inter-temporal
wealth constraint. Embedded within this
structure is a reduced-form representation of
the physical Earth system. MERGE has
been used to explore a range of climate-re-
lated issues, including multi-gas strategies,
the value of low-carbon-emitting energy
technologies, the choice of near-term hedg-
ing strategies under uncertainty, the impacts
of learning-by-doing, and the potential im-
portance of when and where flexibility. To
support this scenario research, the multi-gas
version has been revised by adjustments in
technology and other assumptions. The
MERGE code and publications describing
its structure and applications can be found
at http://www.stanford.edu/group/MERGE/. 
• MiniCAM is an integrated assessment
model (Brenkert et al. 2003) that combines
a technologically detailed global energy-
economy-agricultural-land-use model with
a suite of coupled gas-cycle, climate, and
ice-melt models, integrated in the Model for
the Assessment of Greenhouse-Gas Induced
Climate Change (MAGICC). MiniCAM
was developed and is maintained at the Joint
Global Change Research Institute, a part-
nership between the Pacific Northwest Na-
tional Laboratory and the University of
Maryland, while MAGICC was developed
and is maintained at NCAR. MiniCAM is
solved on a 15-year time step. MiniCAM
has been used extensively for energy, cli-
mate, and other environmental analyses con-
ducted for organizations that include the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, the
IPCC, and several major private sector en-
ergy companies. Its energy sector is based
on a model developed by Edmonds and
Reilly (1985). The model is designed to ex-
amine long-term, large-scale changes in
global and regional energy systems, focus-
ing on the impact of energy technologies.
Documentation for MiniCAM can be found
in Brenkert et al. (2003). 
Because these models were designed to address
an overlapping set of climate change issues,
they are similar in many respects. All three have
social science-based components that capture
the socioeconomic and technology interactions
underlying the emissions of GHGs, and each in-
corporates models of physical cycles for GHGs
and other radiatively important substances and
other aspects of the natural science of global cli-
mate. The differences among them lie in the de-
tail and construction of these components and
in the ways they are modeled to interact. Each
was designed with somewhat different aspects
of the climate issue as a main focus. IGSM in-
cludes the most detailed representation of the
chemistry, physics, and biology of the atmos-
phere, oceans, and terrestrial biosphere; thus, its
EPPA component is designed to provide the
emissions detail that these natural science com-
ponents require. MERGE has its origins in an
energy-sector model that was initially designed
for energy technology assessment. It was sub-
sequently modified to explore the influence of
expectations (and uncertainty regarding expec-
tations) about future climate policy on the eco-
nomics of current investment and the
cost-minimizing allocation of emissions miti-
gation over time. Its focus requires a forward-
looking structure, which in turn employs
simplified non-energy components of the econ-
omy. MiniCAM is a technology-rich IAM. It
features detailed representations of energy tech-
nologies, energy systems, and energy markets
and their interactions with demographics, the
economy, agricultural technologies, markets,
land use, and the terrestrial carbon cycle.
Each of these IAMs has unique strengths and
areas of special insight. In this research, the si-
multaneous application of different model struc-
tures is useful in revealing different aspects of
the task of stabilizing radiative forcing. The dif-
ferences among the scenarios prepared by the
1 It differs from the pure bottom-up approach described
in Box 2.1 in that demands for energy are price re-
sponsive.
47
Scenarios of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Atmospheric Concentrations
three modeling groups, presented in Chapters 3
and 4, are an indication of the limits of the
knowledge about future GHG emissions and the
challenges in stabilizing atmospheric condi-
tions. Indeed, differences among the emissions
characteristics of the reference scenarios and in
the implications of various stabilization targets
are likely within the range that would be real-
ized from an uncertainty analysis applied to any
one of the three, as indicated by the analysis of
the IGSM model by Webster et al. (2003).
Table 2.1 provides a cross-model overview of
some of the key characteristics to be compared
in the following sections of this chapter. Section
2.2 focuses on social science components, de-
scribing similarities and differences and high-
lighting the assumptions that have the greatest
influences on the scenarios. Section 2.3 does the
same for the natural science sub-models of each
IAM, which in this research make the connec-
tion between the emissions of GHGs and the re-
sulting atmospheric conditions.
Feature
IGSM 
(with EPPA Economics
Component)
MERGE MiniCAM
Regions 16 9 14
Time Horizon, 
Time Steps 2100, 5-year steps 2200, 10-year steps 2095, 15-year steps
Model Structure General equilibrium General equilibrium Partial equilibrium
Solution Recursive dynamic Inter-temporal optimization Recursive dynamic
Final Energy 
Demand Sectors 
in Each Region
Households, private
transportation, commercial
transportation, service sector,
agriculture, energy intensive
industries, and other industry
A single, non-energy production
sector
Buildings, transportation, and
industry (including agriculture) 
Capital Turnover Five vintages of capital with adepreciation rate
A putty clay approach wherein
the input-output coefficients 
for each cohort are optimally
adjusted to the future
trajectory of prices at the 
time of investment
Vintages with constant
depreciation rate for all
electricity-sector capital;
capital structure not explicitly
modeled in other sectors
Goods in 
International Trade
All energy and non-energy
goods as well as emissions
permits
Energy, energy intensive
industry goods, emissions
permits, and representative
tradable goods 
Oil, coal, natural gas, biomass,
agricultural goods, and
emissions permits  
Emissions
CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs,
SF6, CO, NOX, SOX, NMVOCs,
BC, OC, NH3
CO2, CH4, N2O, long-lived 
F-gases, short-lived F-gases, 
and SOX
CO2, CH4, N2O, CO, NOX,
SO2, NMVOCs, BC, OC,
HFC245fa, HFC134a, HFC125,
HFC143a, SF6, C2F6, and CF4
Land Use
Agriculture (crops, livestock,
and forests), biomass land use,
and land use for wind and/or
solar energy
Reduced-form emissions from
land-use; no explicit land use
sector; assume no net
terrestrial emissions of CO2
Agriculture (crops, pasture,
and forests) as well as biomass
land use and unmanaged land;
the agriculture-land-use
module directly determines
land-use change emissions and
terrestrial carbon stocks.
Population Exogenous Exogenous Exogenous
Table 2.1. Characteristics of the Models 
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Table 2.1 Characteristics of the Models, continued 
Feature
IGSM 
(with EPPA Economics
Component)
MERGE MiniCAM
GDP Growth
Exogenous productivity
growth assumptions for labor,
energy, and land;  exogenous
labor force growth determined
from population growth;
endogenous capital growth
through savings and investment
Exogenous productivity growth
assumptions for labor and
energy;  exogenous labor force
growth determined from
population growth;  endogenous
capital growth through savings
and investment 
Exogenous productivity
growth assumptions for labor;
exogenous labor force growth
based on population
demographics
Energy Efficiency Change Exogenous Proportional to the rate ofGDP growth in each region Exogenous
Energy Resources
Oil (including tar sands), shale
oil, gas, coal, wind and/or solar,
land (biomass), hydro, and
nuclear fuel
Conventional oil,
unconventional oil (coal-based
synthetics, tar sands, and shale
oil), gas, coal, wind, solar,
biomass, hydro, and nuclear fuel
Conventional oil,
unconventional oil (including
tar sands and shale oil), gas,
coal, wind, solar, biomass
(waste and/or residues and
crops), hydro, and nuclear fuel
(uranium and thorium);
includes a full representation
of the nuclear fuel cycle
Electricity 
Technologies
Conventional fossil (coal, gas,
and oil), nuclear, hydro, natural
gas combined cycle (NGCC)
with and without capture,
integrated coal gasification
with capture, and wind and/or
solar, biomass
Conventional fossil (coal, gas,
and oil), nuclear, hydro, new coal
and gas with and without CCS,
other renewables.
Conventional fossil (coal, gas,
and oil) with and without
capture; integrated gasification
combined cycles (IGCCs) with
and without capture;  NGCC
with and without capture; Gen
II, III, and IV reactors and
associated fuel cycles; hydro,
wind, solar, and biomass
(traditional and modern
commercial)
Conversion 
Technologies
Oil refining, coal gasification,
and bio-liquids
Oil refining, coal gasification 
and liquefaction, bio-liquids, 
and electrolysis
Oil refining, natural gas
processing, natural gas to
liquids conversion, coal, and
biomass conversion to
synthetic liquids and gases;
hydrogen production using
liquids, natural gas, coal,
biomass; and electrolysis,
including direct production
from wind and solar, and
nuclear thermal conversion
Atmosphere-Ocean 
2-dimensional atmosphere
with a 3-dimensional ocean
general circulation model,
resolved at 20 minute time
steps, 4º latitude, 4 surface
types, and 12 vertical layers in
the atmosphere
Parameterized ocean 
thermal lag
Global multi-box energy
balance model with upwelling-
diffusion ocean heat transport
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SOCIOECONOMIC AND
TECHNOLOGY COMPONENTS 
Equilibrium, Expectations, and Trade
As can be seen in Table 2.1, the three partici-
pating models represent economic activity and
associated emissions in a similar way; each di-
vides the world economy into several regions,
and further divides each region into economic
sectors. In all three, the greatest degree of dis-
aggregation is applied to the various compo-
nents of energy supply and demand. 
The models differ, however, in their representa-
tions of the equilibrium structure, the role of fu-
ture expectations, and in the goods and services
traded. MERGE and the EPPA component of
IGSM are CGE models, which solve for a con-
sistent set of supply-demand and price equilib-
ria for each good and factor of production that
is distinguished in the analysis. In the process,
CGE models ensure a balance in each period of
income and expenditure and of savings and in-
vestment for the economy, and they maintain a
balance in international trade in goods and
emissions permits. MiniCAM is a partial-equi-
librium model, solving for supply-demand and
price equilibria within linked energy and agri-
cultural markets. Other economic sectors that
influence the demand for energy and agricul-
tural products and the costs of factors of pro-
duction in these sectors are represented through
exogenous assumptions.
The models also differ in how expectations
about the future affect current decisions. The
EPPA component of IGSM and MiniCAM are
recursive-dynamic, meaning they are solved one
period at a time with economic agents modeled
as responding to conditions in that period. This
behavior is also referred to as myopic because
these agents do not consider expected future
market conditions in their decisions. The un-
derlying behavioral assumption is that con-
sumers and producers maximize their individual
utilities or profits. In MiniCAM, this process is
captured through the use of demand and supply
functions that evolve over time as a function of
evolving economic activity and regional eco-
nomic development. In IGSM, explicit repre-
sentative-agent utility and sector production
functions ensure that consumer and producer
decisions are consistent with welfare and profit
maximization. In both of these models, the pat-
terns of emissions mitigation over time in the
scenarios that stabilize radiative forcing are im-
posed through assumptions intended to capture
the features of a strategy that, as explained in
Section 2.4, would be cost efficient. MERGE,
Table 2.1 Characteristics of the Models, continued 
Feature
IGSM 
(with EPPA Economics
Component)
MERGE MiniCAM
Carbon Cycle
Biogeochemical models of
terrestrial and ocean
processes; depends on climate
and/or atmospheric conditions
with 35 terrestrial ecosystem
types
Convolution ocean carbon
cycle model assuming a neutral
biosphere
Globally balanced carbon-cycle
with separate ocean and
terrestrial components, with
terrestrial response to land-
use changes
Natural Emissions
CH4, N2O, and weather and/or
climate dependent as part of
biogeochemical process
models
Fixed natural emissions 
over time
Fixed natural emissions over
time
Atmospheric fate of GHGs,
pollutants
Process models of
atmospheric chemistry
resolved for urban and
background conditions
Single box models with fixed
decay rates. No consideration
of reactive gases
Reduced form models for
reactive gases and their
interactions
Radiation Code
Radiation code accounting for
all significant GHGs and
aerosols
Reduced form, top-of-the-
atmosphere forcing
Reduced form and top-of-the-
atmosphere forcing; including
indirect forcing effects
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on the other hand, is an inter-temporal opti-
mization model, meaning that all periods are
solved simultaneously such that resources and
mitigation effort are allocated optimally over
time as well as among sectors. Inter-temporal
models of this type are often referred to as for-
ward-looking or perfect foresight models be-
cause actors in the economy base current
decisions not only on current conditions but on
future ones, which are assumed to be known
with certainty. Simultaneous solution of all pe-
riods ensures that agents’ expectations about the
future are realized in the model solution.
MERGE’s forward-looking structure allows it
to explicitly solve for cost-minimizing emis-
sions pathways, in contrast to MiniCAM and
IGSM, which exogenously prescribe emissions
mitigation policies over time.
Although all three models also represent inter-
national trade in goods and services and include
exchange in emissions permits, they differ in the
combinations of goods and services traded. In
IGSM, all goods and services represented in the
model are traded, with electricity trade limited
to geographically contiguous regions to the ex-
tent that it occurs in the base data. MiniCAM
models international trade in oil, coal, natural
gas, agricultural goods, and emission permits.
MERGE models trade in oil and natural gas,
emissions permits, energy-intensive industrial
goods, and a single non-energy good represent-
ing all other tradable goods and services.
Population and Economic Growth
An increase in the overall scale of economic ac-
tivity is among the most important drivers of
GHG emissions. However, economic growth
depends, in part, on growth in population, which
in all three models is an exogenously determined
input. Although economic activity is an output of
the models, its level is largely determined by as-
sumptions about labor productivity and labor
force growth, which are also model inputs. Poli-
cies to reduce emissions below those in the ref-
erence scenarios also affect economic activity,
which may be measured as changes in gross do-
mestic product (GDP) or in national consump-
tion. (See Chapter 4, which provides a discussion
of the interpretation and limitations of GDP and
other welfare measures.) 
In MiniCAM, labor productivity and growth in
the labor force are the main drivers of GDP
growth. GDP is calculated as the product of
labor force and average labor productivity mod-
ified by an energy-service cost feedback elas-
ticity. The labor force and labor productivity are
both exogenous inputs to MiniCAM, but were
developed for these scenarios from detailed de-
mographic analysis. Starting with the underly-
ing population scenario, the labor force was
estimated from age- and gender-specific labor
force participation rates applied to the relevant
cohorts, then summed and adjusted by a fixed
unemployment rate. Trends were explicitly con-
sidered, such as the increasing rate of labor
force participation by females in the U.S. econ-
omy, the aging of the baby boomers, and evolv-
ing labor participation rates in older cohorts,
reflecting the consequences of changing health
and survival rates. Labor force productivity
growth rates vary over time and across region
to represent these evolving demographics.
In MERGE and the EPPA component of IGSM,
the labor force and its productivity, while ex-
tremely important, are not the only factors de-
termining GDP. Savings and investment and
productivity growth in other factors (e.g., materi-
als, land, labor, and energy) variously contribute
as well. IGSM and MERGE use population di-
rectly as a measure of the labor force and apply
assumptions about labor productivity change that
are appropriate for that definition.
Energy Demand
In all three models, energy demands are repre-
sented regionally and driven by regional eco-
nomic activity. As a region’s economic activity
increases, its corresponding demand for energy
services rises. Energy demand is also affected
by assumptions about changes in technology, in
the structure of the economy, and in other eco-
nomic conditions (see Section 2.2.5). Similarly,
all the models represent the way demand will
respond to changes in price. The formulation of
price response is particularly important in the
construction of stabilization scenarios because
the imposition of a constraint on carbon emis-
sions will require the use of more expensive en-
ergy sources with lower emissions and will,
therefore, raise the consumer price of all forms
of energy.
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The demand for energy is derived from de-
mands for other goods and services in all three
IAMs. However, the models differ in the way
they derive their energy demands. In IGSM
each good- or service-producing sector de-
mands energy. The production sector is an
input-output structure in which every industry
(including the energy sector) supplies its out-
puts as inputs to intermediate production in
other industries and for final consumption.
Households have separate demands for auto-
mobile fuel and for all other energy services.
Each final demand sector can use electricity,
liquid fuels (petroleum products or biomass liq-
uids), gas, and coal; fuel for automobiles is lim-
ited to liquids. MiniCAM is similar in that each
MiniCAM sector demands energy. Energy is
demanded by both final consumers and trans-
forming sectors. In MiniCAM, there are three
final energy consumption sectors – buildings,
industry, and transport – which consume elec-
tricity and energy products such as coal, bio-
mass, refined liquid fuels, methane, and
hydrogen. In addition, energy is demanded by
energy-producing and refining sectors, power
generators, and hydrogen producers, whose de-
mands in turn are derived from the demands
arising in the final energy consumption sectors.
MERGE is similar to IGSM except that its inter-
industry transactions are aggregated into a sin-
gle, non-energy-production sector for each
region from which demands for fuels (oil, gas,
coal, and bioenergy) and electricity are derived.
The power generation sector’s demands for en-
ergy are derived from the economy’s demand
for electricity.
Energy Resources
The future availability of energy resources, par-
ticularly of exhaustible fossil fuels, is an im-
portant determinant of energy use and
emissions, so all three of the participating mod-
els provide explicit treatments of the underlying
resource base. All three include empirically
based estimates of in-ground resources of oil,
coal, and natural gas that might ultimately be
available, along with a model of the costs of ex-
traction. The levels of detail in the different
models are shown in Table 2.1. Each of the
models includes both conventional and uncon-
ventional sources in its resource base and rep-
resents the process of exhaustion of resources
by an increasing cost of exploitation. That is,
lower-cost resources are utilized first so that the
costs of extraction rise as the resources are de-
pleted. The models differ, however, in the way
they represent the increasing costs of extraction.
MiniCAM divides the resource base for each
fossil fuel into discrete grades with increasing
costs of extraction, along with an exogenous
technological change parameter that lowers ex-
traction costs over time. MERGE has similar
differential grades for oil and gas, but assumes
that the coal base is more than sufficient to meet
potential demand and that exogenous techno-
logical improvements in extraction will be min-
imal. For these reasons, MERGE represents
coal as having a constant cost over time irre-
spective of utilization. IGSM models resource
grades with a continuous function, separately
identifying conventional oil, shale oil, natural
gas, and coal. Fuel-producing sectors are sub-
ject to economy-wide technical progress (e.g.,
increased labor productivity growth), which
partly offsets the rise in extraction costs. The
models all incorporate tar sands and unconven-
tional gas (e.g., tight gas and coal-seam gas) in
the grade structure for oil and natural gas, and
each also includes the potential development of
shale oil. 
The models seek to represent all resources that
could be available as technology and economic
conditions vary over time and across simula-
tions. Thus, they represent conditions under
which currently unused resources could be eco-
nomically exploited due to advances in tech-
nology or higher prices driven by increasing
demands. Generally, then, the modeling groups
define a resource base that is more expansive
than, for example, that of the U.S. Geological
Survey, which estimates technological and eco-
nomic feasibility only at current technology and
prices. However, differences exist in the treat-
ments of potentially available resources. Mini-
CAM includes a detailed representation of the
nuclear power sector, including uranium and
thorium resources; nuclear fuel fabrication; re-
actor technology options; and associated fuel-
cycle cycles, including waste, storage, and 
fuel reprocessing. IGSM and MERGE assume
that the uranium resources used for nuclear
power generation are sufficient to meet likely
use and, therefore, do not explicitly model 
their depletion. 
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The treatment of wind and solar resources also
differs among the models. IGSM represents the
penalty for intermittent supply by modeling
wind and solar as imperfect substitutes for cen-
tral station generation, where the elasticity of
substitution implies a rising cost as these re-
sources supply a larger share of electricity sup-
ply. Land is also an input, and the regional cost
of wind and solar energy is based on estimates
of regional resource availability and quality.
MERGE represents these resources as having a
fixed cost, but it applies upper limits on the pro-
portion of these resources in the electricity sys-
tem, representing limits on the integration of
these resources into the grid. MiniCAM repre-
sents wind and solar technologies as extracting
power from graded, regional, renewable re-
source bases. Variation in resource availability
across diurnal and annual cycles affects market
penetration of these technologies. As wind and
solar technologies achieve larger fractions of the
total power generation system, storage and an-
cillary power production capacity are required,
which in turn affects the cost of power genera-
tion and technology choice.
IGSM and MiniCAM model biomass produc-
tion as competing for agricultural land. In-
creasing production leads to increasing land
rent, representing the scarcity of agricultural
land, and thus, to increasing cost of biomass as
production expands. MiniCAM also has a sep-
arate set of regional supply functions for bio-
mass supplied from waste and residue sources.
In these scenarios, MERGE represents biomass
as a graded resource. Two grades of biomass are
included, with fixed costs for each. The total
supply from the first, less-expensive grade is
limited, but the second, more-expensive grade
is allowed to compete unhindered in the market.
Technology and 
Technological Change
Technology is the broad set of processes cover-
ing know-how, experience, and equipment used
by humans to produce services and transform
resources. In the three models participating in
this scenario, the relationship between things
that are produced and things that are used in the
production process are represented mathemati-
cally. In the jargon of the models, the relation-
ship between things that are produced and
things that are used in the production process is
referred to as a production function.
The three modeling groups differed substan-
tially in their representation of technology de-
pending on their overall design objectives.
Differences also resulted from data limitations
and computational feasibility, which force trade-
offs between the inclusion of engineering detail
and the representation of the interaction among
the segments of a modern economy that deter-
mines supply, demand, and prices (see Box 2.1).
All three of the models applied here follow a hy-
brid approach to the representation of energy
technology, involving substantial detail in some
areas and more aggregate representations in
others, and some of the choices that flow from
the distinct design of each can be seen in Table
2.1. They represent energy demand, as de-
scribed in Section 2.2.3, with the application of
an autonomous energy efficiency improvement
(AEEI) factor to represent non-price-induced
trends in energy use. However, AEEI parameter
values are not directly comparable across the
models because each has a unique representa-
tion of the processes that together explain the
multiple forces that have contributed histori-
cally to changes in the energy intensity of eco-
nomic activity. In IGSM and MERGE, the
AEEI captures non-price changes (including
structural change not accounted for in the mod-
els) that can be energy using rather than energy
saving. MERGE represents the AEEI as a func-
tion of GDP growth in each region. MiniCAM
captures shifts among fuels through differing in-
come elasticities, which change over time, and
separately represents AEEI efficiency gains.
Other areas shown in Table 2.1 where there are
significant differences among the models are in
energy conversion – from fossil fuels or renew-
able sources to electricity and from solid fossil
fuels or biomass to liquid fuels or gas. In IGSM,
discrete energy technologies are represented as
energy supply sectors contained within the
input-output structure of the economy. Those
sources of fuels and electricity that now domi-
nate supply are represented as production func-
tions with the same basic structure as the other
sectors of the economy. Technologies that may
play a large role in the future (e.g., power plants
with CCS or oil from shale) are introduced as
discrete technologies using a production func-
tion structure similar to that for existing pro-
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duction sectors and technologies. They are sub-
ject to economy-wide productivity improve-
ments (e.g., labor, land, and energy
productivity), with the effect on cost depending
on the share of each factor in the technology
production function. MERGE and MiniCAM
also characterize energy-supply technologies in
terms of discrete technologies. In the MERGE
scenarios in this research, technological im-
provements are captured by allowing for the in-
troduction of more advanced technologies in
future periods. In the MiniCAM scenarios, the
cost and performance of technologies are as-
sumed to improve over time, and new technolo-
gies become available in the future. Similar
differences among the models hold for other
conversion technologies, such as coal gasifica-
tion, coal liquefaction, or liquids from biomass.
The entry into the market of new sources and
their levels of production by region are deter-
mined endogenously in all three models and de-
pend on the relative costs of supply. It should be
emphasized that the versions of the models used
in this research do not explicitly represent the
processes of technological change, for example,
public and private R&D, spillovers from inno-
vation in other economic sectors, and learning-
by-doing. A number of recent efforts have 
been made to incorporate such processes and
their effects as an endogenous component of
modeling exercises. In most cases, these stud-
ies have not been applied to models of the com-
plexity needed to meet the requirements of this
scenario product.
Because of the differences in structure among
these models, there is no simple technology-by-
technology comparison of performance and cost
across particular sources of supply or techno-
logical options. This situation exists for a vari-
ety of reasons. First, cost is an output of the
three models and not an input. In the three mod-
els here technologies are defined in many cases
not in terms of some exogenously specified
cost, but rather as a function of inputs whose
prices change across simulations and over time.
The three models differ in many regards. Each
model defines the scope of a technology differ-
ently. Sectoral definitions, technology defini-
The models used in energy and environmental assessments are sometimes classified as either top-
down or bottom-up in structure, a distinction that refers to the way they represent technological
options. A top-down model uses an aggregate representation of how producers and consumers
can substitute non-energy inputs for energy inputs or relatively energy-intensive goods for less en-
ergy-intensive goods. Often, these tradeoffs are represented by aggregate production functions or
by utility functions that describe consumers’ willingness and technical ability to substitute among
goods. 
The bottom-up approach begins with explicit technological options, and fuel substitution or changes
in efficiency occur as a result of discrete changes from one specific technology to another. The bot-
tom-up approach has the advantage of being able to represent explicitly the combination of out-
puts, inputs, and emissions of types of capital equipment used to provide consumer services (e.g.,
a vehicle model or building design) or to perform a particular step in energy supply (e.g., a coal-fired
powerplant or wind turbine). However, a limited number of technologies are often included, which
may not well represent the full set of possible options that exist in practice. Also, in a pure bottom-
up approach, the demands for particular energy services are often characterized as fixed (unre-
sponsive to price), and the prices of inputs such as capital, labor, energy, and materials are exogenous. 
On the other hand, the top-down approach explicitly models demand responsiveness and input
prices, which usually require the use of continuous functions to model at least some parts of the
available technology set. The disadvantage of the latter approach is that production functions of this
form will poorly represent switch points from one technology to another – as from one form of
electric generation to another or from gasoline to biomass blends as vehicle fuel. In practice, the
vast majority of models in use today, including those applied in this scenario, are hybrids in that
they include substantial technological detail in some sectors and more aggregate representa-
tions in others.
BOX 2.1  Top-Down, Bottom-Up, and Hybrid Modeling
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tions, and data sources all vary across the three
models. For example, one model has a service
sector while another has a buildings sector.
There is then, no common definition for tech-
nologies, technology descriptors and hence for a
set of comparable costs. The detailed scenario
documentation for each of the three modeling
groups provides more information about the
technology assumptions employed by three mod-
eling groups. These are documented in Paltsev et
al. (2005) for IGSM and in Clarke et al. (2007)
for MiniCAM. Assumptions for MERGE are in-
cluded in the version of the model posted at
http://www.stanford.edu/group/MERGE.
The influence of differing technology specifi-
cations and assumptions is evident in the sce-
narios discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. For
example, in the absence of efforts to control
GHG emissions, motor fuel is drawn ever more
heavily from high-emitting sources. Oil from
shale comes in under the resource and technol-
ogy assumptions used in the IGSM scenarios,
whereas liquids from coal figure prominently in
the MERGE scenarios, and the MiniCAM sce-
narios include an intermediate mix of both. Fur-
thermore, because each model assumes market
mechanisms operate efficiently, the marginal
cost of reducing GHG emissions – that is the
cost of reducing the last tonne of GHG – is
equal to the price of carbon in every technology
employed in every sector and in every country
of the world. When stabilization conditions are
imposed, CCS takes on a key role in all the sce-
narios over the time period considered in this re-
search. Nuclear power contributes heavily in
MERGE and in MiniCAM scenarios, whereas
the potential role of this technology is overridden
in the IGSM scenarios by an assumption of non-
climate restraints on expansion due to concerns
over issues such as safety, waste, and prolifera-
tion. Finally, although differences in emissions
in the reference scenario contribute to variations
in the difficulty of achieving stabilization, alter-
native assumptions about technological im-
provements also play a prominent role.
Land Use and Land-Use Change
The models used in this research were devel-
oped originally with a focus on energy and fos-
sil carbon emissions. The integration of the
terrestrial biosphere, including human activity,
into the climate system is less highly developed.
Each model represents the global carbon cycle,
including exchanges among the atmosphere,
natural vegetation, and soils; the effects of human
land use and responses to carbon policy; and
feedbacks to the global climate. No model rep-
resents all of these possible responses and inter-
actions, and the level of detail varies substantially
among the models. For example, the models dif-
fer in their handling of natural vegetation and
soils and in their responses to change CO2 con-
centrations and climate. Furthermore, land-use
practices (e.g., low- or no-till agriculture and bio-
mass production) and changes in land use (e.g.,
afforestation, reforestation, or deforestation) that
influence GHG emissions and the sequestration
of carbon in terrestrial systems are handled at dif-
ferent levels of detail. Indeed, improved two-way
linking of global economic and climate analysis
with models of physical land use (land use re-
sponding to climate and economic pressures and
climate responding to changes in the terrestrial
biosphere) is the subject of ongoing research in
these modeling groups.
In IGSM, land is an input to agriculture, bio-
mass production, and wind and/or solar energy
production. Agriculture is a single sector that
aggregates crops, livestock, and forestry. Bio-
mass energy production is modeled as a sepa-
rate sector, which competes with agriculture for
land. Markets for agricultural goods and bio-
mass energy are international, and demand for
these products determines the price of land in
each region and its allocation among uses. In
other sectors, returns to capital include returns
to land, but the land component is not explicitly
identified. Anthropogenic emissions of GHGs
(importantly, CH4 and N2O) are estimated
within IGSM as functions of agricultural activ-
ity and assumed levels of deforestation. The re-
sponse of terrestrial vegetation and soils to
climate change and CO2 increase is captured in
the Earth system component of the model,
which provides a detailed treatment of biogeo-
chemical and land-surface properties of terres-
trial systems. However, the biogeography of
natural ecosystems and human uses remains un-
changed over the simulation period, with the
area of cropland fixed to the pattern of the early
1990s. Balance in the carbon cycle between
ocean uptake, land-use and land-use change,
and anthropogenic emissions is achieved in
55
Scenarios of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Atmospheric Concentrations
IGSM with an adjustment factor to ensure that
the recent trend in atmospheric CO2 increase is
replicated. This adjustment factor is best inter-
preted as what carbon uptake due to forest re-
growth must have been, given the representation
of terrestrial and ocean systems in IGSM. The
need for such an adjustment factor reflects the
continuing scientific uncertainty in the carbon
cycle. In other words, with fossil emissions and
concentrations relatively well known, the total
uptake is known but the partitioning of the up-
take between terrestrial and ocean systems is
uncertain (Sabine et al. 2004). IGSM does not
simulate carbon price-induced changes in car-
bon sequestration (e.g., reforestation and
tillage), and change among land-use types in the
EPPA component of IGSM is not fed to the ter-
restrial biosphere component of the model.
The MERGE modeling group assumed a neu-
tral terrestrial biosphere across all scenarios.
That is, it is assumed that the net CO2  exchange
with the atmosphere by natural ecosystems and
managed systems – the latter including agricul-
ture, deforestation, afforestation, reforestation,
and other land-use change – sums to zero. 
MiniCAM includes a model that allocates the
land area in a region among various components
of human use and unmanaged land – with
changes in allocation over time in relation to in-
come, technology, and prices – and estimates
the CO2 emissions (or sinks) that result. Land
conditions and associated emissions are para-
meterized for a set of regional sub-aggregates.
The supply of primary agricultural production
(four food crop types, pasture, wood, and com-
mercial biomass) is simulated regionally with
competition for a finite land resource based on
the average profit rate for each good potentially
produced in a region. In stabilization scenarios,
the value of carbon stored in the land is added to
this profit, based on the average carbon content
of different land uses in each region. This allows
carbon mitigation policies to explicitly extend
into land and agricultural markets. The model
is solved by clearing a global market for pri-
mary agricultural goods and regional markets
for pasture. The biomass market is cleared with
demand for biomass from the energy compo-
nent of the model. Exogenous assumptions are
made for the rate of intrinsic increase in agri-
cultural productivity, although net productivity
can decrease in the case of expansion of agri-
cultural lands into less productive areas (Sands
and Leimbach 2003). Unmanaged land can be
converted to agro-forestry, which in general
leads to net CO2 emissions from tropical regions
in the early decades. Emissions of non-CO2
GHGs are tied to relevant drivers, for example,
with CH4 from ruminant animals related to beef
production. MiniCAM thus treats the effects on
carbon emissions of gross changes in land use
(e.g., from forests to biomass production) using
an average emission factor for such conversion.
The pricing of carbon stocks in the model pro-
vides a counterbalance to increasing demand for
biomass crops in stabilization scenarios.
Emissions of CO2 and 
Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases
In all three models, the main source of CO2
emissions is fossil fuel combustion, which is
computed on the basis of the carbon content of
each of the underlying resources: oil, natural
gas, and coal. Special adjustments are made to
account for emissions associated with the addi-
tional processing required to convert coal, tar
sands, and shale sources into products equiva-
lent to those from conventional oil. Other in-
dustrial CO2 emissions also are included,
primarily from cement production.
As required for this research, all three models
include representations of emissions and abate-
ment of CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 (plus
aerosols and other substances not considered in
this scenario). The models use somewhat dif-
ferent approaches to represent abatement of
non-CO2 GHGs. IGSM includes the emissions
and abatement possibilities directly in the pro-
duction functions of the sectors that are respon-
sible for emissions of the different gases.
Abatement possibilities are represented by sub-
stitution elasticities in a nested structure that en-
compasses GHG emissions and other inputs,
benchmarked to reflect bottom-up studies of
abatement potential. This construction is paral-
lel to the representation of fossil fuels in pro-
duction functions, where abatement potential is
similarly represented by the substitution elas-
ticity between fossil fuels and other inputs, with
the specific set of substitutions governed by the
nest structure. Abatement opportunities vary by
sector and region.
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In MERGE, CH4 emissions from natural gas use
are tied directly to the level of natural gas con-
sumption, with the emissions rate decreasing
over time to represent reduced leakage during
the transportation process. Non-energy sources
of CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 are based
largely on the guidelines provided by the EMF
Study No. 21 on Multi-Gas Mitigation and Cli-
mate Change (de la Chesnaye and Weyant
2006). The EMF developed baseline projections
from 2000 through 2020. For all gases but N2O
and CO2 , the baseline for beyond 2020 was de-
rived by extrapolation of these estimates. Abate-
ment cost functions – the relationship between
levels of emissions reductions and the costs of
these reductions – for these two gases are also
based on EMF 21, which provided estimates of
the abatement potential for each gas in each of
11 cost categories in 2010. These abatement
cost curves are directly incorporated in the
model and extrapolated after 2010 following the
baseline. There is also an allowance for techni-
cal advances in abatement over time.
MiniCAM calculates emissions of CH4, N2O,
and seven categories of industrial sources for
HFCs, PFCs, and SF6. Emissions are deter-
mined for over 30 sectors, including fossil fuel
production, transformation, and combustion; in-
dustrial processes; land use and land-use
change; and urban emissions. For details, see
Smith (2005) and Smith and Wigley (2006).
Emissions are proportional to driving factors
appropriate for each sector, with emissions 
factors in many sectors decreasing over time ac-
cording to an income-driven logistic formula-
tion. Marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves
from the EMF-21 study are applied, including
shifts in the curves for CH4 due to changes in
natural gas prices. Any below-zero reductions
in MAC curves are assumed to apply in the ref-
erence scenario.
EARTH SYSTEMS COMPONENTS
The Earth system components of the models
represent the response of the atmosphere,
ocean, and terrestrial biosphere to emissions
and increasing concentrations of GHGs and
other substances. Representation of these
processes, including the carbon cycle (Box 2.2),
is necessary to determine emissions paths con-
sistent with stabilization because these systems
determine how long each of these substances re-
mains in the atmosphere and how they interact
in altering the Earth’s radiation balance. Each
model includes such physical-chemical-
biological components, but incorporates differ-
ent levels of detail. The most elaborated Earth
system components are found in IGSM
(Sokolov et al. 2005), which falls in a class of
models referred to as Earth System Models of
Intermediate Complexity (Claussen et al. 2002).
These are models that fall between the full
three-dimensional atmosphere-ocean general
circulation models (AOGCMs) and energy bal-
ance models with a box model of the carbon
cycle. The Earth system components of
MERGE and MiniCAM fall in the class of en-
ergy balance-carbon cycle box models. Table
2.1 shows how each of the models treat differ-
ent components of the Earth systems. 
IGSM has explicit spatial detail, resolving the
atmosphere into multiple layers and by latitude,
and it includes a terrestrial vegetation model
with multiple vegetation types that are also spa-
tially resolved. A version of IGSM with a full
three-dimensional ocean model was used for
this scenario, and it includes temperature-de-
pendent uptake of carbon. IGSM models at-
mospheric chemistry, resolved separately for
urban (i.e., heavily polluted) and background
conditions. Processes that move carbon into or
out of the ocean and vegetation are modeled ex-
plicitly. IGSM also models natural emissions of
CH4 and N2O, which are weather and/or cli-
mate-dependent. The model includes a radiation
code that computes the net effect of atmospheric
concentrations of the GHGs studied in this re-
search. Also included in the global forcing is the
effect of changing ozone and aerosol levels,
which result from emissions of CH4 and non-
GHGs, such as NOX and volatile organic hy-
drocarbons; SOX; black carbon; and organic
carbon from energy, industrial, agricultural, and
natural sources.
The carbon cycle in MERGE relates emissions
to concentrations using a convolution ocean 
carbon-cycle model and assuming a neutral
biosphere (i.e., no net CO2 exchange). It is a re-
duced-form carbon cycle model developed by
Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann (1987). Carbon
emissions are divided into five classes, each
with different atmospheric lifetimes. The be-
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havior of the model compares favorably with at-
mospheric concentrations provided in the
IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (TAR) (IPCC
2001) when the same SRES scenarios of emis-
sions are simulated in the model (Nakicenovic
et al. 2000). MERGE models the radiative ef-
fects of GHGs using relationships consistent
with summaries by the IPCC, and applies the
median aerosol forcing from Wigley and Raper
(2001). The aggregate effect is obtained by sum-
ming the radiative forcing effect of each gas.
MERGE’s physical Earth system component is
embedded in the inter-temporal optimization
framework, thus allowing solution of an optimal
allocation of resources through time, account-
ing for damages related to climate change, or
optimizing the allocation of resources with re-
gard to other constraints such as concentrations,
temperature, or radiative forcing. In this re-
search, the second of these capabilities is ap-
plied, with a constraint on radiative forcing (see
Chapter 4). In contrast, the IGSM and Mini-
CAM Earth system models are driven by emis-
sions as simulated by the economic
components. In that regard, they are simulations
rather than optimization models.
MiniCAM uses the MAGICC model (Wigley
and Raper 2001, 2002) as its biophysical com-
ponent. MAGICC is an energy-balance climate
model that simulates the energy inputs and out-
puts of key components of the climate system
(sun, atmosphere, land surface, and ocean) with
parameterizations of dynamic processes such as
ocean circulations. It operates by taking anthro-
pogenic emissions from the other MiniCAM
components, converting these to global average
concentrations (for gaseous emissions), then de-
termining anthropogenic radiative forcing rela-
tive to preindustrial conditions, and finally
computing global mean temperature changes.
The carbon cycle is modeled with both terres-
trial and ocean components. The terrestrial
Although an approximate atmospheric lifetime is sometimes calculated for CO2, the term is po-
tentially misleading because it implies that CO2 put into the atmosphere by human activity always
declines over time by some stable removal process. In fact, the calculated concentration of CO2 is
not related to any mechanism of destruction, or even to the length of time an individual molecule
spends in the atmosphere, because CO2 is constantly exchanged between the atmosphere and the
surface layer of the ocean and with vegetation. Instead, it is more appropriate to think about how
the quantity of carbon that the Earth contains is partitioned between stocks of in-ground fossil re-
sources, the atmosphere (mainly as CO2), surface vegetation and soils, and the surface and deep lay-
ers of the ocean. When stored carbon is released into the atmosphere, either from fossil or
terrestrial sources, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 increase, leading to disequilibrium with the
ocean, and more carbon is taken up than is cycled back. For land processes, vegetation growth may
be enhanced by increases in atmospheric CO2, and this change could augment the stock of carbon
in vegetation and soils. As a result of the ocean and terrestrial uptake, only about half of the carbon
currently emitted remains in the atmosphere. Over millennial time scales, oceans would continue
to remove carbon until a large fraction, presently about 80%, would ultimately be removed to the
oceans, leaving about 20% as a permanent increase in the atmospheric CO2 concentration. But this
large removal only occurs because current levels of emissions lead to substantial disequilibrium be-
tween atmosphere and ocean. Lower emissions would lead to less uptake, as atmospheric concen-
trations come into balance with the ocean and interact with the terrestrial system. Rising
temperatures themselves will reduce uptake by the ocean, and will affect terrestrial vegetation up-
take, processes that the models in this scenario variously represent.
An important policy implication of these carbon-cycle processes as they affect stabilization sce-
narios is that stabilization of emissions near the present level will not lead to stabilization of at-
mospheric concentrations. CO2 concentrations were increasing in the 1990s at just over 3 ppmv
per year, an annual increase of 0.8%.  Thus, even if societies were able to stabilize emissions at cur-
rent levels, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 would continue to rise.  As long as emissions ex-
ceed the rate of uptake, even very stringent abatement will only slow the rate of increase.
BOX 2.2  The Carbon Cycle
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component includes CO2 fertilization and tem-
perature feedbacks; the ocean component is a
modified version of the Maier-Reimer and Has-
selmann (1987) model that also includes tem-
perature effects on the terrestrial biosphere. Net
land-use change emissions from the Mini-
CAM’s land-use change component are fed into
MAGICC so that the global carbon cycle is con-
sistent with the amount of natural vegetation.
Reactive gases and their interactions are mod-
eled on a global-mean basis using equations de-
rived from results of global atmospheric
chemistry models (Wigley et al. 2002).
In MiniCAM, global mean radiative forcing for
CO2, CH4, and N2O are determined from GHG
concentrations using analytic approximations.
Radiative forcing for other GHGs are taken to
be proportional to concentrations. Radiative
forcing for aerosols (for sulfur dioxide and for
black and organic carbon) are taken to be pro-
portional to emissions. Indirect forcing effects,
such as the effect of CH4 on stratospheric water
vapor, are also included. Given radiative forc-
ing, global mean temperature changes are de-
termined by a multiple box model with an
upwelling-diffusion ocean component. The cli-
mate sensitivity is specified as an exogenous pa-
rameter. MAGICC’s ability to reproduce the
global mean temperature change results of
AOGCMs has been demonstrated (Cubasch et
al. 2001, Raper and Gregory 2001).
Although aerosols and ozone are not included
in the computation of the radiative forcing tar-
gets that are the focus of these scenarios, they
are nonetheless included in these scenarios as
noted above. That is, the radiative forcing stabi-
lization levels identified in Table 1.2 and the ra-
diative forcing levels reported in subsequent
chapters account for only that part of radiative
forcing due to those GHGs covered by the tar-
get. The models can simulate total radiative
forcing including additional positive forcing
from ozone and dark aerosols and negative forc-
ing from sulfate aerosols. As shown by Prinn et
al. (In Press), even for very large changes in
emissions related to these substances, the tem-
perature effect is small, in large part because
aerosols and ozone have offsetting cooling and
warming effects. To the extent temperature is af-
fected by these substances, however, they have
a small, indirect influence on the scenarios be-
cause trace gas cycles are climate-dependent.
For example, climate affects vegetation and
ocean temperature and, thus, carbon uptake, and
natural emissions of CH4 and N2O, and the life-
time of CH4 also depends on climate. Because
the net effect of these substances on tempera-
ture is small, the feedback effect on trace gas
cycles also is very small. However, to the extent
these feedbacks are represented in the models
as discussed above, they are included in the cal-
culation of required emissions reduction be-
cause the temperature paths, while not reported
here, are simulated in the models and affect the
CO2 and non-CO2 GHG concentrations. By the
same token, the gases included under the Mon-
treal Protocol, which are being phased out, are
nonetheless included in these models and exert
some influence on temperature. 
Note that although the models used in this re-
search have capabilities to evaluate various cli-
mate change effects, with few exceptions, they
do not include the consequences of such feed-
back effects as: temperature on home heating
and cooling requirements; local climate change
on agricultural productivity; CO2 fertilization
on agricultural productivity (though a CO2 fer-
tilization effect is included in the terrestrial car-
bon cycle models employed by IGSM and
MiniCAM); climate on water availability for ap-
plications ranging from crop growing to power
plant cooling. Such improvements are left to fu-
ture research.
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the reference scenarios developed by the three modeling groups. These
scenarios are plausible future paths, not predictions, for by the very nature of their construction
they lack the features of predictions or best-judgment forecasts. For example, they assume that
in the post-2012 period existing measures to address climate change expire and are never re-
newed or replaced, which is an unlikely occurrence. Rather, they have been developed as points
of departure to highlight the implications for energy use and other human activities of the stabi-
lization of radiative forcing. Each of the modeling groups could have created a range of other plau-
sible reference scenarios by varying assumptions about rates of economic growth, the cost and
availability of alternative energy options, assumptions about non-climate environmental regula-
tions, and so forth.
Other than to standardize reporting conventions and GHG emissions mitigation policies (or lack
thereof), the three modeling groups developed their reference scenarios independently as each
judged appropriate. As noted in Chapter 2, the three models were developed with somewhat dif-
ferent original design objectives. They differ in (a) their inclusiveness, (b) their specifications of
key aspects of economic structure, and (c) their choice of values for key parameters. These choices
then lead to different characterizations of the underlying economic and physical systems that these
models represent.
Moreover, even if the models were identical in structure, the independent choice of key assump-
tions by the modeling groups leads to differences among scenarios. For example, as will be dis-
cussed, the reference scenarios differ in their specification of the technical details of virtually every
aspect of the future global energy system, ranging from the cost and availability of oil and natural
In the reference scenarios, energy consumption grows significantly and the en-
ergy system continues to rely on fossil fuels, leading to an increase in CO2 emis-
sions of roughly 3 to 3½ times the present level by 2100. Combined with
increases in the non-CO2 GHGs and net uptake by the ocean and terrestrial
biosphere, radiative forcing from the GHGs considered in this research reaches
6.4 W/m2 to 8.6 W/m2 from preindustrial by 2100.
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gas to the prospects for nuclear power. These
differences affect emissions in the reference
scenarios and the nature and cost of stabiliza-
tion regimes.
Finally, the modeling groups did not attempt to
harmonize assumptions about non-climate-
related policies. Such differences matter both in
the reference and stabilization scenarios. For ex-
ample, the MiniCAM reference scenario as-
sumes a larger effect of CH4 emission-control
technologies deployed for economic reasons,
which leads to lower reference scenario CH4
emissions than in the reference scenarios from
the other modeling groups. Similarly, the IGSM
modeling group assumed that non-climate con-
cerns would limit the deployment of nuclear
power, while the MERGE and MiniCAM mod-
eling groups assumed that nuclear power would
be allowed to participate in energy markets on
the basis of energy cost alone.
This variation in modeling approaches and as-
sumptions is one of the strengths of this re-
search, for the resulting differences across
scenarios can help shed light on the implications
of differing assumptions about the way key
forces may evolve over time. It also provides
three independent starting points for considera-
tion of stabilization goals.
Although there are many reasons to expect that
the three reference scenarios would be different,
it is worth noting that the modeling groups met
periodically during the research process to re-
view progress and to exchange information.
Thus, while not adhering to any formal proto-
col of standardization, the three reference sce-
narios are not entirely independent either. 
Development of a reference scenario involves
the elaboration of one path from among a range
of uncertain outcomes. Thus, it should be fur-
ther emphasized that the three reference sce-
narios were not designed in an attempt to span
the full range of potential future conditions or
to shed light on the probability of the occur-
rence of future events. That is a much more am-
bitious undertaking than the one reported here. 
The remainder of this chapter describes the ref-
erence scenarios developed by the three model-
ing groups working forward from underlying
drivers to implications for radiative forcing.
(Chapter 4 proceeds in the other direction, im-
posing the stabilization levels on radiative forc-
ing and exploring the implications.) The
presentation begins with a summary of the un-
derlying socioeconomic assumptions, most no-
tably for population and economic growth.
There follows a discussion of the evolution of
the global energy system over the twenty-first
century in the absence of additional GHG con-
trols and discusses the associated prices of
fuels. The energy sector is the largest but not the
only source of anthropogenic GHG emissions.
Also important is the net uptake or release of
CO2 by the oceans and the terrestrial biosphere.
The next section shows how the three reference
scenarios handle this aspect of the interaction
of human activity with natural Earth systems.
Finally, the anthropogenic emissions are de-
scribed, taking into account both the energy sec-
tor and other sources, such as agriculture and
various industrial activities. This last section
draws together all these various components to
present reference scenarios of the consequences
of anthropogenic emissions and the processes
of CO2 uptake and non-CO2 gas destruction for
the ultimate focus of the research: atmospheric
concentrations and global radiative forcing.
SOCIOECONOMIC
ASSUMPTIONS
Reference scenarios are grounded in a larger de-
mographic and economic story. Each uses pop-
ulation as the basis for developing scenarios of
the scale and composition of economic activity
for each region. For population assumptions, the
IGSM modeling group adopted a regionally de-
GHGs are a product of modern life. Popula-
tion increase and economic activity are
major determinants of the scale of human
activities and ultimately of anthropogenic
GHG emissions. In the reference scenarios,
the global population rises from 6 billion in
the year 2000 to between 8.6 and 9.9 billion
in 2100. Economic activity grows through
2100 across the globe. Developed nations
continue to expand their economies at his-
torical rates, and developing nations make
significant progress toward improved stan-
dards of living.
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tailed United Nations (U.N.) projection for the
period 2000-2050 (UN 2001) and extended this
scenario to 2100 using information from a
longer-term U.N. study (UN 2000). The Mini-
CAM assumptions are based on a median sce-
nario by the U.N. (UN 2005) and a Millennium
Assessment Techno-Garden Scenario from the
International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (O’Neill 2005). Near-term population
assumptions for the MERGE scenarios come
from the Energy Information Administration’s
International Energy Outlook. 
Population increases substantially across the
scenarios by the end of the century, but all of
the scenarios portray the population growth rate
as slowing to near zero, if not turning negative,
by the end of the century (Table 3.1 and Figure
3.1). As a result, by 2050 more than 75% of all
the change between the year 2000 and 2100 has
occurred. A demographic transition from high
birth and death rates to low death rates and
eventually to low birth rates is a feature of most
demographic scenarios, reflecting assumptions
that birth rates will decline to replacement lev-
els or below. For some countries, birth rates are
Region 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
U.S. 283 334 379 396 395 393
Western Europe 390 388 368 331 302 289
Japan 127 126 116 113 118 119
Former Soviet Union 291 278 260 243 234 230
Eastern Europe 97 91 83 74 67 64
China 1282 1454 1500 1429 1365 1334
India 1009 1291 1503 1610 1635 1643
Africa 793 1230 1749 2163 2390 2500
Latin America 419 538 627 678 701 713
Rest of the World 1366 1848 2269 2521 2614 2652
Region 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
U.S. 276 335 335 335 335 335
Western Europe 390 397 397 397 397 397
Japan 127 126 126 126 126 126
Former Soviet
Union/Eastern Europe 411 393 393 393 393 393
China 1275 1429 1478 1493 1498 1499
India 1017 1312 1427 1472 1489 1496
Africa/Latin America/
Rest of World 2566 3538 4209 4677 5003 5228
Region 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
U.S. 283 334 371 396 412 426
Western Europe 457 486 481 456 421 399
Japan 127 127 121 113 103 95
Former Soviet Union 283 284 283 275 261 253
Eastern Europe 124 119 111 100 87 80
China 1385 1578 1591 1506 1407 1293
India 1010 1312 1472 1513 1443 1300
Africa 802 1197 1521 1763 1893 1881
Latin America 525 670 786 869 929 952
Rest of World 1055 1454 1779 1976 2012 1918
IGSM Population by Region (million)
MERGE Population by Region (million)
MiniCAM Population by Region (million)
Table 3.1.
Population
(million) by Region
Across Models,
2000-2100. 
Regional aggregations
are different in the three
models. For example,
MiniCAM includes
Turkey in Western
Europe, but IGSM and
MERGE do not.
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already below replacement levels, and just
maintaining these levels would result in popu-
lation decline for these countries. A key uncer-
tainty in all demographic scenarios is whether a
transition to less-than-replacement levels is a
more or less permanent feature of those coun-
tries where it has occurred and whether such a
pattern will be repeated in other countries. 
The differences among the scenarios lie in nu-
ances of this pattern. The MiniCAM scenarios
exhibit a peak in global population around the
year 2070 at slightly more than 9 billion people,
after which the population declines to 8.6 bil-
lion. The MERGE and IGSM scenarios, on the
other hand, both employ demographic assump-
tions by which the global population stabilizes
but does not decline during this century. By
2100, populations range from 8.6 to 9.9 billion
across the scenarios, which is an increase of
roughly 40% to 65% from the 6 billion on Earth
in 2000. In total, the difference between the de-
mographic scenarios is relatively small: they
differ by only 3% in 2030 and by less than 10%
until after 2080.
The variation in population among the scenarios
is greater for the U.S. than for the globe. The
U.S. population (Figure 3.1) increases from
about 280 million in the year 2000 to between
335 million and 425 million by 2100. Although
the MiniCAM global population is the lowest of
the three scenarios in 2100, it is the highest for
the U.S. The higher U.S. population in MiniCAM
reference scenarios compared to the scenarios
from the other two modeling groups can be traced
to different assumptions about net migration.
As discussed in Chapter 2, GDP, while ostensi-
bly an output of all three models, is in fact
largely determined by assumptions about labor
productivity and labor force growth, which are
model inputs. None of the three modeling
groups began with a GDP goal and derived sets
of input factors that would generate that level of
activity. Rather, each began with assessments
about potential growth rates in labor productiv-
ity and labor force and used these, through dif-
fering mechanisms, to compute GDP. In
MiniCAM, labor productivity and labor force
growth are the main drivers of GDP growth. In
MERGE and IGSM, savings and investment
and productivity growth in other factors (e.g.,
materials, land, and energy) contribute as well.
All three models derive labor force growth from
the underlying assumptions about population.
The alternative scenarios of population and pro-
ductivity growth lead to differences among the
three reference scenarios in U.S. GDP growth
(Figure 3.2). There is relatively little difference
among the three trajectories through the year
2020. After 2020, however, the scenarios di-
verge, with the lowest scenario of U.S. GDP
Figure 3.1. World and U.S. Population Across Models.  Assumed growth in global and U.S.
population is similar among the three models. Global population in 2100 spans a range from about 8.5 to
10 billion. U.S. population in 2100 spans a range from less than .35 to over .45  billion.
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(MERGE) at roughly half of that of the highest
scenario (IGSM) by the end of the century. The
labor productivity growth assumptions for the
U.S. in the IGSM scenario are the highest of the
three, and the U.S. population assumptions are
also relatively high in the IGSM scenarios. The
relatively lower labor productivity growth as-
sumptions used in the MERGE and MiniCAM
scenarios lead to lower levels of GDP. The lower
population growth assumptions employed in the
MERGE scenarios give the MERGE reference
scenario the lowest GDP in 2100. 
Table 3.2 shows GDP across regions in the three
reference scenarios. Differences in the absolute
levels of GDP increase result from relatively
small differences in rates of per capita growth.
Although difficulties arise in comparisons of
GDP across countries (see Box 3.1), the growth
rates underlying these scenarios are usefully
compared with historical experience. Long-term
growth rates developed from reconstructed data
(Table 3.3) show that consistent rapid growth is
a phenomenon of industrialization, starting in
the 1800s in North America and Europe and
gradually spreading to other areas of the world.
By the end of the period 1950 to 1973, it ap-
peared that the phenomenon of rapid growth
had taken hold in all major regions of the world.
Since 1973, it has been less clear to what degree
that conclusion holds. Growth slowed in the
1970s in most regions, the important exceptions
being China, India, and several South and East
Asian economies. In Africa, Latin America,
Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union,
growth slowed in this period to rates more as-
sociated with preindustrial times.
With this historical experience as background,
the differences in GDP growth among the ref-
erence scenarios can be explained. Demo-
graphic trends, slowing population, and labor
force growth all combine to influence overall
GDP growth in the scenarios. With respect to
the developed countries, the per capita income
growth rate for the U.S. in the IGSM reference
scenario is about the average for North America
for the period 1950-2000. The MiniCAM refer-
ence scenario has lower growth, reflecting an
assumption that an aging population will lead
to lower labor force participation, and the result
of this demographic maturation is a lower future
rate of per capita GDP growth compared to his-
tory. U.S. growth rates in the MERGE reference
scenario are similar to those of MiniCAM ref-
erence scenario. 
GDP growth patterns for Western Europe and
Japan are similar to one another within refer-
ence scenarios but vary across models. The
IGSM reference scenario follows the post World
War II trend in per capita GDP growth, but the
MiniCAM and MERGE scenarios anticipate a
break from the trend with lower per capita
growth in GDP as a consequence of changes in
underlying demographic trends. As with the
U.S., the MiniCAM reference scenario exhibits
a decline in average labor force participation in
other developed regions as populations age, re-
sulting in lower growth in per capita GDP com-
pared to the IGSM reference scenario. The GDP
growth pattern in the MERGE reference scenario
is similar to that of MiniCAM reference scenario. 
GDP growth patterns for developing regions
show greater differences from historical expe-
rience. Notably, all three modeling groups chose
assumptions leading to consistent growth in
many non- Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD) regions at rates
Figure 3.2. U.S. GDP Across Reference
Scenarios (1997$ for IGSM, 2000$ for MERGE
and MiniCAM, MER).  U.S. economic growth is driven,
in part, by labor force growth and, in part, by assumptions
about productivity growth of labor and, in part, by other
factors such as by savings and investment. Annual average
growth rates are 1.4% for the MERGE reference scenario,
1.7% for the MiniCAM reference scenario, and 2.2% for
the IGSM reference scenario.
By comparison, U.S. GDP grew
at an annual average rate of
3.4% from 1959-2004 (CEA
2005).
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experienced by industrializing countries. How-
ever, growth rates are not homogeneous.
Growth in China and India is generally higher
than for regions such as Latin America and
Africa, as it has been in recent decades. The
IGSM reference scenario shows somewhat less
growth for the non-OECD regions compared to
the MiniCAM and MERGE reference scenar-
ios. These are just one set of possible economic
assumptions from each modeling group and are
not intended to be expressions of what the
groups view as desirable performance. Clearly,
more rapid growth in developing countries, if 
gains spread to lower income groups within
these regions, could be the basis for improving
the outlook for people in these areas.
ENERGY USE, PRICES, AND
TECHNOLOGY
The Evolving Structure 
of Energy Use
In the reference scenarios, global primary
energy consumption expands dramatically
over the century, growing to between 3 and
Region 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
U.S. 9.1 16.9 29.3 44.4 59.8 76.4
Western Europe 9.2 15.8 27.0 41.5 57.2 74.2
Japan 4.4 7.5 13.8 21.8 30.0 38.6
Former Soviet Union 0.6 1.4 2.9 4.8 7.2 10.2
Eastern Europe 0.3 0.6 1.2 2.1 3.3 4.9
China 1.2 3.3 6.9 12.8 19.9 28.9
India 0.5 1.1 2.0 3.3 5.2 8.0
Africa 0.6 1.3 2.0 3.3 5.0 7.4
Latin America 1.6 3.0 6.3 11.5 18.0 25.9
Rest of the World 4.4 8.6 14.9 23.9 35.3 49.9
Region 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
U.S. 9.8 16.1 20.9 26.8 33.1 39.6
Western Europe 9.8 14.4 19.9 26.9 35.0 43.6
Japan 4.6 6.0 7.7 9.6 11.7 13.9
Former Soviet
Union/Eastern Europe 1.0 1.9 3.6 6.6 11.9 20.4
China 1.2 3.1 7.4 17.3 38.5 78.6
India 0.5 1.5 3.6 8.3 18.5 39.2
Africa/Latin America/
Rest of World 6.5 14.6 27.5 49.3 85.1 141.9
Region 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
U.S. 9.8 15.1 21.1 28.8 38.9 52.6
Western Europe 8.6 11.1 13.3 16.1 19.4 23.7
Japan 4.7 5.9 7.1 8.6 10.2 12.0
Former Soviet Union 0.4 0.8 1.4 2.3 3.6 5.7
Eastern Europe 0.4 0.7 1.4 2.4 4.0 6.6
China 1.2 4.8 11.6 20.8 34.1 49.3
India 0.5 1.6 4.8 10.7 19.5 32.0
Africa 0.6 1.2 2.1 3.9 7.7 13.8
Latin America 2.0 3.3 5.0 8.8 16.1 26.9
Rest of World 3.2 6.3 12.5 22.6 37.4 56.6
IGSM GDP by Region (trillions of $1997, MER)
MERGE GDP by Region (trillions of $2000, MER)
MiniCAM GDP by Region (trillions of $2000, MER)
Table 3.2. GDP for 
Key Regions Across
Reference Scenarios,
2000-2100. This table
reports GDP for all regions
of the globe, but accounts
for inconsistency in regional
aggregations across models.
Note that while regions are
generally comparable, slight
differences exist in regional
coverage, particularly in
aggregate regions.
Differences in 2000 arise
from these differences as do
differences in regional
deflators and regional
exchange rates. (Note: IGSM
is in $1997 and 1997
exchange rates; MERGE uses
$1997 and 1997 exchange
rates restated to $2000 by
the ratio of U.S. GDP for 2000
in $1997 and $2000;
MiniCAM is in $2000 and
2000 exchange rates.)
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Table 3.3. Historical
Annual Average per
Capita GDP Growth
Rates. Source: Maddison,
2001
Region 1500-1820 1820-1870 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-2001
North America 0.34 1.41 1.81 1.56 2.45 1.84
Western Europe 0.14 0.98 1.33 0.76 4.05 1.88
Japan 0.09 0.19 1.48 0.88 8.06 2.14
Former U.S.SR 0.10 0.63 1.06 1.76 3.35 -0.96
Eastern Europe 0.10 0.63 1.39 0.60 3.81 0.68
Africa 0.00 0.35 0.57 0.92 2.00 0.19
Latin America 0.16 -0.03 1.82 1.43 2.58 0.91
China 0.00 -0.25 0.10 -0.62 2.86 5.32
India -0.01 0.00 0.54 -0.22 1.40 3.01
Other Asia 0.01 0.19 0.74 0.13 3.51 2.42
Models used in this type of research typically represent the economy in real terms, following the
common assumption that inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon that does not have real ef-
fects, but issues occur in comparing income across regions in terms of what currency exchange rates
are most appropriate. The models do not represent the factors that govern exchange-rate deter-
mination and, therefore, cannot represent changes. However, modeling international trade in goods
requires either an exchange rate or a common currency. Rather than separately model economies
in native currencies and use a fixed exchange to convert currencies for trade, the equivalent and
simpler approach is to convert all regions to a common currency at average market exchange rates
(MER) for the base year of the model.
At the same time, it is widely recognized that using market exchange rates to compare countries
can have peculiar implications. Country A might start with a larger GDP than country B when con-
verted to a common currency using that year’s exchange rates, and grow faster in real terms than
B, yet could later have a lower GDP than B using exchange rates in that year. This paradoxical situ-
ation can occur if A’s currency depreciates relative to B’s. Depreciation and appreciation of cur-
rencies by 20% to 50% over just a few years is common, so the example is not extreme. Interest in
making cross-country comparisons that are not subject to such peculiarities has led to development
of indices of international purchasing power. A widely used index is purchasing power parity (PPP),
whose development was sponsored by the World Bank. PPP-type indices have the advantage of
being more stable over time and are thought to better reflect relative living standards among coun-
tries than MER. Thus, analysts drawing comparisons among countries have found it preferable to use
PPP-type indices rather than MER. Although the empirical foundation for the indices has been im-
proving, the theory for them remains incomplete, and thus there is a limited basis on which sce-
narios of future changes in PPP can be developed. Some hypothesize that differences close as real
income gaps narrow, but the evidence for this outcome is weak, in part due to data limitations.
Controversy regarding the use of MER arose around the SRES produced by the IPCC (Nakicenovic
et al. 2001) because they were reported to model economic convergence among countries, yet re-
ported economic attributes of the scenarios in MER. Assessing convergence implies a cross-coun-
try comparison, but that would only be strictly meaningful if MER measures were corrected for a
country’s real international purchasing power. In developing the scenarios for this research, no as-
sumptions were made regarding convergence. Growth prospects and other parameters for the
world’s economies were assessed relative to their own historical performance. The models used in
this research are simulated in MER, as this is consistent with modeling of trade in goods. To the ex-
tent GDP results are provided, international comparisons are to made with great caution; for exam-
ple, even global GDP for an historical period will differ if exchange rates of different years are used.
BOX 3.1  Exchange Rates and Comparisons of Real Income Among Countries
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Energy production and consumption are closely
associated with emissions of GHGs, particularly
CO2, because of the dominant role of fossil fuels
in the energy sector. Figure 3.3 shows global
primary energy consumption over the century
and its composition by fuel type in the three ref-
erence scenarios. Not surprisingly, given the as-
sumptions about economic growth, primary
energy consumption grows substantially in all
of the reference scenarios: from approximately
400 EJ/yr in the year 2000 to roughly between
1275 EJ/yr and 1500 EJ/yr by the end of this
century. Combined with population growth, all
three reference scenarios include a growing per
capita use of energy for the world (Figure 3.4).
The per capita growth in primary energy con-
sumption for the world is very similar for Mini-
CAM and IGSM reference scenarios, with
trends diverging somewhat late in the century.
The MERGE reference scenario has relatively
slower growth in per capita primary energy con-
sumption early in the century, with accelerated
growth later. On the other hand, per capita pri-
mary energy consumption in the U.S. differs
substantially among the reference scenarios.
U.S. per capita primary energy consumption in
MERGE and IGSM reference scenarios 
increases substantially, while it declines gradu-
ally over the century in the MiniCAM reference
scenario.
The growth in total and per capita primary en-
ergy consumption arises despite substantial im-
provements in energy technology assumed in all
three scenarios. The ratio of U.S. primary en-
ergy consumption to GDP (primary energy in-
tensity) declines throughout the century in all
three reference scenarios (Figure 3.5). These
patterns represent a continuation of changes in
primary energy intensity that have occurred in
recent decades in the U.S. In 2100, each dollar
of real GDP is produced with only 40% of the
primary energy consumed in 2000 in the
MERGE reference scenario, only 30% of the
energy in the IGSM reference scenario, and
only 25% in the MiniCAM reference scenario. 
Globally and in the U.S., primary energy con-
sumption over the century remains dominated
by fossil fuels. In this sense, the three reference
scenarios tell a consistent story about future
global energy, and all three run counter to the
view that the world is running out of fossil
fuels. Although reserves and resources of con-
ventional oil and gas are limited in all three ref-
erence scenarios, the same cannot be said of
coal and unconventional liquids and gases. In
all three reference scenarios, the world economy
moves from current conventional fossil re-
sources to increased exploitation of some com-
bination of the extensive (if more costly) global
resources of heavy oils, tar sands, and shale oil,
and to synfuels derived from coal. The three ref-
erence scenarios exhibit a different mix of these
sources. The IGSM reference scenario exhibits
4 times its 2000 level of roughly 400 EJ. This
growth results from a combination of forces,
including rising economic activity, increasing
efficiency of energy use, and changes in en-
ergy consumption patterns. Growth in per
capita energy consumption occurs despite a
continuous decline in the energy intensity of
economic activity. The improvement in en-
ergy intensity reflects, in part, assumptions of
substantial technological change in all three
reference scenarios.
In all three reference scenarios a range of
fossil resources is available to supply the bulk
of the world’s increasing demand for energy.
Fossil fuels provided almost 90% of the en-
ergy supply in the year 2000 and remain the
dominant energy source in all three refer-
ence scenarios throughout the twenty-first
century despite a phasing out of conven-
tional petroleum resources. Differing among
the reference scenarios, however, is the mix
of fossil fuels. The IGSM reference scenario
has relatively more oil, derived from shale;
the MERGE reference scenario has relatively
more coal with a substantial amount of the
increase used to produce liquid fuels; and the
MiniCAM reference scenario has relatively
more natural gas.
In all three reference scenarios, non-fossil
fuel energy use grows substantially, reaching
levels in 2100 that range from around half to
levels that exceed total global energy con-
sumption in 2000. The reference scenarios
differ in terms of the mix of non-fossil re-
sources. The substantial growth in non-fossil
fuel energy use does not forestall substantial
growth in fossil fuel consumption.
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Figure 3.3. Global and U.S. Primary Energy Consumption by Fuel Across Reference Scenarios (EJ/yr). Global
total primary energy consumption grows to between three and four times today’s levels over the century in the reference scenarios,
while U.S. primary energy consumption grows to between 1 and 2½ times today’s levels. Fossil fuels remain a major energy source,
despite substantial increases in the consumption of non-fossil energy sources. [Notes. i. Oil consumption includes that derived from tar sands
and oil shales, and coal consumption includes that used to produce synthetic liquid and gaseous fuels.  ii. Primary energy consumption from nuclear
power and non-biomass renewable electricity are accounted for at the average
efficiency of fossil-fired electric facilities, which vary over time and across
scenarios. This long-standing convention means that, all other things being equal,
increasing efficiency of fossil-electric energy lowers the contribution to primary
energy from these sources.]
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a relatively higher share of oil production (in-
cluding unconventional oil); the MERGE refer-
ence scenario exhibits a relatively higher coal
share; and the MiniCAM reference scenario ex-
hibits a higher share for natural gas.
The relative contribution of oil to primary en-
ergy supply differs across the reference scenar-
ios, but all three include a decline in the share of
conventional oil. Thus, these scenarios represent
three variations on a theme of energy transition
precipitated by limited availability of conven-
tional oil and continued expansion of final de-
mands for liquid fuels, mainly for passenger and
freight transport.
In the IGSM reference scenario, limits on the
availability of conventional oil resources lead to
the development of technologies to exploit un-
conventional oil, such as oil sands, heavy oils,
and shale oil. These resources are large and im-
pose no meaningful constraint on production
during the twenty-first century. Thus, despite the
fact that production costs are higher than for con-
ventional oil, total oil production (conventional
plus shale) expands throughout the century, al-
though oil as a primary energy source declines as
a share of total energy with the passage of time.
The transition plays out differently in the
MERGE reference scenario. Although it begins
Figure 3.4. Global and U.S. Primary Energy Consumption per Capita Across Reference
Scenarios (GJ per capita). All three reference scenarios include growing global per capita primary
energy consumption. However, even after 100 years of growth, global per capita primary energy
consumption is about ½ of the current U.S. level. U.S. per capita primary energy consumption varies more
substantially among the reference scenarios. [Note. Primary energy consumption from nuclear power and non-
biomass renewable electricity are accounted for at the average efficiency of fossil-fired electric facilities, which vary over time and across scenarios.]
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Figure 3.5. U.S. Primary Energy Intensity:
Consumption per Dollar of GDP Across
Reference Scenarios (Index, yr 2000 = 1.0).  
U.S. total primary energy intensity – primary energy
consumption per dollar of GDP – continues to decline in the
reference scenarios. In recent decades, the rate of decline has
been about 14% per decade. U.S. primary energy intensity
declines about 12% per decade in the IGSM reference
scenario, about 13% per decade in the MiniCAM reference
scenario, and about 9% per decade in the MERGE reference
scenario. [Note. Primary energy consumption from nuclear power
and non-biomass renewable
electricity are accounted for at the
average efficiency of fossil-fired
electric facilities, which vary over
time and across scenarios.]
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the same way (that is, the transition is initiated
by limits on conventional oil resources), declin-
ing production of conventional oil leads to
higher oil prices and makes alternative fuels, es-
pecially those derived from coal liquefaction,
economically competitive. Thus, there is a tran-
sition away from conventional oil (and gas) and
a corresponding expansion of coal production.
The large difference between the MERGE and
IGSM scenarios regarding primary oil thus re-
flects the role of coal liquefaction rather than a
fundamentally different scenario of the need for
liquid fuels.
The MiniCAM reference scenario depicts yet a
third possible transition. Again, it begins with
limited conventional oil resources leading to
higher oil prices. Higher oil prices then lead to
the development and deployment of technolo-
gies that access unconventional oil, such as oil
sands, heavy oils, and shale oils. However, it also
leads to expanded production of natural gas and to
expanded production of coal to produce synthetic
liquids, as in the MERGE reference scenario.
Primary energy consumption patterns also re-
flect assumptions about the availability of low-
cost alternatives to conventional fossil fuels. In
all three reference scenarios, non-fossil sources
increase both their absolute and relative roles in
providing energy to the global economy, with
their share growing to roughly 20% to 30% of
total supply by 2100. In the IGSM reference
scenario, which has the lowest consumption
from non-fossil resources, the magnitude of
total consumption from these resources in 2100
is 65% the size of the total global primary en-
ergy consumption in 2000, which is more than
a 500% increase in the level of production of
non-fossil energy. In the MERGE reference sce-
nario, which has the highest contribution from
non-fossil resources, total primary energy con-
sumption from these sources in 2100 exceeds
total primary energy consumption in 2000. De-
spite this growth, the continued availability of
relatively low-cost fossil energy supplies, com-
bined with continued improvements in the effi-
ciency with which they are used, allows fossil
energy forms to remain competitive throughout
the century.
The three reference scenarios tell different sto-
ries about non-fossil energy (much of which is
covered below in the discussion of electricity
generation). The IGSM reference scenario as-
sumes political limits on the expansion of nu-
clear power, so it grows only to about 50%
above the 2000 level by 2100. However, grow-
ing demands for energy and for liquid fuels in
particular lead to the development and expan-
sion of bioenergy, both absolutely and as per-
centage of total primary energy consumption. 
In contrast, the MERGE reference scenario as-
sumes that a new generation of nuclear tech-
nology becomes available and that societies do
not limit its market penetration, so the share of
nuclear power in the economy grows with time.
In addition, renewable energy forms, both com-
mercial biomass and other forms such as wind
and solar, expand production during the century.
The MiniCAM reference scenario also assumes
the availability of a new generation of nuclear
energy technology that is both cost competitive
and unrestrained by public policy. Nuclear
power, therefore, increases market share al-
though not to the extent found in the MERGE ref-
erence scenario. Non-biomass renewable energy
supplies become increasingly competitive as well.
In the MiniCAM reference scenario, bioenergy
production is predominantly recycled wastes,
with a modest contribution from commercial bio-
mass farming toward the end of the century.
The three reference scenarios for the U.S. are
similar in character to the global ones (Figure
3.3). The transition from conventional oil to al-
ternative sources of liquid fuels and changes in
electricity production affect energy markets and
patterns in the U.S. However, primary energy
consumption grows somewhat more slowly in
the U.S. than in the world in general. As with
the world total, the U.S. energy system remains
dominated by fossil fuels in all three reference
scenarios. The MERGE and IGSM reference sce-
narios have similar contributions from non-fossil
energy, but the sources in the MERGE reference
scenario are predominantly nuclear and other re-
newables, whereas it is biomass in the IGSM ref-
erence scenario. The MiniCAM reference
scenario has the smallest overall contribution
from non-fossil sources split relatively evenly be-
tween nuclear, biomass, and other renewables. 
70
The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 3 - Reference Scenarios
Trends in Fuel Prices
Historically, oil prices have been highly vari-
able, with the volatility often related to political
events (Figure 3.6). Prices were in the $15 to
$20 range (in the constant 2006 dollars shown
in the figure) until the increases in the 1970s
and early 1980s that resulted from disruptions in
the Middle East. In inflation-adjusted terms,
prices declined from peaks in the late 1970s to
vary around the $20 level in the latter half of the
1980s and 1990s. The period 2000 to 2005 has
again seen rising prices of oil and other fossil
energy sources, which suggests the possibility
of a long-term trend toward rising prices. De-
pletion alone would suggest rising prices be-
cause of a combination of rents associated with
a limited resource and the exhaustion of easily
recoverable grades of oil. Global demand con-
tinues to grow, putting increasing pressure on
supply. Improvements in technology that reduce
the cost of recovering known deposits and fa-
cilitate discovery of new ones are opposing
these forces toward higher prices.
The three models used for these scenarios em-
ploy time steps of 5 to 15 years (see Chapter 2)
and, thus, are not set up to analyze short-term
variability in prices. Their long-term trends are
best interpreted as multi-year averages.
The three reference scenarios paint similar, but
by no means identical, pictures of future energy
prices. The price paths in the three reference
scenarios reflect assumptions regarding both en-
ergy resources and energy technologies, and
they shed light on these assumptions. For ex-
ample, the price of oil is related to the marginal
cost of bio-fuels, and the prices of both reflect,
among other things, the technology options as-
sumed to be available for their production.
Figure 3.7 shows mine-mouth coal prices, elec-
tricity producer prices, natural gas producer
prices for the U.S., and the world oil (producer)
price. All four energy markets – oil, natural gas,
coal, and electricity – are shaped by the supply
of, and demand for, these commodities. These
fuels also are interconnected because users can
substitute one fuel for another, thus higher
prices in one fuel market will tend to increase
demand for and the price of other fuels. Oil mar-
kets are driven by the rising cost of conventional
oil and the transition to more expensive uncon-
ventional sources to supply a growing demand
for liquid fuels, mainly for transportation. Thus,
the oil prices in the scenarios result from the in-
terplay between increasing demands for liquid
fuels, the available technology, and the availabil-
ity of liquids derived from these other sources.
Natural gas prices tell a similar story. Assump-
tions regarding the ultimately recoverable natu-
ral gas resource vary, as does the cost structure
of the resource, leading to differences among
the models. Like the demand for oil, the de-
mand for natural gas grows, driven by increas-
ing population and per capita incomes. As is the
case for oil, the price of natural gas tends to be
driven higher in the transition from inexpensive
Figure 3.6. Long-Term
Historical Crude Oil Prices.
Crude oil prices have historically
been highly variable. (Figure courtesy
of James Williams, WTRG Economics)
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conventional resources to less easily accessible
grades of the resource and to substitutes, such as
gas derived from coal or biological sources. The
different degrees and rates of price escalation
reflect different technology assumptions in the
three reference scenarios. 
Coal prices do not rise as fast as oil and natural
gas prices in any of the three reference scenar-
ios. The reason is the abundance of the coal re-
source base. The different patterns of coal price
movement with time in the three scenarios re-
flect differences in assumptions about the rate
of resource depletion, its grade structure, and
improvements in extraction technology. 
The stability of electricity prices compared with
oil and natural gas prices is a reflection of the
variety of technologies and fuels available to
produce electricity, their improvement over
time, and the fact that fuel is just one compo-
nent of the cost of electricity. The details un-
derlying this electric sector development are re-
ported next.
Electricity Production and
Technology
Electricity production steadily increases in both
the U.S. and the world in the reference scenar-
ios, although the scale and generation mix dif-
fer among the three reference scenarios (Figure
3.8). All the reference scenarios depict a con-
tinued role for coal.  The IGSM reference sce-
nario is dominated by coal, which accounts for
more than half of all power production by the
end of the twenty-first century. This character-
istic of the IGSM reference scenario is consis-
tent with its limited growth in nuclear power. In
contrast, nuclear power penetrates the market
based on economic performance, and non-bio-
mass renewable energy gains market share in
the MERGE reference scenario. Limited natural
gas resources lead to a peak and decline in gas
Figure 3.7. Indices of Energy Prices Across Reference Scenarios (Indexed to yr 2000 = 1.0).  Energy prices through
2100 cover a wide range among the reference scenarios, but
generally show a rising trend relative to recent decadal averages.
Prices in the MERGE reference scenario are intermediate; by
2100 the crude oil price is about that observed in 2005 (3 times
the 2000 level). The MiniCAM reference scenario has the lowest
prices, with crude oil price about twice 2000 levels in 2100,
somewhat below the level reached in 2005. The IGSM reference
scenario has the highest prices, which for crude oil would be
about 50% to 60% higher in 2100 than the price level of 2005.
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Figure 3.8.  Global and U.S. Electricity Production by Source Across Reference Scenarios (EJ/yr of electricity).
Global and U.S. electricity production in the reference scenarios show continued use of coal, especially the IGSM reference scenario,
which assumes that nuclear energy expansion is limited by safety, waste,
and proliferation concerns. The MERGE and MiniCAM reference
scenarios are based on the assumption that nuclear energy is
unconstrained by non-climate concerns, so these scenarios exhibit
greater expansion. They also include greater contributions from
renewable energy sources and somewhat greater use of electricity
overall compared with IGSM reference scenario.
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use in the first half of the century. In the Mini-
CAM reference scenario, coal supplies the
largest share of power, but natural gas is rela-
tively abundant and provides a significant por-
tion as well, as do nuclear and non-biomass
renewable energy forms.
Non-Electric Energy Use
An important consideration in scenarios of the
future energy system is conversion losses as rel-
atively lower-grade resources are converted to
higher-grade fuels for use in final applications
such as space conditioning, lighting, and me-
chanical power. Figure 3.9 identifies the energy
content of primary fuels for the U.S. in the year
2000 and where conversion losses occur. It
shows the energy loss in the conversion from
fuel to electricity to be 29.6 exajoules while the
energy content of the electricity is 13.0 exa-
joules. Other losses occur when fuels are used
to create the mechanical power to, for example,
propel vehicles or when efficiency of conver-
sion to heat, light, or mechanical energy is less
that 100%. The potential for reducing such
losses is one reason why energy intensity of the
economy can continue to improve. 
However, in the future other fuel transformation
activities may become important and funda-
mentally change energy-flow patterns, as
higher-grade resources are exhausted and lower-
grade resources that require more conversion
are used. As already discussed, the potential ex-
ists for coal and commercial biomass to be con-
verted to liquids and gases – a technology thus
far implemented only at a small scale. Further-
more, fuels and electricity may be transformed
into hydrogen, creating fundamentally new
branches of the energy system. Like electricity,
these new branches will have conversion losses,
and those losses can be important. 
Figure 3.10 shows non-electric energy use in the
reference scenario, and it is important to realize
that these patterns of non-electric use also can
imply significant conversion losses. This
prospect plays a strong role in the MERGE ref-
erence scenario, in which coal and biomass go
into liquefaction and gasification plants. To a
lesser extent, these conversions are also present
in the MiniCAM and IGSM scenarios. In addi-
tion, in the MiniCAM reference scenario some
nuclear and renewable energy appears in non-
electricity uses to produce hydrogen. In the
IGSM and MiniCAM reference scenarios, oil
Figure 3.9. U.S.
Energy Flow Diagram
and Non-Electrical
Energy Use for the
Year 2000. Primary
energy is transformed into
different energy carriers
that can easily be used for
specific applications (e.g.,
space conditioning, light,
and mechanical energy), but
in the process losses occur.
Of the 104 exajoules, of
primary energy consumed
in the U.S. in the year 2000,
only an estimated 36
exajoules, were actually
useful. Each of the models
used in this research
represents such conversion
processes. Assumptions
about efficiency
improvements in
conversion and end use are
one of the reasons why
energy intensity per dollar
of GDP falls in the
reference scenarios.
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Figure 3.10. Global and U.S. Primary Energy Consumption in Non-Electric Applications Across Reference
Scenarios (EJ/yr).  As with electricity production, non-electric energy
consumption remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels with some penetration of
biomass energy. Primary energy is reported here, and the resurgence of coal in
the reference scenarios is due to its use to produce synthetic liquids or gas.
[Notes. Oil consumption includes that derived from tar sands and oil shales, and coal
consumption includes that used to produce synthetic liquid and gaseous fuels.]
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use is the largest single non-electric energy
source, reflecting continued growth in demand
for liquids by the transportation sectors. In the
MERGE reference scenario, increasingly ex-
pensive conventional oil is supplanted by coal-
based liquids. This phenomenon also has
implications for energy intensity in that im-
provements in end-use energy intensity can be
offset, in part, by losses in converting primary
fuels to end-use liquids or gases.
LAND USE AND LAND-USE
CHANGE
An important aspect of land use and land-use
change in the scenarios from all three modeling
groups is the production of bio-fuels for energy.
Both IGSM and MiniCAM take account of the
competition for scarce land resources in devel-
oping scenarios of bioenergy production and
consumption. MERGE takes the availability of
bio-fuels as an exogenous input based on extra-
model analysis. Global and U.S. biomass pro-
duction is displayed in Figure 3.11. The IGSM
and MiniCAM scenarios use somewhat differ-
ent definitions, which account for the difference
in 2000. The numbers presented for the IGSM
scenarios account only the production of bio-
mass energy beyond that now used and do not
include traditional use of biomass or, for exam-
ple, the own-use of wood wastes for energy in
the forest products industry. The MiniCAM sce-
narios explicitly account for some current uses
of biomass energy, such as that used in the pulp
and paper industry, and separately consider the
future potential for bio-fuels derived from
wastes and residue along with energy crops
grown explicitly for their energy content. 
Apparent differences among the models need to
be considered in light of this differential ac-
counting. In the MiniCAM reference scenario,
biomass production tends to be higher in early
years because it is accounting waste and
residue-derived bio-fuels explicitly. These waste
and residue-derived bio-fuels account for all of
the biomass production in the MiniCAM refer-
The three reference scenarios take different
approaches to emissions from land use and
land-use change. The MERGE reference sce-
nario assumes that the biosphere makes no
net contribution to the carbon cycle. In the
IGSM and MiniCAM reference scenarios, the
net contribution of the terrestrial biosphere
is to remove carbon from the atmosphere,
which results from the countervailing forces
of land-use change emissions from defor-
estation and other human activities and the
net uptake from unmanaged systems.
Figure 3.11.  Global and U.S. Production of Biomass Energy Across Reference
Scenarios (EJ/yr).  The MiniCAM scenarios include waste-derived biomass fuels as well as commercial
biomass and, thus, show significant use in 2000. The IGSM and MERGE scenarios include only commercial
biomass energy beyond that already used. Globally, the IGSM and MERGE reference scenarios include
more biomass production than does the MiniCAM reference scenario toward the end of the century. 
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ence scenario in the early part of the century and
the majority of all biomass production at the end
of the century. The IGSM reference scenario ex-
hibits strong growth in bio-fuels production be-
ginning after the year 2020. Deployment in the
IGSM reference scenario is driven primarily by
a world oil price that in the year 2100 is over 4.5
times the price in the year 2000. In contrast, the
MiniCAM reference scenario, with its lower
long-term world oil price, includes insufficient
incentive to create a substantial market for bio-
mass crops. However, the MiniCAM reference
scenario does include an increasing share of the
potentially recoverable bio-waste as a source 
of energy. 
Land use has implications for the carbon cycle
as well. IGSM applies its component Terrestrial
Ecosystem Model with a prescribed scenario of
land use, and this land-use pattern is employed
in all the IGSM scenarios. Thus, in the IGSM
scenarios commercial biomass production must
compete with other agricultural activities for
cultivated land, but the extent of cultivated land
does not change from scenario to scenario. Be-
cause the land-use pattern is fixed in the IGSM
scenarios, changes in the net flux of carbon to
the atmosphere reflect the behavior of the ter-
restrial ecosystem in response to changes in
CO2 and climatic effects that are considered
within the IGSM’s Earth system component.
Taken together, these effects lead to the nega-
tive net emissions from the terrestrial ecosys-
tem (Figure 3.12), which contrasts with the
neutral biosphere assumed in the MERGE ref-
erence scenario. (Note that one tonne C is
equivalent to 3.67 tonnes CO2. See Box 3.2 for
more on converting between units of carbon and
units of CO2.)   
MiniCAM uses the terrestrial carbon cycle
model of MAGICC (Wigley and Raper 2001,
Wigley and Raper 2002) to determine the ag-
gregate net carbon flux to the atmosphere. How-
ever, unlike either IGSM or MERGE,
MiniCAM determines the level of terrestrial
emissions as an output from an integrated agri-
culture-land-use module rather than as the prod-
uct of a terrestrial model with fixed land use.
Thus, the MiniCAM scenarios exhibit the same
types of CO2 fertilization effects as the IGSM
scenarios, but they also represent interactions
between the agriculture sector and the distribu-
tion of natural terrestrial carbon stocks.
EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS,
AND RADIATIVE FORCING
The growth in the global economy in the ref-
erence scenarios and the changes in the
composition of the global energy system
lead to growing emissions of GHGs over the
century. Emissions from fossil fuel burning
and cement production more than triple
from 2000 to 2100 in all three reference sce-
narios. With growing emissions, GHG con-
centrations rise substantially over the
twenty-first century, with CO2 concentra-
tions increasing by 2½ to over 3 times prein-
dustrial levels. Increases in non-CO2 GHG
concentrations vary more widely across the
reference scenarios. Radiative forcing from
the GHGs considered in this research
reaches 6.4 W/m2 to 8.6 W/m2 from prein-
dustrial by 2100, with the non-CO2 GHGs
accounting for 20% to 25% of the instanta-
neous forcing in 2100.
Figure 3.12. Global Net Emissions of CO2 from
Terrestrial Systems Including Net Deforestation
Across Reference Scenarios (GtC/yr).  Global net
emissions of CO2 from terrestrial systems, including net
deforestation, serve as a slight net sink in 2000 that grows
over time in the IGSM and MiniCAM reference scenarios,
mainly because of reduced deforestation and CO2
fertilization of plants. The MERGE scenarios assume a neutral
terrestrial system.
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Greenhouse Gas Emissions
CALCULATING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
Emissions of CO2 from fossil fuels are the sum
of emissions from each of the different fuel
types, and for each type, emissions are the prod-
uct of a fuel-specific emissions coefficient and
the total combustion of that fuel. Exceptions to
this treatment occur if a fossil fuel is used in a
non-energy application (e.g., as a feedstock for
plastic) or if the carbon is captured and stored in
isolation from the atmosphere. All three of the
modeling groups assumed the availability of
CCS technologies and treated the leakage from
such storage as zero over the time period con-
sidered in this research, although they assumed
that carbon capture technologies capture and
store less than 100% of the CO2. CCS increases
the costs of electricity production with no at-
tendant benefits, absent actions to constrain car-
bon emissions, so CCS is not deployed in any
of the reference scenarios. 
Although bioenergy such as wood, organic
waste, and straw are hydrocarbons like the fos-
sil fuels (only much younger), they are treated
as if their use had no net carbon release to the
atmosphere. Any fossil fuels used in their culti-
vation, processing, transport, and refining are
accounted for. Nuclear and non-biomass re-
newables, such as wind, solar, and hydroelectric
power, have no direct CO2 emissions and there-
fore have a zero carbon coefficient. Like bioen-
ergy, emissions associated with the construction
and operation of conversion facilities are ac-
counted with the associated emitting source. 
The calculation of net emissions from terrestrial
ecosystems, including land-use change, is more
complicated, and each model employs its own
technique. IGSM employs the Terrestrial
Ecosystem Model, which is a state-of-the-art
terrestrial carbon-cycle model with a detailed,
geographically disaggregated representation of
terrestrial ecosystems and associated stocks and
flows of carbon on the land. The IGSM scenar-
ios, therefore, incorporate fluxes to the atmos-
phere as a dynamic response of managed and
unmanaged terrestrial systems to the changes in
the climate and atmospheric composition.
MiniCAM builds its net terrestrial carbon flux
by summing both emissions from changes in the
stocks of carbon from human-induced land-use
change and the natural system response, repre-
sented in the reduced-form terrestrial carbon
module of MAGICC. As noted above, Mini-
CAM employs a simpler reduced-form repre-
sentation of terrestrial carbon reservoirs and
fluxes; however, its scenario is fully integrated
with its agriculture and land-use module, which
in turn is directly linked to energy and economic
activity in the energy portion of the model. As noted
above, the MERGE modeling group assumed no
net emissions from the terrestrial biosphere.
Differing approaches among the modeling
groups are used to account for the non-CO2
GHGs. They begin with a current inventory of
these gases and link growth in emissions to rel-
evant activity levels. Because emissions are as-
sociated with very narrow activities, in some
cases below the sectoral resolution of the mod-
els, emissions growth may be benchmarked to
more detailed forecasts of activities.
REFERENCE SCENARIOS OF FOSSIL FUEL
CO2 EMISSIONS
All three reference scenarios include a transi-
tion from conventional oil production to some
other source of liquid fuels based primarily on
other fossil sources, either unconventional liq-
uids or coal. As a consequence, carbon-to-
energy ratios cease their historic pattern of
decline (Figure 3.13). While the particulars of
the reference scenarios differ, no reference sce-
nario shows a dramatic reduction in carbon in-
tensity over this century. 
Moderating the effect on the atmosphere of
anthropogenic CO2 emissions is the net up-
take by the ocean and the terrestrial bios-
phere. As atmospheric CO2 grows in the
reference scenarios, the rate of net uptake
by the ocean increases as well.  Also, mainly
through the effects of CO2 fertilization, in-
creasing atmospheric levels of CO2 spur
plant growth and net carbon uptake by the
terrestrial biosphere. Differences among sce-
narios of these effects are, in part, a reflection
of variation in their sub-models of the car-
bon cycle.
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Substantial increases in total energy use with no
or little decline in carbon intensity lead to sub-
stantial increases in CO2 emissions per capita
(Figure 3.14) and in global totals (Figure 3.15).
Emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel use and in-
dustrial processes increase from less than 7
GtC/yr in 2000 to between 22.5 and 24.0 GtC/yr
by 2100. These global emissions are higher than
in many earlier studies such as IS92a, where
emissions were 20 GtC/yr in 2100 (Leggett et
al. 1992). Global emissions from these refer-
ence scenarios are closer to those from the
higher scenarios in the IPCC SRES (Nakicen-
ovic et al. 2000); particularly those included
under the headings A1FI and A2. U.S. emissions
trajectories are more varied than the global tra-
jectories. By 2100, U.S. emissions are between
2 GtC/yr and 5 GtC/yr.
The three reference scenarios display a larger
share of emissions growth outside of the Annex
I nations – the developed nations of the OECD
as well as Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union1 (Figure 3.16). Annex I emissions are
highest and Non-Annex I emissions lowest in
the IGSM reference scenarios. At least in part,
this is because of two factors underlying the
Figure 3.13. Global and U.S CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion and Industrial Sources Relative to
Primary Energy Consumption (GtC/EJ).  The CO2 intensity of energy use changes little over
the century in the three reference scenarios, reflecting the fact that fossil fuels remain important sources
of energy. Potential reductions in the CO2 intensity of energy from more carbon-free or low-carbon
energy sources is offset by a move to more carbon-intensive shale oil or synthetic fuels from coal.
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1 Annex I is defined in the U.N. Framework Convention
on Climate Change (FCCC [UN 1992]).  However,
since the FCCC entered into force, the Soviet Union
has broken up.  As a consequence, some of the re-
publics of the former Soviet Union are now considered
developing nations and do not have the same obliga-
tions as the Russian Federation under the FCCC.  Thus,
strictly speaking, the aggregations employed by the
three modeling groups may not precisely align with the
present partition of the world’s nations.  However, the
quantitative implications of these differences are small. 
Two different conventions have been used to report emissions
and prices in past studies of CO2 emissions and concentrations.
One convention is based on the total mass of emitted CO2. Emis-
sions are commonly expressed in tonnes of CO2 and prices in
terms of dollars per tonne of CO2. The second convention is
based on the carbon component of the emitted CO2. Emissions
are expressed in tonnes of carbon and prices in terms of dollars
per tonne of carbon. This report uses the second approach
throughout. In contrast, emissions of non-CO2 GHGs, such as
CH4 or N2O, are reported in terms of their full mass.
It is important to be clear on which convention is used, but it is
easy to convert between the two based on the molecular com-
position of CO2. One molecule of CO2 includes one carbon atom,
with a molecular weight of 12, and two oxygen atoms, each with
a molecular weight of 16. The total molecular weight of CO2 is
therefore 44, and carbon represents 12/44 of this weight. Emis-
sions expressed in terms of CO2 are therefore larger than when
expressed in terms of the carbon component of CO2: one tonne
of CO2 is equivalent to 44/12, or 3.67, tonnes of carbon. Con-
versely, emissions prices are lower when reported in units of
CO2 because the price must be spread over a larger weight; $100
per tonne of carbon is equivalent to $27 per tonne of CO2.
BOX 3.2 Reporting Conventions for Carbon Emissions 
and Prices 
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IGSM scenarios. First, the demand for liquids
is satisfied by expanding production of uncon-
ventional oil, which has relatively high carbon
emissions at the point of production. The U.S.,
with major resources of shale oil, switches from
being an oil importer to an exporter but is re-
sponsible for CO2 emissions associated with
shale oil production. Second, assumed rates of
productivity growth in Non-Annex I nations are
lower in the IGSM scenarios than in those of the
other two models.
In contrast, the MERGE reference scenario as-
sumes that liquids come primarily from coal, a
fuel that is more broadly distributed around the
world than unconventional oils. The MERGE
Figure 3.14. Global and U.S. Emissions of CO2 from Fossil and Other Industrial
Sources per Capita Across Reference Scenarios (tonnes per capita).  Global per capita
fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions grow in all three reference scenarios. However even after 100
years of growth, global per capita CO2 emissions are slightly less than ½ of the 2000 U.S. level in the three
scenarios. There is greater divergence in U.S. CO2 emissions per capita over the century among the
reference scenarios.
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Figure 3.15. Global and U.S. Emissions of CO2 from Fossil Fuels and Industrial Sources (CO2 from land-use
change excluded) Across Reference Scenarios (GtC/yr).  Global emissions of CO2 from
fossil fuel combustion and other industrial sources, mainly cement production, grow throughout the
century in all three reference scenarios. By 2100, global emissions are between 22.5 GtC/yr and 24.0
GtC/yr.  U.S. emissions are more varied across the reference scenarios. By 2100, U.S. emissions are
between 2 GtC/yr and 5 GtC/yr. Note that CO2 from land-use change is excluded from this figure.
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
0
5
10
15
20
25
G
tC
/y
r
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
G
tC
/y
r
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Global U.S. 
IGSM_REF
MERGE_REF
MINICAM_REF
80
The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 3 - Reference Scenarios
scenarios also exhibit higher rates of labor pro-
ductivity in the Non-Annex I nations than the
IGSM scenarios. Finally, the MERGE reference
scenario has a greater deployment of nuclear
power, leading to a lower carbon-to-energy
ratio. These three features combine to produce
lower Annex I emissions and higher Non-Annex
I emissions than in the IGSM reference sce-
nario. The MiniCAM reference scenario has
Annex I emissions similar to those of the
MERGE reference scenario, but higher Non-
Annex I emissions. 
The range of global fossil fuel and industrial
CO2 emissions across the three reference sce-
narios is relatively narrow compared with the
uncertainty inherent in these developments over
a century. While it is beyond the scope of this
research to conduct a formal uncertainty or
error analysis, both higher and lower emissions
trajectories could be constructed.
There are at least two approaches to developing
a sensible context in which to view these sce-
narios. One is to compare them with others pro-
duced by analysts who have taken on the same
or a largely similar task. The literature on emis-
sions scenarios is populated by hundreds of sce-
narios of future fossil fuel and industrial CO2
emissions. Figure 3.17 gives some sense of what
earlier efforts have produced, although they
should be used with care. Many were developed
at earlier times and may be significantly at vari-
ance with events as they have already unfolded.
Also, no effort was undertaken in constructing
the collection in the figure to weight scenarios
for the quality of underlying analysis. Scenar-
ios for which no underlying trajectories of pop-
ulation or GDP are available are mixed in with
efforts that incorporate the combined wisdom
of a large team of interdisciplinary researchers
working over the course of years. Moreover, it is
not clear that the observations are independent.
Figure 3.16. Global Emissions of Fossil Fuel and Industrial CO2 by Annex I and Non-Annex I Countries Across
Reference Scenarios (GtC/yr).  Emissions of fossil fuel and industrial CO2 in the Non-Annex I countries exceed Annex I
emissions for all three reference scenarios by 2030 or earlier.
The MERGE and MiniCAM reference scenarios exhibit continued
relative rapid growth in emissions in Non-Annex I regions after
that, so that emissions are on the
order of twice the level of Annex I by
2100. The IGSM reference scenario
does not show continued divergence,
due in part to assumptions of relatively
slower economic growth in Non-
Annex I regions and faster growth in
Annex I than the scenarios from the
other modeling groups. The IGSM
reference scenario also shows
increased emissions in Annex I as
those nations become producers and
exporters of shale oil, tar sands, and
synthetic fuels from coal
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The clustering of year 2100 fossil fuel and in-
dustrial CO2 emissions around 20 GtC/yr in
both the pre- and post-IPCC TAR time frames
coincides closely with the IPCC IS92a scenario.
Many later scenarios were simply tuned to it, so
are not independent assessments. For these rea-
sons and others, looking to the open literature
can provide some information, but caution in in-
terpreting literature compilations is warranted.
Another approach to provide a context is sys-
tematic uncertainty analysis. There have now
been several such analyses, including efforts by
Nordhaus and Yohe (1983), Reilly et al. (1987),
Manne and Richels (1994), Scott et al. (2000),
and Webster et al. (2002). These studies contain
many valuable lessons and insights. For the pur-
poses of this research, one useful product of
these uncertainty studies is an impression of the
position of any one scenario within the window
of futures that might pass a test of plausibility.
Also useful is the way that the distribution of
outcomes is skewed upward – an expected out-
come when one considers that many model in-
puts, and indeed emissions themselves, are
constrained to be greater than zero. Naturally,
these uncertainty calculations present their own
problems (Webster 2003).
FUTURE SCENARIOS OF ANTHROPOGENIC CH4
AND N2O EMISSIONS
The range of emissions for CH4 and N2O is
wider than for CO2 (Figure 3.18). Base-year
emissions in the MERGE and MiniCAM refer-
ence scenarios are similar for N2O but diverge
for CH4. In the IGSM reference scenario, CH4
emissions are higher in the year 2000 than in the
other scenarios, reflecting an independent as-
sessment of historical emissions and uncertainty
in the scientific literature regarding even his-
toric emissions. Note that the IGSM reference
scenario has a correspondingly lower natural
CH4 source (from wetlands and termites) that is
not shown in Figure 3.18, balancing the ob-
served concentration change, rate of oxidation,
and natural and anthropogenic sources.
Both the IGSM and MERGE reference scenar-
ios exhibit steadily growing CH4 emissions
throughout the twenty-first century as a conse-
quence of the growth of CH4-producing activi-
ties such as ruminant livestock herds, natural
gas use, and landfills. Unlike CO2, for which the
combustion of fossil fuels without CCS leads
inevitably to emissions, slight changes in activ-
ities can substantially reduce emissions of the
non-CO2 gases (Reilly et al. 2003). The Mini-
CAM reference scenario assumes that despite
the expansion of human activities traditionally
associated with CH4 production, emissions con-
trol technologies will be deployed in response
Figure 3.17. Global Emissions
of CO2 from Fossil Fuel and
Industrial Sources: Historical
Development and Scenarios
(GtC/yr).  The 284 non-
intervention, or reference, scenarios
published before 2001 are included in
the figure as the blue-shaded range.
The thin lines are an additional 55
non-intervention scenarios published
since 2001. Two vertical bars on the
right-hand side indicate the ranges
for scenarios since 2001 (post-TAR
non-intervention) and for those
published up to 2001 (TAR plus 
pre-TAR non-intervention). 
Source: Figure 4, Nakicenovic et al.
2006, with kind permission of Springer
Science and Business Media.
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to local environmental regulations and in re-
sponse to the economic value of CH4. For this
reason, CH4 emissions peak and decline in the
MiniCAM reference scenario.
FUTURE SCENARIOS OF ANTHROPOGENIC
F-GAS EMISSIONS
A set of industrial products that act as GHGs are
combined under the term, F-gases, which refers to
an element that is common to them, fluorine. Sev-
eral are replacements for the CFCs that have
been phased out under the Montreal Protocol.
They are usefully divided into two groups: (1) a
group of HFCs, most of which are short-lived,
and (2) the long-lived PFCs and SF6. Figure
3.19 presents the reference scenarios for these
GHGs. The IGSM and MERGE reference sce-
narios exhibit strong growth in the short-lived
species, while the MiniCAM reference scenario
exhibits about half as much growth over the
century. Emissions of the long-lived gases are
very similar among the reference scenarios.
PFCs are used in semiconductor production and
are emitted as a byproduct of aluminum smelt-
ing; they can be avoided relatively cheaply.
Emissions from the main use of SF6 in electric
switchgear can easily be abated by recycling to
minimize venting to the atmosphere. Many of
the abatement activities have already been un-
dertaken, and the modeling groups assumed
they will continue to be used.
The Carbon Cycle: Net Ocean and
Terrestrial CO2 Uptake
The stock of carbon in the atmosphere at any
time is determined from an initial concentration
of CO2 to which is added anthropogenic emis-
sions from fossil fuel and industrial sources and
from which is subtracted net CO2 transfer from
the atmosphere to the ocean and terrestrial sys-
tems. Each of the three participating models
represents these processes differently.
The three reference scenarios display strong in-
creases in ocean uptake of CO2 (Figure 3.20),
reflecting modeled mechanisms that become in-
creasingly active as CO2 accumulates in the at-
mosphere. The IGSM reference scenario has the
least active ocean, which results from its three-
dimensional ocean representation that shows
less uptake, in part, as a result of rising water
temperatures and CO2 levels in the surface layer
and, in part, as a result of a slowing of mixing
into the deep ocean. The MERGE reference sce-
nario has the most active ocean, and uptake
rates continue to increase over the century. As
will be discussed in Chapter 4, the three ocean
models produce more similar behavior in the
stabilization scenarios; for example, the
MERGE and MiniCAM Level 1 and Level 2
scenarios have almost identical ocean uptake.
Figure 3.18. Global CH4 and N2O Emissions Across Reference Scenarios (Mt  CH4/yr and Mt N2O/yr).  Global
anthropogenic emissions of CH4 and N2O vary widely among the reference scenarios. There is
uncertainty in year 2000 CH4 emissions, with the IGSM reference scenario ascribing more of the
emissions to human activity and less to natural sources. Differences in the scenarios reflect, to a large
extent, different assumptions about whether current emissions rates will be reduced significantly for other
reasons, for example, whether higher natural gas prices will stimulate capture of CH4 for use as a fuel.
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As discussed above, the net transfer of CO2
from the atmosphere to terrestrial systems in-
cludes many processes, such as deforestation
(which transfers carbon from the land to the at-
mosphere), uptake from forest regrowth, and the
net effects of atmospheric CO2 and climate con-
ditions on vegetation. As noted earlier, MERGE
employs a neutral biosphere: by assumption, its
net uptake is zero with processes that store car-
bon assumed to just offset those that release it.
Taken together with its more active ocean sys-
tem in the reference scenario, the behavior of
the carbon cycle in total is similar to the other
two models, especially MiniCAM. IGSM and
MiniCAM employ active terrestrial biospheres,
which on balance remove carbon from the at-
mosphere (Figure 3.12). Both the MiniCAM
and the IGSM reference scenarios display the
net effects of deforestation, which declines in
the second half of the century, combined with
terrestrial processes that accumulate carbon in
existing terrestrial reservoirs. The IGSM and
MiniCAM reference scenarios also include
feedback effects of a changing climate.
Greenhouse Gas Concentrations
Radiative forcing is related to the concentrations
of GHGs in the atmosphere. The relationship
between emissions and concentrations of GHGs
is discussed in Box 2.2. The concentration of
gases that reside in the atmosphere for long pe-
Figure 3.19. Global Emissions of Short-Lived and Long-Lived F-Gases
(Kt HFC-134a-Equivalent/yr and Kt SF6-Equivalent/yr).  
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
K
t 
H
F
C
-1
34
a-
E
qu
iv
al
en
t/
yr
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
K
t 
S
F
6-
E
qu
iv
al
en
t/
yr
Short-Lived F-Gas Emissions Long-Lived F-Gas Emissions
IGSM_REF
MERGE_REF
MINICAM_REF
Figure 3.20. CO2 Uptake from Oceans Across Reference Scenarios (GtC/yr, expressed in terms of net
emissions). The IGSM reference scenario, which is based on the IGSM’s three-dimensional ocean model, exhibits less CO2 uptake
than the other two reference scenarios and, after some point, little additional increase in uptake even though concentrations are rising.
The MiniCAM reference scenario exhibits some slowing of
ocean uptake, although not as pronounced as in the IGSM
reference scenario. There is no slowing of uptake in the
MERGE reference scenario. Although the MERGE reference
scenario has higher ocean uptake in the latter half of the
century, the effects of this increase are offset by the
assumption of a neutral biosphere. Hence the aggregate
behavior of its carbon cycle tends to be more similar to that
in the other two reference scenarios, especially the MiniCAM
reference scenario (Figure
3.22). The three ocean
models produce more similar
behavior in the stabilization
scenarios.
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riods of time – decades to millennia – is more
closely related to cumulative emissions than to
annual emissions. In particular, this is true for
CO2, the gas responsible for the largest contri-
bution to radiative forcing. This relationship can
be seen for CO2 in Figure 3.21, where cumula-
tive emissions over the period 2000 to 2100,
from the three reference scenarios and the
twelve stabilization scenarios, are plotted
against the CO2 concentration in the year 2100.
The plots for all three models lie on essentially
the same line, indicating that despite consider-
able differences in representation of the processes
that govern CO2 uptake, the aggregate response
to increased emissions is very similar. This basic
linear relationship also holds for other long-lived
gases, such as N2O, SF6, and the other long-lived
F-gases.
GHG concentrations rise in all three reference
scenarios. CO2 concentrations increase from
370 ppmv in year 2000 to somewhere in the
range of 700 to 875 ppmv in 2100 (Figure 3.22).
The preindustrial concentration of CO2 was ap-
proximately 280 ppmv. While all three reference
scenarios display the same increasing pattern,
by the year 2100 there is a difference of approx-
imately 175 ppmv among the three scenarios.
This difference has implications for radiative
forcing and emissions mitigation (discussed in
Chapter 4).
Increases in the concentrations of the non-CO2
GHGs vary across the reference scenarios. The
concentrations of CH4 and N2O in the Mini-
CAM reference scenario are on the low end of
the range, reflecting assumptions discussed
above about use of CH4 for energy and emis-
sions control for non-climate reasons. The
IGSM reference scenario has the highest 
concentrations for all of the substances. The dif-
ferences mainly reflect differences in anthro-
pogenic emissions, but they also are influenced
by the way each model treats natural emissions
and sinks for the gases. The IGSM scenarios in-
clude climate and atmospheric feedbacks to nat-
ural systems, which tend to result in an increase
in natural emissions of CH4 and N2O. Also, in-
creases in other pollutants generally lengthen
the lifetime of CH4 in the IGSM scenarios be-
cause the other pollutants deplete the atmos-
phere of the hydroxyl radical (OH), which is the
removal mechanism for CH4. These feedbacks
tend to amplify the difference in anthropogenic
emissions among the reference scenarios. The
concentrations of the short-lived and long-lived
F-gases are also presented in Figure 3.22.
Radiative Forcing from 
Greenhouse Gases
Contributions to radiative forcing are a combi-
nation of the abundance of the gas in the at-
mosphere and its heat-trapping potential
(radiative efficiency). Of the directly released
anthropogenic gases, CO2 is the most abundant,
measured in parts per million; the others are
measured in parts per billion. However, the
other GHGs are about 24 times (CH4), to 200
times (N2O), to thousands of times (SF6 and
PFCs) more radiatively efficient than CO2.
Thus, what they lack in abundance they make
up for, in part, with radiative efficiency. How-
ever, CO2 is still the main contributor to radia-
tive forcing among these substances, and all
three reference scenarios exhibit an increasing
relative contribution from CO2.
Figure 3.21. Relationship Between Cumulative
CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion and
Industrial Sources, 2000-2100, and Atmospheric
CO2 Concentration in 2100 Across All Scenarios.
Despite differences in how the carbon cycle is handled in
each of the three models, the scenarios exhibit a very similar
response in terms of concentration level for a given level of
cumulative emissions. [Note. The cumulative emissions do not
include emissions from land use and
land-use change]. IGSM
MERGE
MINICAM
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The three models display essentially the same
relationship between GHG concentrations and
radiative forcing, so the three reference scenar-
ios also all exhibit higher radiative forcing,
growing from roughly 2.1 W/m2 from prein-
dustrial in 1998 to between 6.4 W/m2 and 8.6
W/m2 in 2100. The differences among radiative
forcing in 2100 imply differences in the amount
of emissions reductions required to stabilize as
the four radiative forcing levels in this research.
For example, the emissions reductions required
for stabilization in the IGSM stabilization sce-
narios are larger than those required in the Mini-
CAM stabilization scenarios, because the
Figure 3.22. Atmospheric Concentrations of CO2,
CH4, N2O, and F-gases Across the Reference
Scenarios (units vary).  Differences in concentrations for
CO2, CH4, and N2O across the reference scenarios reflect
differences in emissions and treatment of removal processes. By
2100, CO2 concentrations range from about 700 ppmv to 900
ppmv, CH4 concentrations range from 2000 ppbv to 4000 ppbv,
and N2O concentrations range from about 380 ppbv to 500 ppbv. 
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radiative forcing reaches 8.6 W/m2 in 2100 in
the IGSM reference scenario and 6.4 W/m2 in
the MiniCAM reference scenario.
The relative contribution of CO2 to radiative
forcing increases over the century in all three
reference scenarios (Figure 3.23). In 2000, the
non-CO2 GHGs examined in this research con-
tributed slightly above 30% of the estimated ra-
diative forcing from preindustrial. In the IGSM
reference scenario, the contribution of the non-
CO2 GHGs to radiative forcing falls slightly to
about 26% by 2100. The MiniCAM reference
scenario includes little additional increase in ra-
diative forcing for non-CO2 GHGs, largely as a
result of assumptions regarding the control of
CH4 emissions for non-climate reasons, and
thus has their share falling to about 18% by
2100. The MERGE reference scenario is inter-
mediate, with the non-CO2 GHG contribution
falling to about 24%.
From the discussion above, it can be seen that
the three reference scenarios contain many
large-scale similarities. All have expanding
global energy systems, all remain dominated by
fossil fuel use throughout the twenty-first cen-
tury, all generate increasing concentrations of
GHGs, and all produce substantial increases in
radiative forcing. Yet the reference scenarios dif-
fer in many details, ranging from demographics
to labor productivity growth rates to the com-
position of energy supply to treatment of the
carbon cycle. These differences shed light on
important points of uncertainty that arise for the
future. In Chapter 4, they will also be seen to
have important implications for efforts to limit
radiative forcing.
Figure 3.23. Radiative Forcing by Gas Across
Reference Scenarios (W/m2 from preindustrial).
CO2 accounts for more than 80% of the radiative forcing from
the GHGs considered in this research by 2100 in all three
reference scenarios. Radiative forcing in 2100 ranges from
about 6.4 W/m2 to 8.6 W/m2 from preindustrial in the
reference scenarios.
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INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 3, each modeling group developed scenarios of long-term GHG emissions associated
with changes in key characteristics, such as demographics, economic growth, and technology. This
chapter describes how such developments might affect or be affected by limits on radiative forc-
ing. It illustrates that society’s response to a limit on radiative forcing can take many paths, re-
flecting factors shaping the reference scenario and the availability and performance of
emissions-reducing technologies. Control of GHG emissions requires changes in the global energy,
economic, agriculture, and land-use systems. 
It should be emphasized that the four radiative forcing stabilization levels considered in this re-
search and detailed in Table 1.2 were chosen for illustrative purposes only. They reflect neither a
preference nor a recommendation. In all the stabilization scenarios, it was assumed that radiative
forcing would not be allowed to overshoot the radiative forcing levels along the path to long-term
stabilization. Given this assumption, each modeling group had to make further decisions regard-
ing the means of meeting these radiative forcing limits. Section 4.2 compares the approaches of
the three modeling groups. Section 4.3 shows the effect of the three strategies on GHG emissions,
concentrations, and radiative forcing. The implications for global and U.S. energy and industrial
systems are explored in Section 4.4 and for agriculture and land-use change in Section 4.5. Sec-
tion 4.6 discusses economic consequences of the measures to achieve the various radiative forc-
ing stabilization levels in these scenarios.
In these scenarios, stabilizing radiative forcing at levels ranging from 3.4 W/m2
to 6.7 W/m2 above preindustrial levels (Level 1 to Level 4) implies significant
changes to the world’s energy and  agriculture systems and leads to lower
global economic output.  Although all the stabilization scenarios require
changes in the world’s energy and agricultural systems, the three modeling
groups produced scenarios with differing conceptions of how these changes
might occur.  The economic implications vary considerably among the sce-
narios, depending on the amount that emissions must be reduced and the
evolution of technology, particularly in the post-2050 period.
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STABILIZING RADIATIVE
FORCING:  MODEL
IMPLEMENTATIONS
Some features of scenario construction were co-
ordinated among the three modeling groups,
and others were left to their discretion. In three
areas, a common set of approaches was adopted:
• Climate policies in the stabilization scenarios
• The timing of participation in stabilization
scenarios
• Policy instrument assumptions in stabiliza-
tion scenarios.
In two areas, the groups employed different ap-
proaches:
• The timing of CO2 emissions mitigation 
• Non-CO2 emissions mitigation.
Climate Policies in the 
Stabilization Scenarios
For the stabilization scenarios, each modeling
group assumed that, as in the reference scenar-
ios, the U.S. will achieve its goal of reducing
GHG emissions intensity (the ratio of GHG
emissions to GDP) by 18% by 2012, although
implementation of this goal was left to the judg-
ment of each modeling group. Also, the Kyoto
Protocol participants were assumed to achieve
their commitments through the first commit-
ment period, 2008 to 2012. In the reference sce-
narios, these policies were modeled as not
continuing after 2012. In the stabilization sce-
narios, these initial period policies were super-
seded by the long-term control strategies
imposed by each group.
Participation in 
Stabilization Scenarios
For the stabilization scenarios, it was assumed
that policies to limit the change in radiative
forcing would be applied globally after 2012, as
directed by the Prospectus. Although it seems
unlikely that all countries would simultaneously
join such a global agreement, and the economic
costs of stabilization would be greater with less-
than-universal participation, the assumption 
that all countries participate does provide a use-
ful benchmark.
Policy Instrument Assumptions 
in Stabilization Scenarios
Note that the issue of economic efficiency ap-
plies across both space and time. All of the 
scenarios assume an economically efficient
allocation of reductions among nations in each
time period, that is, across space. Thus, in these
scenarios, GHG emissions in all regions and
across all sectors of the economy were con-
trolled by imposing a single price for each GHG
at any point in time. As will be discussed in de-
tail in Section 4.5, the prices of emissions for
individual GHGs differ across the models. The
implied ability to access emissions reduction
opportunities wherever they are cheapest is
sometimes referred to as where flexibility
(Richels et al. 1996).
Timing of CO2 Emissions Mitigation
The cost of stabilizing radiative forcing to any
given level depends on the timing of the associ-
ated emissions reductions. There is a strong eco-
nomic argument that costs will be lower if
emissions reductions start slowly and then pro-
gressively ramp up, particularly for CO2. Dis-
tributing emissions mitigation over time, such
that larger efforts are undertaken later, reduces
the current cost as a consequence of such effects
as discounting, the preservation of energy-using
capital stock over its natural lifetime, and the
potential for the development of increasingly
cost-effective technologies (Wigley et al. 1996).
Although 100 years is a very long time horizon
for economic scenarios, it is not long enough to
fully evaluate stabilization goals. For several of
the radiative forcing stabilization levels, the sce-
narios are only approaching stabilization in
2100; radiative forcing is below the long-term
stabilization levels and still rising, but the rate of
increase is slowing. Stabilizing radiative forc-
ing and associated atmospheric GHG concen-
trations requires that any emissions be
completely offset by uptake or destruction
processes. Because ocean and terrestrial uptake
of CO2 is subject to saturation and system iner-
tia, at least for the approximate CO2 concentra-
tion levels considered in this research,
emissions need to peak and subsequently de-
cline during the twenty-first century or soon
thereafter. In the very long term (many hun-
dreds to thousands of years), emissions must de-
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cline to virtually zero for any CO2 concentration
to be maintained. Although there is some flexi-
bility in the inter-temporal allocation of emis-
sions, this allocation is inherently constrained
by the carbon cycle. Given that anthropogenic
CO2 emissions rise with time in all three of the
reference scenarios, the degree of CO2 emis-
sions reduction also increases steadily with time
in the stabilization scenarios.
Different approaches were used by the modeling
groups to determine the profile of emissions re-
ductions over time and how the different GHGs
contribute to meeting the radiative forcing sta-
bilization levels. A major reason for the differ-
ence is the structure of the models. MERGE is
an inter-temporal optimization model and is
able to solve for the cost-minimizing allocation
of emissions reductions across GHGs and over
time to meet a given radiative forcing stabiliza-
tion level. It thus offers insights regarding the
optimal path of emissions reductions. A posi-
tive discount rate will lead to a gradual phase-in
of emissions reductions, and the tradeoff among
GHGs is endogenously calculated based on the
contribution each makes toward the long-term
goal (Manne and Richels 2001). The changing
relative prices of GHGs over time can be inter-
preted as an optimal trading index for the GHGs
that combines economic considerations with
modeled physical considerations (lifetime and
radiative forcing). The resulting relative weights
are different from those derived using Global
Warming Potential (GWP) indices, which are
based purely on physical considerations (IPCC
2001). Furthermore, economically efficient in-
dices for the relative importance of GHG emis-
sions reductions will vary over time and across
policy regimes.
IGSM and MiniCAM are simulation models
and do not endogenously solve for optimal al-
locations over time and by GHG. However, the
choice of price paths over time used in the stabi-
lization scenarios for the IGSM and MiniCAM
modeling groups take account of insights from
economic principles that lead to a pattern similar
to that computed by MERGE. The pattern was
anticipated by Peck and Wan (1996) using a sim-
ple optimizing model with a carbon cycle and by
Hotelling (1931) in a simpler context.
In the MiniCAM stabilization scenarios, the rate
of increase in the carbon price was set equal to
the rate of interest plus the average rate of car-
bon removal from the atmosphere by natural
systems. This approach follows Peck and Wan
(1996) and yields a resulting carbon price path
similar in structure to that obtained in the
MERGE scenarios. This carbon price path en-
sures that the present discounted marginal cost
of having one tonne of carbon less in the at-
mosphere during one period in the future is ex-
actly the same regardless of whether the
removal takes place today or one period later.
When marginal costs are equal over time, total
costs cannot be reduced by making emissions
mitigation either earlier or later.
As is the case in the MERGE scenarios, the ex-
ponential increase in the price of CO2 continues
until such time as radiative forcing is stabilized
in the MiniCAM stabilization scenarios. There-
after, the price is set by the carbon cycle. That is,
once radiative forcing has risen to its stabiliza-
tion level, additional CO2 can only enter the at-
mosphere to the extent that natural processes
remove it, otherwise CO2 radiative forcing
would be increasing. This is relevant in the
Level 1 stabilization scenario and, to a lesser ex-
tent, in the Level 2 stabilization scenario. How-
ever, it is not relevant in the Level 3 or Level 4
scenarios because stabilization is not reached
until after the end of the twenty-first century.
The IGSM scenarios are based on a carbon
price path that rises 4% per year. The initial car-
bon price is set to achieve the required concen-
trations and radiative forcing. Thus, the rate of
increase in the CO2 price paths is identical for
all stabilization scenarios, but the initial value
of the carbon price is different. The lower the
concentration of CO2 allowed, the higher the ini-
tial price. The insight behind this approach is
that an entity faced with a carbon constraint and
a decision to reduce emissions now or later
would compare the expected return on that
emissions reduction investment with the rate of
return elsewhere in the economy. The 4% rate
is taken to be this economy-wide rate of return.
If the carbon price were rising more rapidly than
the rate of return, investments in emissions re-
ductions would yield a higher return than in-
vestments elsewhere in the economy, so that the
entity would invest more in emissions reduc-
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tions now (and possibly bank emissions permits
to use them later). By the same logic, an in-
crease in the carbon price lower than the rate of
return would lead to a decision to postpone
emissions reductions. It would lead to a tighter
carbon constraint and a higher carbon price in
the future. Thus, this approach is intended to be
consistent with a market solution that would al-
locate emissions reductions through time. 
Timing of Non-CO2
Emissions Mitigation
Like CO2, the contribution of non-CO2 GHGs
to radiative forcing depends on their concentra-
tions. However, these gases are dissociated in
the atmosphere over time so that the relation-
ship between emissions and concentrations is
different from that for CO2, as are the sources
of emissions and opportunities for emissions re-
ductions. Each of the three modeling groups
used its own approach to model control of non-
CO2 GHGs. As noted above, MERGE employs
an inter-temporal optimization approach. The
price of each GHG was determined so as to
minimize the cost of stabilizing radiative forc-
ing at each level. Thus, the price of each GHG
was constant across regions at any point in time,
but varied over time so as to minimize the cost
of achieving each stabilization level.
In the MiniCAM stabilization scenarios, non-
CO2 GHG prices were tied to the price of CO2
using the GWPs of the gases. This procedure
has been adopted by parties to the Kyoto Proto-
col and applied in the definition of the U.S.
emissions intensity goal. The IGSM stabiliza-
tion scenarios are based on the same approach
as MiniCAM stabilization scenarios for deter-
mining the prices for HFCs, PFCs, and SF6,
pegging the prices to that of CO2 using GWP
coefficients. For CH4 and N2O, however, inde-
pendent emission stabilization levels were set
for each gas in the IGSM scenarios because
GWPs poorly represent the full effects of CH4,
and emissions trading at GWP rates leads to
problems in defining what stabilization means
when CH4 and N2O are involved (Sarofim et al.
2005). The relatively near-term stabilization for
CH4 in the IGSM scenarios implies that near-
term emissions reductions result in economic
benefit, an approach consistent with a view that
there are risks associated with levels of radia-
tive forcing below the long-term stabilization
levels. This approach is different than that fol-
lowed in the MERGE scenarios, where any
value of CH4 emissions reductions is derived
only from the extent to which it contributes to
meeting the long-term stabilization level. In the
MERGE stabilization scenarios, reductions of
emissions of short-lived species like CH4 have
very little consequence for a radiative forcing
stabilization level that will not be reached for
many decades, so the optimized result places lit-
tle value on reducing emissions of short-lived
species until the stabilization level is ap-
proached. A full analysis of the resulting climate
change and its effects would be required to se-
lect between the approaches used in the
MERGE and IGSM scenarios. The different sta-
bilization paths in the scenarios from these two
models provide a range of plausible scenarios
for non-CO2 GHG stabilization. The MiniCAM
scenarios yield an intermediate result.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RADIATIVE
FORCING, GREENHOUSE GAS
CONCENTRATIONS, AND
EMISSIONS
Despite significantly different radiative forc-
ing levels in the reference scenarios, radia-
tive forcing relative to preindustrial levels in
2100 is similar across models in all four sta-
bilization scenarios. CO2 concentrations are
also similar in 2100 across the models. Sce-
narios with higher CO2 concentrations for
a given stabilization level generally have
lower concentrations and emissions of non-
CO2 GHGs, trading off reductions in these
substances to make up for higher forcing
from CO2. 
All three modeling groups produced scenar-
ios in which emissions reductions below lev-
els in the reference scenarios were much
smaller between 2000 and 2050 than be-
tween 2050 and 2100. With one exception at
the least stringent stabilization level, the sta-
bilization scenarios were characterized by a
peak and decline in global CO2 emissions in
the twenty-first century. In the most stringent
scenarios, CO2 emissions begin to decline 
immediately or within a matter of decades.
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Implications for Radiative Forcing
Given that all the models were constrained to
the same radiative forcing stabilization levels,
radiative forcing from preindustrial for the year
2100 is similar across the models (Table 4.1).1
The differences across the models between the
long-term stabilization levels and the radiative
forcing levels in 2100 are smaller for Levels 1
and 2 than for Levels 3 and 4 because the latter
allow a greater accumulation of GHGs in the at-
mosphere. For Levels 3 and 4, each modeling
group required radiative forcing to be below the
long-term limits in 2100 to allow for subsequent
emissions to fall gradually toward levels re-
quired for stabilization. 
The radiative forcing stabilization paths are
shown in Figure 4.1. Even though they reflect
different criteria used to allocate emissions re-
ductions over time, the paths are very similar
across models. The radiative forcing paths are
dominated by radiative forcing associated with
CO2 concentrations, which in turn are driven by
cumulative emissions. Thus, even fairly differ-
ent time profiles of CO2 emissions can yield rel-
atively little difference in concentrations and
radiative forcing.
Although their totals are similar, the GHG com-
position of radiative forcing differs among the
models. Figure 4.2 shows the breakdown among
gases in 2100 for the reference scenario along
with all four stabilization levels. Forcing is
dominated by CO2 in all scenarios at all stabi-
lization levels, but there are variations among
models. For example, the MiniCAM stabiliza-
tion scenarios have larger contributions from
CO2 and lower contributions from the non-CO2
gases than the scenarios from the other two
models. Conversely, the MERGE stabilization
scenarios have higher contributions from the
non-CO2 gases and lower contributions from
CO2 relative to the IGSM and MiniCAM stabi-
lization scenarios.
Implications for Greenhouse Gas
Concentrations
The relative GHG composition of radiative forc-
ing across models in any scenario reflects dif-
ferences in concentrations of the GHGs. The
CO2 concentration paths are presented in Figure
4.3, and the year 2100 atmospheric levels are
shown in Table 4.3. Because the stabilization
levels were specified in terms of total radiative
forcing from the multiple GHGs, it is possible
to meet those levels while varying from the ap-
proximate CO2 concentration levels used to con-
struct them (Table 1.2). That means CO2
concentrations in 2100 differ across models for
any stabilization level. For example, the CO2 con-
centrations in the MiniCAM stabilization sce-
narios are generally higher than in IGSM and
MERGE stabilization scenarios. Consequently,
CH4 and N2O concentrations are systematically
lower as can be seen in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5.
Differences in the GHG concentrations among
the scenarios from the three models reflect dif-
ferences in the way that tradeoffs were made
among gases and differences in assumed emis-
sions reduction opportunities for non-CO2
GHGs compared to CO2. 
Radiative Forcing in 2100
(W/m-2 from preindustrial)
Stabilization
Level
Long-Term
Radiative Forcing
Limit (W/m2 from
preindustrial)
IGSM MERGE MiniCAM
Reference No Constraint 8.6 6.6 6.4
Level 4 6.7 6.1 6.2 6.1
Level 3 5.8 5.4 5.7 5.5
Level 2 4.7 4.4 4.7 4.5
Level 1 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.4
Table 4.1. Radiative
Forcing in the Year
2100 Across Scenarios
1 The IGSM exceeds the Level 1 target by 0.1 W/m2,
which is a negligible difference that results from the it-
erative process required to achieve a radiative forcing
target.
Figure 4.1. Total Radiative Forcing by Year Across
Scenarios (W/m2 from preindustrial). Radiative forcing
trajectories differ across the stabilization levels but are similar
among models for each stabilization level. The similarity across
models reflects the design of the scenarios. Radiative forcing is
stabilized or close to being stabilized this century in the Level 1
and Level 2 scenarios. Radiative forcing remains below the long-
term radiative forcing stabilization
level in 2100 in the Level 3 and
Level 4 stabilization scenarios,
allowing for a gradual approach to
stabilization in the following
century.
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Approximate stabilization of CO2 concentra-
tions occurs by 2100 in all the Level 1 and Level
2 scenarios, but concentrations are still increas-
ing in 2100 for the Level 3 and Level 4 scenar-
ios, although at a slowing rate. An important
implication of the less stringent stabilization
levels is that substantial emissions reductions
would be required after 2100. Sometime within
the next century, all the stabilization paths
would require emissions levels nearly as low as
that for Level 1. Higher stabilization levels do
not change the nature of long-term changes in
emissions required in the global economy; they
only delay when the emissions reductions must
be achieved.
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Figure 4.2. Total Radiative Forcing by Gas in 2100
Across Scenarios (W/m2 from preindustrial).  CO2 is
the main contributor to radiative forcing by the end of the
century in the scenarios from all three modeling groups. The
IGSM reference scenario has the highest contribution from non-
CO2 GHGs among the three models. The MERGE stabilization
scenarios have the highest contribution from non-CO2 GHGs
among the three models, implying greater non-CO2 control
efforts in the IGSM scenarios than in the MERGE scenarios.
Contributions from non-CO2 GHGs are lowest in the MiniCAM
scenarios, reflecting, in
part, assumptions
about control of these
substances for non-
climate reasons.
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In all the stabilization scenarios, as the rise in
atmospheric concentrations slows, ocean uptake
slows and even begins to decline. These natural
removal processes are uncertain, and to some
extent this uncertainty is reflected in differences
in the scenarios from the three modeling groups,
as shown in Figure 4.6. Ocean uptake is small-
est in the IGSM scenarios. The MERGE sce-
narios have the highest uptake for the least strin-
gent stabilization levels, and the MiniCAM and
MERGE scenarios are almost identical under
the most stringent stabilization levels. 
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Figure 4.3. CO2 Concentrations Across Scenarios
(ppmv). Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 range from about
700 ppmv to 900 ppmv in 2100 in the reference scenarios, with
no sign of slowing. In the stabilization scenarios, differences in
CO2 concentrations among models occur because of the relative
contribution of other GHGs to meeting the radiative forcing
stabilization levels, and because for Levels 3 and 4, the scenarios
are based on a gradual approach to the stabilization level that will
not be reached until the following century.
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Greenhouse Gas Emissions
IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL CO2 EMISSIONS
Global CO2 emissions begin declining immedi-
ately after 2010 or in a matter of decades in all
three Level 1 stabilization scenarios (Figure
4.7). The constraint is so tight that there is rela-
tively little room for variation among models. 
All three modeling groups show continued
emissions growth throughout the first half of the
twenty-first century for Level 4, the least strin-
gent stabilization levels, and the MiniCAM
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Figure 4.4. CH4 Concentrations Across Scenarios (ppbv).  Differences among the models in CH4 concentrations are larger
than differences in CO2 concentrations. These differences stem from differences in reference scenarios, assumptions about options for
emissions reductions, and the methods used by the modeling groups for determining the relative emissions reductions among different
GHGs. Reductions in non-CO2 GHG emissions in the MiniCAM stabilization scenarios are based on 100-year GWPs. The MERGE
stabilization scenarios are based on intertemporal optimization, leading to
relatively little value for controlling CH4 emissions until the stabilization level
is approached due to the relatively short lifetime of CH4. The IGSM
stabilization scenarios are based on independent stabilization of CH4.
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CO2 Concentration in 2100 (ppmv)
Level
Approximate 
Long-Term CO2
Concentration
Limit (ppmv)
IGSM MERGE MiniCAM
Reference — 875 711 746
Level 4 750 677 670 716
Level 3 650 614 619 656
Level 2 550 526 535 562
Level 1 450 451 426 456
Table 4.2. CO2 Concentrations in the Year
2100 Across Scenarios (ppmv).  The
approximate CO2 concentrations were used as a
guide to develop the radiative forcing stabilization
levels. The scenarios were required to meet the total
radiative forcing limits. The CO2 concentrations in the
scenarios do not exactly match these approximations
and differ among the modeling groups because of
differences in the treatment of the forces that
influence emissions of GHGs, possibilities for
emissions reductions, and tradeoffs between
reductions among GHGs.
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Figure 4.5. N2O Concentrations Across Scenarios (ppbv).  Atmospheric concentrations of N2O range from about 375
ppbv to 500 ppbv in 2100 across the scenarios, with concentrations
continuing to rise in the reference scenarios. Different approaches were used
by the different modeling groups to develop emissions reductions, leading to
differences in concentrations between the reference and stabilization
scenarios.
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Level 4 scenario exhibits increasing emissions
throughout the century, although emissions are
approaching a peak by 2100. 
The stabilization scenarios from all three mod-
eling groups exhibit more emissions reduction
in the second half of the twenty-first century
than in the first half, as noted earlier, so the mit-
igation challenge grows with time. The precise
timing and degree of departure from the refer-
ence scenario depend on many aspects of the
scenarios and on each model’s representation of
Earth system properties, including the radiative
forcing stabilization level, the carbon cycle, at-
mospheric chemistry, the character of technol-
ogy options over time, the reference scenario
CO2 emissions path, the non-climate policy en-
vironment, the rate of discount, and the climate
policy environment. For Level 4, 85% or more
of emissions mitigation occurs in the second
half of the twenty-first century in the scenarios
from all three modeling groups. Even for 
Level 1, where the limit on radiative forcing is
the tightest and near-term mitigation most ur-
gent, 75% or more of the emissions reduction
below reference scenario occurs in the second
half of the century. While this is partly a result
of the when flexibility assumption, continuing
emissions growth in the reference scenarios
means that the percentage reduction increases
over time. 
All three of the modeling groups constructed
reference scenarios in which Non-Annex 1
emissions were a larger fraction of the global
total in the future than at present (Figure 3.16).
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Figure 4.6. Ocean CO2 Uptake Across Scenarios (GtC/yr, expressed in terms of net emissions).  Oceans have
taken up approximately one half of anthropogenic emissions of CO2 since preindustrial times, and future ocean behavior is an important
determinant of atmospheric concentrations. The three-
dimensional ocean used for the IGSM scenarios shows the least
ocean carbon uptake and considerable slowing of carbon uptake
even in the reference scenario as carbon concentrations
continue to rise. The MERGE reference scenario shows the
largest uptake among the three models, and the MERGE
stabilization scenarios have the greatest reductions from the
reference scenario among the models. The MiniCAM scenarios
are intermediate at most stabilization levels. At the more
stringent stabilization levels, the MERGE and MiniCAM scenarios
exhibit similar ocean uptake behavior.
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Because the stabilization scenarios are based on
the assumption that all regions of the world face
the same price of GHG emissions and have ac-
cess to the same general set of technologies for
mitigation, the resulting distribution of emis-
sions mitigation between Annex I and Non-
Annex I regions generally reflects the
distribution of reference scenario emissions
among them. So, when radiative forcing is re-
stricted to Level 1, all three models find that
more than half of the emissions mitigation oc-
curs in Non-Annex I regions by 2050 because
more than half of reference scenario emissions
occur in Non-Annex I regions. Note that with
the global policy specified so that a common
carbon price occurs in all regions at any one
time, emissions reductions occur separately
from and mostly independent of the distribution
of the economic burdens of reduction. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-CO2 GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS
The stabilization properties of the non-CO2
GHGs differ due to their lifetimes (as deter-
mined by chemical reactions in the atmos-
phere), technologies for reducing emissions,
and natural sources. CH4 has a relatively short
lifetime, and anthropogenic sources are a big
part of CH4 emissions. If anthropogenic emis-
sions are kept constant, an approximate equi-
librium between oxidation and net emissions
will be established relatively quickly and con-
centrations will stabilize. The same is true for
the relatively short-lived HFCs.
CH4 emissions under stabilization are system-
atically lower the more stringent the stabiliza-
tion level, as can be seen in Figure 4.8. The
MiniCAM scenarios have the lowest CH4 emis-
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Figure 4.7. Fossil Fuel and Industrial CO2 Emissions Across Scenarios (GtC/yr). Fossil fuel CO2 emissions vary among
the reference scenarios, but the three differing emissions
trajectories lead to emissions in 2100 in the range of 22.5
GtC/yr to 24.0 GtC/yr. The timing of emissions reductions varies
substantially across the stabilization levels. In the Level 1
scenarios, global emissions begin to decline soon after the
stabilization policy is put in place (as the scenarios were
designed, after 2012), and emissions are below current levels by
2100 in all of the Level 1 and Level 2 scenarios. Emissions peak
sometime around the mid-century to early in the next century in
the Level 3 and Level 4 scenarios and then begin a decline that
would continue beyond 2100. 
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sions among the models in the reference sce-
nario and the stabilization scenarios. The as-
sumed policy environment for CH4 control is
also important. Despite the fact that the IGSM
reference scenario has higher reference CH4
emissions than the MERGE reference scenario,
the MERGE stabilization scenarios have higher
emissions under stabilization in several in-
stances. The reason is that the MERGE inter-
temporal optimization approach leads to a low
relative price for CH4 emissions in the near
term, which grows rapidly relative to CO2, fa-
voring strong reductions of CH4 emissions only
toward the end of the century, whereas CH4
emissions were controlled based on quantitative
limits in the IGSM stabilization scenarios, and
these limits lead to substantial reduction early
in the century. Thus, emissions in the MERGE
stabilization scenarios sometimes exceed those
in the IGSM stabilization scenarios until the rel-
ative CH4 price rises sufficiently to induce sub-
stantial emissions reductions.
The very long-lived gases are nearly indestruc-
tible, thus for stabilization their emissions must
be very near zero. Based on the assumptions
used by all three modeling groups, it is possi-
ble, at reasonable cost, to achieve substantial re-
ductions in long-lived gas emissions. While
these substances are important, their emissions
are not as difficult to reduce as those from 
fossil energy.
N2O is more problematic. A major anthro-
pogenic source is from use of fertilizer for agri-
cultural crops – an essential use. Moreover, its
natural sources are important, and they are aug-
mented by terrestrial changes associated with
climate change. It is fortunate that N2O is not a
major contributor to radiative forcing because
the technologies and strategies needed to
achieve its stabilization are not obvious at this
time. Nevertheless, differences in the control of
N2O are observed across models, as shown in
Figure 4.9, although these differences are
smaller than those for CH4.
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Figure 4.8. CH4 Emissions Across Scenarios (Mt CH4/yr).  Emissions of anthropogenic CH4 vary widely across the models,
including differences in year 2000 emissions that reflect uncertainty about these emissions. With current concentrations and destruction
rates relatively well known, the difference in current levels means that IGSM scenarios ascribe relatively more to anthropogenic sources
and relatively less to natural sources than do the MERGE and MiniCAM
scenarios. Wide differences in scenarios for the future reflect differing modeling
approaches, outlooks for activity levels that lead to emission reductions, and
assumptions about whether emissions will be reduced for non-climate reasons.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR ENERGY
USE, INDUSTRY, AND
TECHNOLOGY ity production are reduced at relatively
lower prices than CO2 emissions from other
sectors, such as transport, industry, and
buildings. Emissions are reduced from elec-
tric power by increased use of technologies
such as CCS, nuclear energy, and renewable
energy. Other sectors respond to rising
greenhouse gas prices by reducing demands
for fossil fuels; substituting low- or non-emit-
ting energy sources such as bioenergy and
low-carbon electricity or hydrogen; and ap-
plying CCS where possible.
In these scenarios, stabilizing radiative forcing
requires a transformation of the global en-
ergy system, including reductions in the de-
mand for energy and changes in the mix of
energy technologies and fuels. This transfor-
mation is more substantial and takes place
more quickly at the more stringent stabiliza-
tion levels. Fossil fuel use and energy con-
sumption are reduced in all the stabilization
scenarios due to increased consumer prices
for fossil fuels. CO2 emissions from electric-
Scenarios of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Atmospheric Concentrations
99
IGSM_REF
MERGE_REF
MINICAM_REF
IGSM_Level
MERGE_Level
MINICAM_Level
Figure 4.9.  N2O Emissions Across Scenarios (Mt N2O/yr).
Anthropogenic emissions of N2O are similar across models in the stabilization
scenarios despite large differences in the reference scenarios. 
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Changes in Global Energy Use
The degree and timing of change in the global
energy system depends on the level at which ra-
diative forcing is stabilized. Although differ-
ences in the reference scenarios developed by
each of the three modeling groups led to differ-
ent patterns of response, some important simi-
larities emerge. The more stringent the radiative
forcing stabilization level, the larger the change
in the global energy system relative to the ref-
erence scenario; moreover, the scale of this
change is increasing over time. Also, significant
fossil fuel use continues at all four stabilization
levels. This pattern can be seen in Figure 4.10,
which shows the global primary energy con-
sumption across the scenarios, and Figure 4.11,
which shows the reference scenario from Chap-
ter 3 with an additional plot of the net changes
in the various sources of primary energy for
each stabilization level.
Although atmospheric stabilization would take
away much of the growth potential of coal over
the century, its usage expands above today’s lev-
els by the end of the century in all the stabiliza-
tion scenarios. In several of the Level 1 and
Level 2 scenarios, the global coal industry de-
clines in the first half of the century before re-
covering by 2100 to levels of production
somewhat larger than today. Oil and natural gas
also continue as contributors to total energy
over the century although, as with coal, they are
increasingly pushed from the energy mix as the
stabilization level is tightened.
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One reason that fossil fuels continue to be uti-
lized despite constraints on GHG emissions is
that CCS technologies are available in the sce-
narios from all three modeling groups. Figure
4.10 shows that as the carbon price rises, CCS
technology takes on an increasing market share.
Section 4.4.2 addresses this pattern as well as
the contribution of non-biomass renewable en-
ergy forms in greater detail.
Changes in the global energy system in re-
sponse to constraints on radiative forcing reflect
an interplay between technology options and the
other assumptions that shaped the reference sce-
narios. For example, the MERGE reference sce-
nario assumes relatively limited ability to access
unconventional oil and gas resources and the
evolution of a system that increasingly employs
coal as a feedstock for the production of liquids,
gases, and electricity. Against this background,
a constraint on radiative forcing leads to reduc-
tions in coal use and end-use energy consump-
tion. As the carbon price rises, nuclear and
non-biomass renewable energy forms and CCS
augment the response.
The IGSM scenarios assume greater availability
of unconventional oil than the MERGE scenar-
ios. Thus, the IGSM stabilization scenarios, in
general, involve less reduction in coal use by the
end of the century, but a larger decline in oil
than in the MERGE stabilization scenarios. To
produce liquid fuels for the transportation sec-
tor, the IGSM scenarios respond to a constraint
on radiative forcing by growing biomass energy
crops both earlier and more extensively than in
the reference scenario. Also, reductions in en-
ergy demand are larger in the IGSM stabiliza-
tion scenarios than in the scenarios from the
other two models.
The MiniCAM stabilization scenarios include
the smallest reductions in energy consumption
among the models. The imposition of con-
straints on radiative forcing leads to reductions
in oil, gas, and coal, as is the case with the
IGSM and MERGE stabilization scenarios, but
also leads to considerable expansion of nuclear
power and renewable energy supplies. The
largest supply response is in commercial bio-
derived fuels. These fuels are largely limited to
bio-waste recycling in the MiniCAM reference
scenario. As the price of CO2 rises, commercial
bioenergy becomes increasingly attractive. As
will be discussed in Section 4.5, the expansion
of the commercial biomass industry to produce
hundreds of EJ/yr of energy has implications for
crop prices, land use, land-use emissions, and
unmanaged ecosystems.
The relative role of nuclear energy differs
among the scenarios from the three modeling
groups. The MERGE reference scenario de-
ploys the largest amount of nuclear power, con-
tributing 170 EJ/yr of primary energy in the
year 2100. In the Level 1 stabilization scenario,
deployment expands to 240 EJ/yr of primary en-
ergy in 2100. Nuclear power in the MiniCAM
reference scenario produces 90 EJ/yr in the year
2100, which in the Level 1 stabilization scenario
expands to more than 180 EJ/yr of primary en-
ergy in the year 2100. The IGSM stabilization
scenarios show little change in nuclear power
generation among the stabilization scenarios or
compared with the reference, reflecting the as-
sumption that nuclear levels are limited by policy
decisions regarding safety, waste, and prolifera-
tion that are unaffected by climate policy.
Reductions in total primary energy consump-
tion play an important role in all of the stabi-
lization scenarios. In the IGSM stabilization
scenarios, this is the largest single change in the
global energy system. While not as dramatic as
the IGSM stabilization scenarios, the MERGE
and MiniCAM stabilization scenarios also ex-
hibit reductions in energy demand. As will be
discussed in Section 4.6, differences in primary
energy reductions among the models reflect dif-
ferences in the carbon prices required for stabi-
lization, which are substantially higher in the
IGSM stabilization scenarios than in the
MERGE and MiniCAM stabilization scenarios.
In all the stabilization scenarios, carbon price
differences are reflected in the user prices of en-
ergy. Carbon prices, in turn, reflect technologi-
cal assumptions that influence both the supply
of alternative energy and the responsiveness of
users to changing prices. The fuel and GHG
prices discussed later in this chapter, therefore,
can be instructive in understanding the charac-
ter of technology assumptions employed in 
the models.
As noted throughout the preceding and follow-
ing discussions, the economic equilibrium na-
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ture of these three models implies that technol-
ogy deployments are a reflection of prices.
Technologies are deployed up to the point where
marginal cost is equal to price. For example, the
prices of oil and carbon set the price at which
bio-fuels compete. It is therefore possible to
infer the marginal costs of bio-fuels when they
first enter the market and how the marginal cost
changes as the market expands.
It is worth reemphasizing that reductions in en-
ergy consumption are an important component
of response at all stabilization levels. These re-
ductions reflect a mix of three factors:
• Substitution of technologies that produce the
same energy service with lower direct-plus-
indirect carbon emissions
• Changes in the composition of final goods
and services, shifting toward consumption
of goods and services with lower direct-
plus-indirect carbon emissions 
• Reductions in the consumption of energy
services.
This report does not attempt to quantify the rel-
ative contribution of each of these responses.
Each of the models has a different set of tech-
nology options, different technology perform-
ance assumptions, and different model
structures. Furthermore, no well defined proto-
col exists that can provide a unique attribution
among these three general processes.
Changes in Global Electric Power
Generation
Across the scenarios, stabilization leads to sub-
stantial changes in electricity-production tech-
nologies, although the MERGE and MiniCAM
stabilization scenarios exhibit relatively little
change in electricity production. Indeed, across
the models, the relative reductions in electricity
production under stabilization are lower than
relative reductions in total primary energy con-
sumption. One reason for this is that electricity
price increases are smaller relative to those for
direct fuel use because the fuel input, while im-
portant, is only part of the consumer cost of
electricity. Also, the long-term cost of the transi-
tion to low and non-carbon-emitting sources is
relatively smaller in electricity production than
in the remaining sectors taken as an average.
There are substantial differences in the scale of
global electricity production across the three
reference scenarios, as shown in Chapter 3 and
repeated at the top of Figure 4.12. Electricity
production increases from about 50 EJ/yr in the
year 2000 to between 230 EJ/yr (IGSM) to 310
EJ/yr (MiniCAM) by 2100. In all three refer-
ence scenarios, electricity becomes an increas-
ingly important component of the global energy
system, fueled by growing quantities of fossil
fuels. Despite differences in the relative contri-
bution of different fuel sources across the three
reference scenarios, total production of elec-
tricity from fossil fuel rises from about 30 EJ/yr
in 2000 to between 150 EJ/yr and 190 EJ/yr in
2100. Thus, the difference in total reference sce-
nario electricity production among the models
largely reflects differences in the deployment of
non-fossil energy forms: bio-fuels, nuclear
power, fuel cells, and other renewables such as
wind, geothermal, and solar power.
The imposition of radiative forcing limits dra-
matically changes the electricity sector. Com-
mon characteristics of the stabilization
scenarios across models are that CCS (with
coal, gas, and, where present, oil-generated
power) is deployed at a large scale by the end of
the century and that use of coal without CCS
declines and eventually is not viable. The IGSM
scenarios, as has been noted, assume restrictions
on the expansion of nuclear power, and other re-
newables are either resource limited (hydro
power and electricity from bio-fuels) or become
more costly to integrate into the grid as their
share of electricity production rises because
they are intermittent (wind and/or solar). Partly
as a result, natural gas use in electricity produc-
tion increases in the IGSM stabilization scenar-
ios, especially in the nearer term before CCS
becomes economically viable. In the MERGE
stabilization scenarios, carbon-free technolo-
gies, including non-biomass renewables and nu-
clear, are viable and, thus, are favored over
natural gas, the use of which falls relative to the
reference scenario. In the MiniCAM stabiliza-
tion scenarios, nuclear and non-biomass renew-
able energy technologies capture a larger share
of the market. At the less stringent levels of sta-
bilization, Level 3 and Level 4, additional bio-
fuels are deployed in electricity production, and
total electricity production declines. Under the
most stringent stabilization level, commercial
bio-fuels used in electricity production in the
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Annual Global Carbon Capture and Storage
(GtC/yr)
Stabilization
Level Year IGSM MERGE MiniCAM
Level 4
2030 0.01 0.00 0.09
2050 0.44 0.00 0.15
2100 4.12 2.31 0.72
Level 3
2030 0.05 0.00 0.10
2050 0.83 0.00 0.19
2100 4.52 4.79 2.75
Level 2
2030 0.12 0.00 0.13
2050 1.96 0.44 0.38
2100 4.97 6.63 5.56
Level 1
2030 0.37 0.66 0.82
2050 2.76 2.24 2.95
2100 4.44 7.17 6.23
Cumulative Global Carbon Capture and Storage
(GtC)
Stabilization
Level Year IGSM MERGE MiniCAM
Level 4
2030 0.0 0.0 1.1
2050 3.6 0.0 3.4
2100 91.7 21.1 20.7
Level 3
2030 0.2 0.0 1.2
2050 8.5 0.0 4.0
2100 152.8 64.2 51.8
Level 2
2030 0.5 0.0 1.5
2050 19.5 3.2 6.4
2100 208.0 187.7 144.2
Level 1
2030 1.8 7.4 6.9
2050 36.7 32.4 43.0
2100 230.6 272.5 278.0
Table 4.3. Global Annual
CO2 Capture and Storage
in 2030, 2050, and 2100 for
Four Stabilization Levels.
Table 4.4. Global
Cumulative CO2 Capture
and Storage in 2050 and
2100 for Four
Stabilization Levels. 
MiniCAM stabilization scenarios are diverted
to the transportation sector, and use in electric-
ity production actually declines relative to the
reference toward the end of the century. In all
of the IGSM scenarios, bio-fuels are used pref-
erentially for transportation rather than for elec-
tricity generation. The difference between
MiniCAM and IGSM scenarios in this regard is
in part a reflection of the higher fuel prices in
the IGSM scenarios discussed in Section 4.6.3.
All modeling groups assumed that CO2 could
be captured and stored in secure repositories,
and as noted, in all scenarios CCS becomes a
large-scale activity. Annual capture quantities
are shown in Table 4.3. CCS is always one of
the largest single changes in the electricity pro-
duction system in response to stabilization, as
can be seen in Figure 4.13. As with mitigation in
general, CCS starts relatively modestly in all the
scenarios, but grows to large levels. The total
Scenarios of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Atmospheric Concentrations
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storage over the century is recorded in Table 4.4,
spanning a range from 20 GtC to 90 GtC for
Level 4 and 230 GtC to 280 GtC for Level 1.
The modeling groups did not report either loca-
tion of storage sites for CO2 or the nature of the
storage reservoirs, but these scenarios are
within the range of the estimates of global geo-
logic reservoir capacity (Edmonds et al. 2001,
Dooley et al. 2004).
Deployment rates for CCS depend on a variety
of circumstances, including capture cost, new
plant construction versus retrofitting for exist-
ing plants, the scale of power generation, the
price of fuel inputs, the cost of competing tech-
nologies, and the level of the CO2 price. It is
clear that the constraints on radiative forcing
considered in these scenarios are sufficiently
stringent that, if CCS is available at a cost and
performance similar to that considered in these
scenarios, and that it successfully navigates
other potential obstacles to widespread deploy-
ment, it could be a crucial component of future
power generation.
Yet CCS is hardly ordinary today. Geologic stor-
age is largely confined to experimental sites or
enhanced oil and gas recovery. There are as yet
no clearly defined institutions or accounting
systems to reward such technology in emissions
control agreements, and long-term liability for
stored CO2 has not been determined. All of
these issues and more must be resolved before
CCS could deploy on the scale envisioned in
these stabilization scenarios. If CCS were un-
available, the effect would be to increase the
cost of achieving stabilization in all of the sce-
narios. These scenarios tend to favor CCS, but
that tendency could easily change with differ-
ent assumptions about technologies such as nu-
clear power that are well within the range of
uncertainty about future costs and the policy en-
vironment. Nuclear power carries with it issues
of safety, waste, and proliferation. Thus, the vi-
ability of both CCS and nuclear power depends
on regulatory and public acceptance issues. For
example, global nuclear power in the reference
scenarios ranges from about 1½ times current
levels (if non-climate concerns such as safety,
waste, and proliferation constrain its growth as
is the case in one reference scenario), to an ex-
pansion of almost an order of magnitude assum-
ing relative economics as the only constraint.
Absent CCS and nuclear power, these models
would need to deploy other emissions reduction
options that could potentially be more costly, or
would need to assume large breakthroughs in
cost, performance, and reliability. This study
has not attempted to quantify the increase in
costs or the reorganization of the energy system
that would be required to achieve stabilization
without CCS. This sensitivity is an important
item in the agenda of future research.
Changes in Energy Patterns in the
United States
Changes in U.S. energy patterns are similar to
those observed for the world in general. This re-
flects the facts that the mitigation policy is im-
plemented globally, there are international
markets in fuels, each model makes most tech-
nologies globally available over time, and the
U.S. primary energy consumption in 2000 rep-
resented roughly a quarter of the world total.
Changes in the U.S. energy system are modest
for stabilization Level 4, but even with this
loose constraint, significant changes begin upon
implementation of the stabilization policy (the
first period shown is 2020) in the IGSM Level
4 scenario (Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15). Near-
term changes are more modest in the MERGE
and MiniCAM Level 4 scenarios. At more strin-
gent stabilization levels, the changes are more
substantial in the scenarios from all three mod-
eling groups. In the Level 1 scenarios, the re-
duction is in U.S. primary energy consumption
ranges from 8 EJ/yr to over 25 EJ/yr in 2020. 
Near-term changes in the U.S. energy system
vary more among models than the long-term ad-
justments. While oil consumption declines at
higher carbon prices for all the models and all
stabilization levels, near-term changes in oil
consumption do not follow a consistent pattern.
However, there is no ambiguity regarding the ef-
fect on coal consumption, which declines rela-
tive to the reference scenario in all stabilization
scenarios for all models in all time periods.
Similarly, total primary energy consumption de-
clines in all the stabilization scenarios. Nuclear
power, commercial biomass, and other renew-
able energy forms are advantaged with at least
one of them always deployed to a greater extent
in stabilization scenarios than in the reference
Chapter 4 - Stabilization ScenariosThe U.S. Climate Change Science Program
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scenario. The particular form and timing of ex-
panded development varies across models.
The stabilization scenarios from the three mod-
eling groups exhibit different energy sector re-
sponses reflecting differences in underlying
reference scenarios and technology assump-
tions. The largest change in the U.S. energy sys-
tem in the IGSM stabilization scenarios is the
reduction in total primary energy consumption
augmented by an expansion in the use of com-
mercial biomass fuels and deployment of CCS.
Similarly, the largest change in the MERGE
scenarios is the reduction in total primary en-
ergy consumption augmented by deployment of
CCS and bioenergy. The MiniCAM stabiliza-
tion scenarios also exhibit reductions in primary
energy consumption and increases in nuclear
power, along with smaller additions of com-
mercial biomass and other renewable energy
forms. The adjustment of the U.S. electric sec-
tor to the various stabilization levels is similar to
that for the world electricity sector. (Figure 4.16
and Figure 4.17).
IMPLICATIONS FOR
AGRICULTURE, LAND-USE,  
AND TERRESTRIAL CARBON
In the stabilization scenarios, the cost of using
fossil fuels and emitting CO2 rises, providing an
increasing motivation for the production and
transformation of bioenergy, as shown in Fig-
ure 4.18. In all of the stabilization scenarios,
production begins earlier and produces a larger
share of global energy as the stabilization level
becomes more stringent. Under less stringent
stabilization levels, production of bio-crops is
lower in the second half of the century in the
MERGE and MiniCAM scenarios than in the
IGSM scenarios. Differences between the mod-
els with respect to biomass deployment are not
simply due to different treatments of agriculture
and land use but also result from the full suite of
competing technologies and behavior assumptions.
Although total land areas allocated to bioenergy
crops are not reported in these scenarios, the ex-
tent of land areas engaged in the production of
energy becomes substantial. This is possible
only if appropriate land is available, which
hinges on future productivity increases for other
crops and the potential of bioenergy crops to be
grown on lands that are less suited for food, pas-
ture, and forests. In both the MiniCAM and
IGSM scenarios – MiniCAM and IGSM are the
two models with agriculture and land-use sub-
models – demands on land for bio-fuels cause
land prices to increase substantially as com-
pared with the reference scenarios because of
competition with other agricultural demands.
Stabilization scenarios limit the rise in CO2 con-
centrations and reduce the CO2 fertilization ef-
fect below that in the reference scenarios, which
in turn leads to smaller CO2 uptake by the ter-
The three modeling groups employed differ-
ent approaches to the treatment of the ter-
restrial carbon cycle, ranging from a simple
neutral biosphere model to a state-of-the-
art terrestrial carbon-cycle model. In two of
the models, a CO2 fertilization effect plays a
significant role. As stabilization levels become
more stringent, CO2 concentrations decline
and terrestrial carbon uptake declines, with
implications for emissions mitigation in the
energy sector. Despite the differences across
the modeling groups’ treatments of the ter-
restrial carbon cycle, the aggregate behavior
of the carbon cycles across models is similar.
In the stabilization scenarios, increased use
is made of biomass energy crops, the contri-
bution of which is ultimately limited by com-
petition with agriculture and forestry.  Two
of the modeling groups employed explicit
agriculture-land-use models to represent this
competition and represent land constraints
on the use of bio-energy. In the scenarios
from one modeling group, increased use of
bio-energy at more stringent stabilization
levels leads to substantial land use change
emissions as previously unmanaged lands are
shifted to biomass production.
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Figure 4.18. Global and U.S. Commercial Biomass Production Across Scenarios.  Scenarios of the potential for
commercial biomass production for the world and the U.S. are similar in magnitude and behavior among the models. Commercial
biomass production increases over time in the reference scenarios due in large part to technological improvements in bioenergy crop
production and increasing demand for liquid fuels. Stabilization increases the demand for bioenergy crops, causing production to
increase more rapidly and to reach higher levels than in the
reference scenarios. Dramatic growth in bioenergy crop production
raises important issues about the attendant increases in the land
that is devoted to these crops, including competition with other
agricultural crops, encroachment into unmanaged lands, and water
and other resource and environmental impacts. 
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restrial biosphere in the IGSM and MiniCAM
stabilization scenarios (Figure 4.19). The effect
is larger and begins earlier the more stringent
the stabilization level. For example, in the IGSM
Level 4 scenario, the effect becomes substantial
after 2070 and amounts to about 0.8 GtC/yr in
2100. The IGSM Level 1 scenario begins to de-
part markedly from the reference before 2050,
and the departure from reference grows to ap-
proximately 2.0 GtC/yr by 2100. The effect of the
diminished CO2 fertilization effect is to require
emissions mitigation in the energy-economy sys-
tem to be larger by the amount of the difference
between the reference aggregate net terrestrial
CO2 uptake and the uptake in the stabilization
scenario. The MiniCAM stabilization scenarios
exhibit similar carbon cycle behavior. The
MERGE stabilization scenarios maintain the as-
sumption of a neutral terrestrial biosphere as in
the MERGE reference scenario.
The MiniCAM scenarios also include a second
effect that results from the interaction between
the energy system and emissions from changes
in land use, such as converting previously un-
managed lands to bioenergy crop production.
As in the IGSM scenarios, economic competi-
tion among alternative human activities, crops,
pasture, managed forests, bioenergy crops, and
unmanaged ecosystems determine land use. In
the MiniCAM scenarios, this competition also
determines land-use change emissions. One im-
plication is increasing pressure to deforest under
stabilization in order to clear space for biomass
crops (Sands and Leimbach 2003). This effect is
best exhibited in the Level 1 scenarios, in which
the terrestrial biosphere becomes a net source
of carbon rather than a sink from 2050 to past
2080. The effect subsides after 2080 because
commercial biomass production ceases to ex-
pand beyond 2080, reducing any further pres-
sure to deforest for biomass crops. Thus,
terrestrial uptake in the MiniCAM scenarios is
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Figure 4.19. Net Terrestrial Carbon Emissions Across Scenarios (GtC/yr).  Net terrestrial carbon emissions to the
atmosphere, under reference and stabilization levels, reflect
differences in the model structures for processes that remain
highly uncertain. The MERGE scenarios are based on the
assumption of a neutral biosphere. The IGSM and MiniCAM
scenarios generally represent the land as a growing carbon sink,
with the exception of the Level 1 MiniCAM stabilization scenario,
in which increased demand for land for biomass production leads
to conversion and carbon loss. This effect is particularly strong
prior to 2080 in the Level 1 MiniCAM stabilization scenario.
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reduced because of the lower CO2 fertilization
effects as in the IGSM scenarios, and it is also
reduced by any land use change emissions that
derive from the increasing demand for bioen-
ergy crops. 
The terrestrial emissions reported in Figure 4.19
for the MiniCAM scenarios assume a policy ar-
chitecture that places a value on energy and in-
dustrial emissions as well as carbon in terrestrial
systems. Thus, there is an economic incentive
to maintain and/or expand stocks of terrestrial
Figure 4.20. Carbon Prices Across Stabilization Scenarios ($/tonne C, 2000$).  In all the stabilization scenarios, the
carbon price rises, by design, over time until stabilization is
achieved (or the end-year 2100 is reached), and the prices are
higher the more stringent is the stabilization level. There are
substantial differences in carbon prices between MERGE and
MiniCAM stabilization scenarios, on the one hand, and the IGSM
stabilization scenarios on the other. Differences between the
models reflect differences in the emissions reductions necessary
for stabilization and differences in the technologies that might
facilitate carbon emissions reductions, particularly in the second
half of the century. 
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Table 4.5. Carbon
Prices in 2020, 2030,
2050, and 2100 for Each
Stabilization Scenario
and Model. 
2020 ($/tonne C) 2030 ($/tonne C)
Stabilization
Level IGSM MERGE MiniCAM IGSM MERGE MiniCAM
Level 4 $18 $1 $1 $26 $2 $2
Level 3 $30 $2 $4 $44 $4 $7
Level 2 $75 $8 $15 $112 $13 $26
Level 1 $259 $110 $93 $384 $191 $170
2050 ($/tonne C) 2100 ($/tonne C)
Stabilization
Level IGSM MERGE MiniCAM IGSM MERGE MiniCAM
Level 4 $58 $6 $5 $415 $67 $54
Level 3 $97 $11 $19 $686 $127 $221
Level 2 $245 $36 $69 $1,743 $466 $420
Level 1 $842 $574 $466 $6,053 $609 $635
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carbon as well as an incentive to bring more
land under cultivation to grow bioenergy crops.
Pricing terrestrial carbon exerts an important
counter-pressure to deforestation and other
land-use changes that generate increased emis-
sions. To illustrate this effect, sensitivity cases
were run by the MiniCAM modeling group in
which no price was applied to terrestrial carbon
emissions. These sensitivity analyses showed in-
creased levels of land-use change emissions
when terrestrial carbon was not valued, particu-
larly at the more stringent stabilization levels,
and the potential for a vicious cycle to emerge.
Efforts to reduce emissions in the energy sector
create an incentive to expand bioenergy pro-
duction without a counter incentive to maintain
carbon in terrestrial stocks. The resultant defor-
estation increases terrestrial CO2 emissions, re-
quiring even greater reductions in fossil fuel
CO2 emissions, even higher prices on fossil fuel
carbon, and further increases in the demand for
bioenergy, leading, in turn, to additional defor-
estation. The net terrestrial emissions for the
MiniCAM scenarios reported here avoid this vi-
cious cycle because they include a policy archi-
tecture that places a value on terrestrial carbon. 
Despite the significant differences in the treat-
ment of terrestrial systems in the three models,
it is interesting to recall from Figure 3.20 that
the overall behavior of the three carbon-cycle
models is similar.
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
STABILIZATION
Stabilization and Carbon Prices
As discussed earlier, all of the modeling groups
implemented prices or constraints that provide
economic incentives to reduce GHG emissions.
The instruments used to reduce CO2 emissions
in the models can be interpreted as the carbon
price that would be consistent with either a uni-
versal cap-and-trade system or a harmonized
carbon tax.
Across models, the more stringent stabilization
levels require higher carbon prices because they
require larger emissions reductions (Figure 4.20
and Table 4.5). Stabilization becomes increas-
ingly difficult at the more stringent stabilization
levels as can be seen in the difference in carbon
prices between Level 2 and Level 1 as compared
to that between Level 3 and Level 4. (Note that
$100/tonne C is equivalent to $27/tonne CO2.
See Box 3.2 for more on converting between
units of carbon and units of COç.)
ing stabilization levels; and (2) differences in
assumptions about technologies, particularly
in the second half of the century, to shift final
demand to low-CO2 sources such as biofu-
els and low-carbon electricity or hydrogen
in transportation, industrial, and buildings end
uses. Although differences in technology do
not strongly emerge until the second half of
the century, they cast a shadow over the full
century because of the manner in which all
three the modeling groups allocated carbon
emissions reductions over time.
In most scenarios, carbon prices depress de-
mand for fossil fuels and therefore their pro-
ducer prices. Electricity producer prices
generally increase because of increasing de-
mand for electricity along with substitution
to higher cost, lower emitting electricity pro-
duction technologies. Consumer prices for
all fuels (fuel price plus the carbon price for
emitted carbon plus any added cost of cap-
turing and storing carbon) are generally
higher under the stabilization scenarios due
to carbon price. The approaches to Non-
CO2 GHG prices differs among the model-
ing groups, reflecting differing approaches to
the tradeoffs between reductions in the
emissions of these GHGs and reductions in
CO2 emissions.
The economic implications of stabilization
include increases in the prices of fossil fuels
and electricity, along with reductions in eco-
nomic output. Substantial differences in
GHG emissions prices and associated eco-
nomic costs arise among the modeling
groups for each stabilization level. Among the
most important factors influencing the vari-
ation in economic costs are: (1) differences in
assumptions – such as those regarding eco-
nomic growth over the century, the behavior
of the oceans and terrestrial biosphere in
taking up CO2, and opportunities for reduc-
tion in non-CO2 GHG emissions – that de-
termine the amount that CO2 emissions that
must be reduced to meet the radiative forc-
Across models, the carbon prices rise exponen-
tially throughout the century (in the IGSM sce-
narios) or until stabilization is reached (in the
MERGE and MiniCAM scenarios). This simi-
larity in the qualitative structure of the carbon
price paths reflects the similarity in the ap-
proach that the modeling groups took to allo-
cate emissions reductions over time, or when
flexibility, as discussed in Section 4.2. This ap-
proach to when flexibility, with a carbon price
that rises over time, tends to minimize the pres-
ent discounted cost of emissions mitigation over
the whole century. It also has the effect of link-
ing future carbon prices to near-term carbon
prices in a predictable way. Thus, when there are
differences in technology assumptions that
mostly appear in the second half of the century or
in reference emissions that occur mostly in the
middle of the century, the assumption imposed
on the price path means that the burden of emis-
sions reduction is spread over the entire century.
In this way, forces that do not emerge until mid-
century or beyond cast a shadow onto the present.
At every stabilization level, there is variation in
the carbon prices among the models. For exam-
ple, the carbon price in 2100 exceeds
$1700/tonne C in the IGSM Level 2 scenario
while the carbon prices in the MERGE and
MiniCAM Level 2 scenarios are $420 to
$460/tonne C. The ratio among the models of
carbon prices for other stabilization levels fol-
lows the same pattern. The range of carbon
prices shown in these scenarios is consistent
with other studies in the literature (IPCC 2001).
The carbon prices in the scenarios in this study
are the result of a complex interplay of differing
structural characteristics of the participating
models and variation in key parameter values.
Nonetheless major differences among carbon
prices can be attributed to two influences: (1)
the amount that emissions must be reduced to
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Figure 4.21. Relationship Between Carbon Price and Percentage Emissions Reductions in 2050 and 2100.  The
relationship between carbon price and percentage reductions in carbon emissions is similar among the models in 2050. In 2100, a given
percentage emissions reduction is generally more expensive in the IGSM stabilization scenarios than in the MERGE and MiniCAM
stabilization scenarios. The difference in 2100 is due, in large part, to different assumptions regarding the technologies available to
facilitate emissions reductions in the second half of the century, with IGSM scenarios assuming relatively fewer or more costly options
than the scenarios from the other two modeling groups.
[Note. CO2 emissions vary across the reference scenarios
from the three modeling groups, so that similar percentage
reductions, as shown in this figure, imply differing levels of
total emissions reduction.]
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Table 4.6. Cumulative Emissions Reductions Across Scenarios
(GtC through 2100) 
IGSM MERGE MiniCAM
Level 4 472 112 97
Level 3 674 258 267
Level 2 932 520 541
Level 1 1172 899 934
achieve an emissions path to stabilization, and
(2) the technologies that are available to facili-
tate these changes in the economy.
On the first point, Table 4.6 shows the cumula-
tive CO2 emissions reductions required over the
century across all four stabilization scenarios
from each modeling group. Differences in total
reductions come principally from three aspects
of model behavior and assumptions: differences
in forces, such as economic growth, that deter-
mine emissions in the reference scenario (Ta-
bles 3.2 and 3.3, and Figure 3.2); the behavior of
the ocean and terrestrial systems in taking up
carbon (Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.19); and the
technological options available for constraining
the emissions of non-CO2 GHGs (Figure 4.8
and Figure 4.9). At all stabilization levels, the
IGSM stabilization scenarios require greater
CO2 emissions reductions than the MERGE or
MiniCAM stabilization scenarios. Indeed, the
emissions reductions in the IGSM Level 2 sce-
nario are commensurate with those of the
MERGE and MiniCAM Level 1 scenarios. All
other things being equal, the greater the required
emissions reductions the higher will be the emis-
sions prices required to meet each target.
The second factor, the modeling of technology,
also contributes to the differences among costs.
The aggregate effect of differing technological
assumptions is illustrated in Figure 4.21, which
shows the relationship between the carbon price
and percentage emissions reductions in 2050
and 2100 across all four stabilization scenarios
from each modeling group. Roughly speaking,
these figures represent what economists refer to
as the marginal abatement cost functions for
these periods. They broadly capture the techno-
logical opportunities for emissions reductions
represented in the models. The similarity be-
tween the marginal abatement cost functions in
2050 implies that the technological opportuni-
ties represented by the three modeling groups
are similar in 2050. The implication is that if the
three modeling groups were to determine the
carbon price associated with, for example, a
50% reduction in emissions in 2050, the results
would be similar.
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Figure 4.22. Percentage of Global Electricity
Production from Low-or Zero-Emissions
Technologies Across Scenarios (percent).  All three
modeling groups assumed sufficient technological options to
allow for substantial reductions in carbon emissions from
electricity production. Options include fossil power plants with
CCS, nuclear power, and renewable energy such as hydroelectric
power, wind power, and solar power. In all of the Level 1
scenarios, the electricity sector is almost fully decarbonized by
the end of the century.
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It is in the second half of the century that sub-
stantial differences in the marginal abatement
cost functions emerge, particularly when the re-
quired abatement pushes towards and beyond
60% below the reference level as is the case in
the Level 1 and Level 2 scenarios. There is no
small set of technology assumptions used by the
modeling groups that determines these differ-
ences. Among the modeling groups, assump-
tions about technology vary along a range of
dimensions such as the rate of growth in labor
productivity, the cost and performance of par-
ticular energy supply technologies, the produc-
tivity of agriculture and the associated costs of
bioenergy, and the ability to substitute among
various fuels and electricity in key demand sec-
tors such as transportation. These assumptions
are embodied not just in model parameters, but
also, as discussed in Chapter 2, in the underly-
ing mathematical structures of the models. As
can be seen in Table 2.1, end-use technologies,
are, in general, not represented explicitly. None
of the participating models, for example, iden-
tify multiple steel production technologies or a
wide range of vehicle options each with differ-
ent energy using characteristics. Instead, energy
demand responses are represented in relatively
aggregate economic sectors (e.g., energy inten-
sive industry or transportation). Other technolo-
gies, particularly in energy supply (e.g., CCS) are
more likely to be identified specifically. 
Three general characteristics of technology bear
note with respect to the variation in carbon
prices: (1) the availability of low- or zero-car-
bon electricity production technologies, (2) the
supply of non-electric energy substitutes such
as biofuels and hydrogen, and (3) the availabil-
ity of technologies to facilitate substitution to-
ward the use of electricity.
All three modeling groups assumed a variety of
cost-effective technology options would be
available to limit CO2 emissions from electric-
ity production. For example, the electric sector
is almost fully de-carbonized by the end of the
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Figure 4.23. Percentage Reduction in World Primary Energy Consumption Across Scenarios (percent).
Differences in assumptions about technological opportunities result in different aggregate approaches to emissions reductions in the
stabilization scenarios from the three modeling groups. The IGSM
stabilization scenarios include greater reductions in primary
energy consumption than the MERGE and MiniCAM stabilization
scenarios because fewer technological opportunities, on both the
demand and supply side, are available for emissions reductions
through substitution to low or zero-carbon energy sources.
[Note. Primary energy consumption from nuclear power and non-
biomass renewable electricity are accounted for at the average
efficiency of fossil-fired electric facilities, which vary over time and
across scenarios.]
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century in all three Level 1 scenarios (Figure
4.22). Electricity is produced with non-fossil
technologies (nuclear or renewables) or fossil-
fired power plants with CCS. Thus, although
low carbon technologies in the electric sector do
influence the carbon prices, it is forces outside
of electricity production that drive costs at
higher levels of abatement because options
available to the electric sector can support its al-
most complete de-carbonization.
The second technology factor is the set of op-
tions available to substitute alternative, non-
electric fuels for fossil energy in end-use
sectors, most importantly in transportation. All
three modeling groups assumed biofuels as a
substitute for fossil fuels in non-electric appli-
cations. As discussed in Section 2 and Section
3, production of bioenergy crops must compete
with other uses of agricultural lands in the
IGSM and MiniCAM scenarios, which con-
strains total production of these substitutes.
MERGE uses an aggregate parameterization to
represent these same constraints. Even with
these differing approaches, bioenergy produc-
tion is similar across the stabilization scenarios.
However, because of higher oil prices (Figure
3.7), the IGSM reference scenario includes sub-
stantial biofuels (Figure 4.10) so that expansion
of biofuels is more limited in the IGSM stabi-
lization scenarios.
In addition to biofuels, the MiniCAM and
MERGE scenarios include other non-electric al-
ternatives, and these become important for more
stringent emissions reductions. The MERGE
scenarios include a generic alternative fuel gen-
erated from renewable sources; which could be,
for example, hydrogen from solar or wind
power. In the MERGE Level 1 scenario, this al-
ternative fuel provides roughly 80% as much
non-electric energy as biofuels by 2100. The
MiniCAM scenarios include hydrogen produc-
tion using electricity, nuclear thermal dissocia-
tion, and fossil fuels with and without CCS.
Though smaller than biofuels, the contribution
of hydrogen rises to a little over 15% of global
non-electric energy consumption in the Level 1
MiniCAM scenario. Without these additional
options included in the MERGE and MiniCAM
scenarios, the marginal cost of emissions re-
ductions is higher in the IGSM scenarios, and
more of the abatement is met through reduc-
tions in energy use (Figure 4.23).
Another factor influencing carbon prices at
higher levels of emissions reduction is the abil-
ity to substitute to electricity in end-use sectors,
through technologies such as heat pumps, elec-
trically-generated process heat, or electric cars.
Were all end uses to easily switch to electricity,
then the availability of nearly carbon-free elec-
tricity production options in these scenarios
would allow complete CO2 emissions reduction
at no more than the cost of these generation op-
tions. However, assumptions about technologies
for electrification differ substantially among the
modeling groups. The MERGE and MiniCAM
modeling groups assumed greater opportunities
for substitution to electricity than did the IGSM
modeling group in the second half of the 21st
century. As a result the electricity fraction of
primary energy consumption is higher in the
MERGE and MiniCAM scenarios in both the
reference scenario and the stabilization scenar-
ios, as shown in Figure 4.24. This means that
low- or zero-carbon electricity production tech-
nologies can serve more effectively as a low-cost
option for emissions reduction, reducing costs.
In the IGSM scenarios, fuel demand for trans-
portation, where electricity is not an option and
for which biofuels supply is insufficient, contin-
ues to be a substantial source of emissions.
Although the main technological influences dis-
cussed above do not emerge for many decades,
they influence carbon prices and economic
costs from the outset because of the approach
the modeling groups took to when flexibility, as
discussed above. This dynamic view of the sta-
bilization challenge reinforces the fact that ac-
tions taken today both influence and are
influenced by the possible ways that the world
might evolve in the future.
Finally, there are other structural differences
among the approaches taken by the modeling
groups that likely play a role in the variation in
carbon prices. For example, MERGE is a for-
ward-looking model and that behavior allows it
to more fully optimize investments over time
than the other two models, including invest-
ments in emissions reductions. Another differ-
ence is that the MiniCAM scenarios include
CCS in cement production, which allows for ce-
ment emissions to be reduced to almost zero at
more stringent stabilization levels. The IGSM
scenarios include cement production within an
aggregate sector so that mitigation options that
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may be specific to this industry are not explic-
itly modeled. The MERGE scenarios explicitly
include emissions from cement production, but
do not include options for reducing these emis-
sions. This omission puts more pressure on
emissions reductions elsewhere in the IGSM
and MERGE stabilization scenarios and would
tend to raise carbon prices relative to the Mini-
CAM scenarios. Finally, IGSM and MERGE
explicitly track savings and investment, whereas
MiniCAM does not. In IGSM and MERGE, in-
vestments in emissions reductions lower savings
and investment in other sectors, affecting the
scale of economic output in future periods, and
this effect accumulates over time. The most di-
rect effect of this dynamic is felt on economic
output, and therefore stabilization costs (ad-
dressed later in this chapter), but it may also af-
fect carbon prices through reductions in the
scale of economic activity.
Stabilization and Non-CO2
Greenhouse Gas Prices
Each of the three modeling groups employed a
different approach to reductions in the emis-
sions the non-CO2 GHGs. After CO2, CH4 is the
next largest component of radiative forcing in
all three reference scenarios. Emissions of CH4
vary among the reference scenarios. The IGSM
reference scenario starts in the year 2000 at
about 350 Mt/yr and rises to more than 700
Mt/yr (Figure 4.8), while the MERGE and
MiniCAM scenarios begin with 300 Mt/yr in
the year 2000. These are anthropogenic CH4
emissions, and the differences reflect existing
uncertainties in how much of total CH4 emis-
sions are from anthropogenic and natural
sources. CH4 emissions grow to almost 600
Mt/yr in the MERGE reference scenario. The
MiniCAM reference scenario is characterized
by a peak in CH4 emission at less than 400
Mt/yr, followed by a decline to about 300 Mt/yr.
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Figure 4.24. Ratio of Global Electricity Production to Primary Energy Consumption Across  Scenarios. Efforts to
constrain CO2 emissions result in increased use of electricity as a fraction of total primary energy in the scenarios from all three
modeling groups. This is because all three modeling groups
assumed lower cost technology options for reductions in
emissions from electricity production than for substitution away
from fossil fuels in direct uses such as transportation. The
MERGE and MiniCAM scenarios generally include greater
electrification than the IGSM scenarios, with MiniCAM having the
highest proportion of electricity to primary energy. Greater
opportunities to electrify reduce the economic impacts of
stabilization. [Note. Primary energy consumption from nuclear power
and non-biomass renewable electricity are accounted for at the
average efficiency of fossil-fired electric facilities, which vary over time
and across scenarios.]
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Each of the modeling groups took a different
approach to setting a stabilization constraint on
CH4. The MiniCAM stabilization scenarios are
based on constant GWP coefficients, so the
price of CH4 is simply the price of CO2 multi-
plied by the GWP. This means that the price of
CH4 relative to the carbon price (the relative
CH4 price) is constant over time, as shown in
Figure 4.25. 
In contrast, MERGE determines the price of
CH4 to carbon through inter-temporal opti-
mization. The relative price of CH4 begins very
low, although it is higher the more stringent the
stabilization level. The relative price then rises
at a roughly constant exponential rate of be-
tween 8% and 9% per year until stabilization is
reached, at which point, the relative price re-
mains approximately constant at around 10
times the carbon price. These characteristics of
the CH4 price and its relationship to the carbon
price are the product of the inter-temporal opti-
mization in which the long-term limit on radia-
tive forcing is the only goal. Manne and Richels
(2001) have shown that different patterns are
possible if other formulations of the policy goal,
such as limiting the rate of change of radiative
forcing, are taken into account.
The IGSM stabilization scenarios are based on
a third approach. CH4 emissions are limited to a
maximum value in each stabilization scenario:
425 Mt/yr at Level 4, 385 Mt/yr at Level 3, 350
Mt/yr at Level 2, and 305 Mt/yr at Level 1. As
a consequence, the relative price of CH4 initially
grows from one-tenth to a maximum of between
3 and 14 between the years 2050 and 2080 and
then declines thereafter. As previously dis-
cussed, this reflects an implicit assumption that
a long-run requirement of stabilization means
that eventually each substance must be (ap-
proximately) independently stabilized, and ab-
sent an explicit evaluation of damages of
climate change, any time path of relative GHG
prices cannot be determined.
As with CH4, emissions of N2O in the reference
scenarios vary across the three modeling groups
(Figure 4.9). The IGSM reference trajectory
roughly doubles from approximately 11 Mt/yr
to approximately 25 Mt/yr. In contrast, the
MERGE and MiniCAM reference scenarios are
roughly constant over time.
MERGE also sets the price of N2O as part of the
inter-temporal optimization process. The rela-
tive price trajectory for N2O begins at roughly
the level of the GWP-based relative price used
in the MiniCAM stabilization scenarios and
then rises, roughly linearly with time (Figure
4.25). The relative N2O price approximately
doubles in the MERGE Level 4 scenario, but is
almost constant in the MERGE Level 1 sce-
nario. Thus, in the Level 1 scenarios, the relative
N2O price path is virtually the same in the
MERGE and MiniCAM scenarios.
In contrast, in the IGSM stabilization scenarios,
stabilization sets a path to a predetermined N2O
concentration for each stabilization level, and
the complexity of the price paths in Figure 4.25
shows the difficulty of stabilizing the atmos-
pheric level of this GHG. Natural emissions of
N2O are calculated, which vary with the climate
consequences of stabilization. The main an-
thropogenic source, agriculture, has a compli-
cated relationship with the rest of the economy
through the competition for land use.
The approaches employed by the three model-
ing groups do not necessarily lead to the stabi-
lization of the concentrations of the non-CO2
GHGs before the end of the twenty-first cen-
tury, as concentrations are still rising slowly in
some scenarios but below a long-term stabilized
level (Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5). How long-
term stabilization was approached was inde-
pendently developed by each modeling group.
Stabilization and Energy Prices
The carbon price drives a wedge between the
producer prices of fuels and the costs to con-
sumers. Table 4.7 provides an approximation of
that of the relationship. A given carbon price has
the largest impact on consumer cost of coal in
percentage terms because the fuel price per unit
of energy is low, and carbon emissions are rel-
atively high per unit of energy. In comparison,
natural gas prices were at historic highs in re-
cent years and CO2 emissions per unit of energy
are lower than oil or coal. This means that the
carbon price has a relatively smaller effect in
comparison to the fuel price.
Stabilization scenarios tend to result in a lower
producer price for oil (Figure 4.26). Stabilization
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Figure 4.25. Relative Prices of CH4 and N2O to Carbon Price Across Scenarios (CH4 in log scale).  Differences in
the prices of CH4 and N2O relative to the carbon price reflect different treatments of this tradeoff among the modeling groups, often
referred to as what flexibility. In the MiniCAM stabilization scenarios, the tradeoff is based on the GWPs of the non-CO2 GHGs, which
are constants, leading to constant relative prices of the non-CO2 GHGs. In the MERGE stabilization scenarios, relative prices are
optimized with respect to meeting the long-run stabilization levels. In the IGSM stabilization scenarios, stabilization was forced for each
GHG independently. Emissions were set so that concentrations of CH4 would stabilize and allowed the CH4 price path to be
determined by changing opportunities for reducing emissions. Given N2O emissions from agriculture, the relative price of N2O is higher
in the IGSM stabilization scenarios, in part because emissions were higher
in the IGSM reference scenario than in the reference scenarios from the
other two modeling groups. Lower emissions of N2O for the MERGE and
MiniCAM reference scenarios allowed the corresponding stabilization
scenarios to achieve relatively low emissions at lower N2O prices.
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at Level 4 has a relatively modest effect on the
oil producer price, particularly prior to 2040; the
effect is stronger the more stringent the stabi-
lization level. Oil producer price reductions vary
across the three models, ranging from the IGSM
stabilization scenarios, which show the most pro-
nounced effects, to the MERGE stabilization sce-
narios, which show a substantial effect only in
the Level 1 scenario. The effect on world oil pro-
ducer prices, in turn, depends on many factors,
including how the supply of oil is characterized;
the carbon price; and the availability of substi-
tute technologies for providing transportation liq-
uids, such as bio-fuels or hydrogen.
Coal producer prices are similarly depressed in
the IGSM and MiniCAM stabilization scenar-
ios (Figure 4.27). The effect is mitigated by two
features: (1) the assumed availability of CCS
technology, which allows the continued large-
scale use of coal in electricity production in the
presence of a positive carbon price and (2) a
coal supply schedule that is highly elastic. That
is, demand for coal can exhibit large increases
Scenarios of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Atmospheric Concentrations
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Fuel Base Cost ($2005) Added Cost ($) Added Cost (%)
Crude Oil ($/bbl) $60.0 $12.2 20%
Regular Gasoline ($/gal) $2.39 $0.26 11%
Heating Oil ($/gal) $2.34 $0.29 12%
Wellhead Natural Gas ($/tcf) $10.17 $1.49 15%
Residential Natural Gas ($/tcf) $15.30 $1.50 10%
Utility Coal ($/short ton) $32.6 $55.3 170%
Electricity (c/kWh) 9.6¢ 1.76¢ 18%
Source:  Bradley et al. (1991), updated with U.S. average prices for the 4th quarter of 2005 
as reported by DOE (2006).
Table 4.7.
Relationship
Between a
$100/tonne Carbon
Price and Energy
Prices. (In most cases,
stabilization depresses
producer prices and so
the percentage rise in the
fuel cost seen by
consumers would be less
than indicated here.  The
change in producer price
is highly scenario and
model dependent.)
Figure 4.26. World Oil Price Across Scenarios
(Index, yr 2000 = 1).  World oil prices (producer price) vary
considerably across the reference scenarios. In all three models,
stabilization tends to depress the producer prices of oil relative to
the reference scenarios. [Note. Producer prices as defined here do not
include additional costs associated with carbon emissions to the
atmosphere through the combustion of fossil fuels, as shown in Table 4.7.]
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or decreases without much change in price. The
high elasticity of supply in the MERGE scenar-
ios leaves coal producer prices unchanged
across the stabilization scenarios, whereas the
MiniCAM and IGSM scenarios have lower sup-
ply price elasticities and, hence, greater pro-
ducer price responses.
The impact on the natural gas producer price is
more complex (Figure 4.28). Natural gas has
roughly one-half the carbon-to-energy ratio of
coal. Thus, emissions can be reduced without
loss of available energy simply by substituting
natural gas for coal or oil. As a consequence,
two effects on the natural gas producer price
work in opposite directions. With a postive car-
bon price, natural gas tends to substitute for
other fossil fuels, increasing its demand. But a
positive carbon price also means that a low- or
zero-carbon substitutes, such as electricity,
bioenergy, or energy-efficiency technologies,
will tend to displace natural gas from markets,
as happens for the more carbon-intensive fuels.
Thus, depending on the strength of these two ef-
fects, the producer price of natural gas can ei-
ther rise or fall.
The natural gas producer price is most affected
in the IGSM stabilization scenarios, reflecting
the greater substitution of natural gas for coal
in IGSM Level 2, 3, and 4 stabilization scenar-
ios. In the IGSM Level 1 stabilization scenario,
natural gas consumption is reduced over the en-
tire period. On balance, the natural gas producer
price is less affected by stabilization in the
MERGE and MiniCAM scenarios in which the
substitution and conservation effects are
roughly offsetting. 
Although the price that oil and coal producers
receive tends to be either stable or depressed,
that is not the full cost of using the fuel. Users,
such as households or industrial fuel users, pay
the market price plus the value of the carbon
emissions associated with the fuel, which is the
carbon price times the fuel’s carbon-to-energy
Chapter 4 - Stabilization ScenariosThe U.S. Climate Change Science Program
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Figure 4.27. U.S. Mine-Mouth Coal Price Across Scenarios (Index, yr 2000 = 1).  U.S. mine-mouth coal price varies
acrosss the reference scenarios. In the IGSM and MiniCAM stabilization scenarios, stabilization depresses coal prices, whereas
stabilization has no impact on coal prices in the MERGE
stabilization scenarios, reflecting characterization of coal supply
as an inexhaustible single grade such that there is no rent
associated with the resource. Prices in the MERGE scenarios
thus reflect the cost capital, labor, and other inputs that are little
affected by the stabilization policy. [Note. Producer prices as defined
here do not include additional costs associated with carbon emissions
to the atmosphere through the combustion of fossil fuels, as shown in 
Table 4.7.]
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ratio. If they employ CCS, the carbon emissions
are lower, but they face the added cost of CCS.
Any additional carbon cost will be reflected in
the users’ fuel price if the carbon taxes, or re-
quired permits in a cap-and-trade system, are
placed upstream with fuel producers. On the
other hand, the actual fuel price impact they see
may be similar to the producer price impact if
carbon is regulated downstream where the fuel
is consumed. In this case, users would be able to
buy fuel relatively inexpensively, but would pay
a separate large price for necessary carbon
charges associated with emissions. 
The effect on the price of electricity is another
unambiguous result (Figure 4.29). Because
electricity producers are fossil fuel consumers,
the price of electricity contains the implicit car-
bon price in the fuels used for generation. All
of the scenarios exhibit upward pressure on elec-
tricity prices, and the more stringent the stabi-
lization level, the greater the upward pressure.
The pressure is limited by the fact that there are
many options available to electricity producers to
lower emissions. These options include, for ex-
ample, the substitution of natural gas for coal; the
use of CCS; the expanded use of nuclear power;
the use of bioenergy; and the expanded use of
wind, hydro, and other renewable energy sources.
The Total Cost of Stabilization
Assessing the macroeconomic cost of stabiliza-
tion is not a simple task either conceptually or
computationally. From an economic perspec-
tive, cost is the value of the loss in welfare as-
sociated with pursuing stabilization or
equivalently, the value of activities that society
will not be able to undertake as a consequence
of pursuing stabilization. Although the concept
is easy enough to articulate, defining an unam-
biguous measure is problematic. Any measure of
cost is a more or less satisfactory compromise.
The task is further complicated by the need to
aggregate the welfare of individuals who have
Scenarios of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Atmospheric Concentrations
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Figure 4.28. U.S. Natural Gas Producers’ Price Across Scenarios (Index, yr 2000 = 1).  U.S. natural gas producers’
prices vary among the reference scenarios. In the MiniCAM and MERGE stabilization scenarios, stabilization has little effect on the
natural gas price. Stabilization at Levels 2, 3, and 4 increases the
price of natural gas in the IGSM stabilization scenarios because of
substitution toward natural gas and away from coal and oil.
Natural gas prices fall relative to reference scenario in the IGSM
Level 1 stabilization scenario because natural gas demand is
depressed from the tight carbon constraint. [Note. Producer prices
as defined here do not include additional costs associated with carbon
emissions to the atmosphere through the combustion of fossil fuels, as
shown in Table 4.7.]
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not yet been born and who may or may not share
present preferences. Even if these problems
were not difficult enough, economies can hardly
be thought to currently be at a maximum of po-
tential welfare. Preexisting market distortions
impose costs on the economy, and mitigation
actions may interact with them so as to reduce
or exacerbate their effects. Any measure of
global cost also runs into the problem of inter-
national purchasing power comparisons dis-
cussed in Chapter 3. Finally, climate change is
only one of many public goods, and measures
to address other public goods (like urban air
quality) can either increase or decrease cost. To
create a metric that is consistent and compara-
ble across the three modeling platforms used in
this study, all of these issues would have to be
addressed in some way.
Beyond conceptual measurement issues, any
metric including gross domestic product, de-
pends on features of the scenario such as the as-
sumed participation by countries of the world,
the terms of the emissions limitation regime, as-
sumed efficiencies of markets, and technology
availability – the latter including energy tech-
nologies, non-CO2 GHG technologies, and re-
lated activities in non-energy sectors (e.g., crop
productivity that strongly influences the avail-
ability and cost of producing commercial bio-
mass energy). In almost every instance,
scenarios of the type explored in this research
employ more or less idealized representations
of economic structure, political decision, and
policy implementation (i.e., conditions that
likely do not accurately reflect the real world,
and these simplifications tend to lead to lower
mitigation costs). 
Finally, assessing welfare effects would require
explicit consideration of how the burden of
emissions reduction is shared among countries
and the welfare consequences of income effects
on poorer versus wealthier societies. Of course,
if the world were to discover and deploy lower
cost technology options than those assumed
Chapter 4 - Stabilization ScenariosThe U.S. Climate Change Science Program
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Figure 4.29. U.S. Electricity Producer Price Across Scenarios (Index, yr 2000 = 1).  U.S. electricity prices in the
reference scenarios range from little change over the century in the MiniCAM reference scenario to about a 50% increase from present
levels in the IGSM reference scenario. Under stabilization,
producer prices are affected by increasing use of more expensive
low- or zero-emissions electricity technologies, including fossil
electricity with CCS, nuclear power, and non-biomass renewables
such as solar and wind power.  Across the scenarios, rising fossil
fuel prices are partially offset by increasing efficiency of fossil
electric facilities. [Note. Producer prices as defined here do not
include additional costs associated with carbon emissions to the
atmosphere through the combustion of fossil fuels, as shown in 
Table 4.7.]
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here, these costs could be lower. On the other
hand, if society does not deliver the cost and
performance for the technologies assumed in
these scenarios, costs could be higher.
While all of the above considerations have not
been extensively investigated in the literature,
the implications of less-than-ideal implementa-
tion have been investigated, and these analyses
show that it could increase the costs substan-
tially. Richels et al. (1996) showed that for a
simple policy regime, eliminating international
where and when flexibility, while assuming per-
fect where flexibility within countries, could po-
tentially raise costs by an order of magnitude
compared to a policy that employed where and
when flexibility in all mitigation activities.
Richels and Edmonds (1995) showed that sta-
bilizing CO2 emissions could be twice as ex-
pensive as stabilizing CO2 concentrations and
leave society with higher CO2 concentrations.
Babiker et al. (2000) similarly showed that lim-
its on where flexibility within countries can sub-
stantially increase costs – although employing
where flexibility also can increase costs in the
context of tax distortions (Babiker et al. 2003a,
Babiker et al. 2003b, Babiker et al. 2004, Palt-
sev et al. 2005).
Figure 4.30 reports the change of gross world
product in the stabilization scenarios during the
twenty-first century in the year in which it oc-
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Figure 4.30. Percentage Reduction in Gross World Product in the Stabilization
Scenarios (percentage).  Stabilization imposes costs on the economy, and stated in terms of gross
world product, the costs rise over time as ever more stringent emissions restrictions are required. The
more stringent the stabilization level, the higher the cost. The variation in costs among the models reflects
differences in the emissions reductions necessary for stabilization and differences in the technologies that
might facilitate carbon emissions reductions, particularly in the second half of the century.
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curs aggregated using market exchange rates.
This information is also displayed in Table 4.8.
The use of market exchange rates is a conven-
ient choice given the formulations of the mod-
els employed here, but as discussed above and
in Chapter 3 the approach has limits (see the
Box 3.1 in Chapter 3). Though change in gross
world product is not the most intellectually sat-
isfying measure, it serves as a common refer-
ence point. 
The effects on gross world product are tightly
linked to the carbon prices. Therefore effects on
gross world product in the stabilization scenar-
ios follow the same patterns and logic as the car-
bon prices, which are discussed in substantially
greater detail in Section 4.6.1. As with the car-
bon price, costs rise with increasing stringency
of the stabilization level. And, as with the car-
bon price, there is variation in costs of stabi-
lization among the modeling groups. For
example, gross world product in 2100 is re-
duced by 6.8% in the IGSM Level 2 scenario,
while the reduction is less than 1% in the
MERGE and MiniCAM Level 2 scenarios. The
ratio of stabilization costs among the models at
other radiative forcing stabilization levels fol-
lows the same pattern.
The differences in stabilization costs among the
models can largely be attributed the same influ-
ences discussed in Section 4.6.1: (1) the amount
that emissions must be reduced to achieve an
emissions path to stabilization, and (2) the tech-
nologies that are available to facilitate these
changes in the economy. A number of addi-
tional, structural differences, such as treatment
of capital investment, intertemporal model
structure, and emissions reductions opportuni-
ties in cement production also lead to differ-
ences in prices and costs. As with emissions
prices, although technology differences emerge
primarily in the second half of the century, their
influence felt throughout the century because of
the common implementation of when flexibil-
ity in the policy design.
Expressed throughout the report is the view that
the development of independent sets of scenar-
ios using three different models helps to inform
common understanding of the forces that shape
opportunities to stabilize greenhouse gas con-
centrations. The differences discussed here
demonstrate the fundamental importance of
technology in facilitating stabilization – partic-
ularly the importance of future technology, even
developments more than half a century in the
future. The scenarios also suggest the particu-
lar importance of options that facilitate the pro-
duction of alternative non-electric fuels and
demand-side technologies that will allow the
substitution of electricity for current applica-
tions of fossil fuels.
Chapter 4 - Stabilization ScenariosThe U.S. Climate Change Science Program
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2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
IGSM 2.1% 4.1% 6.7% 10.1% 16.1%
MERGE 0.6% 1.4% 2.2% 1.8% 1.4%
MiniCAM 0.2% 1.2% 1.9% 1.9% 1.4%
2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
IGSM 0.5% 1.2% 2.3% 3.9% 6.8%
MERGE 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7%
MiniCAM 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.8% 1.0%
2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
IGSM 0.2% 0.4% 0.9% 1.8% 3.1%
MERGE 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3%
MiniCAM 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.4%
2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
IGSM 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.9% 1.7%
MERGE 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
MiniCAM 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Table 4.8.
Percentage
Reduction in
Gross World
Product in the
Stabilization
Scenarios.
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INTRODUCTION
Scenarios based on formal, computer-based models, such as the scenarios developed in this re-
search, can help illustrate how key drivers such as economic and population growth or policy
options lead to particular levels of GHG emissions. An important benefit of models such as those
used in this research is that they ensure basic accounting identities and consistent application of
behavioral assumptions. However, model-based scenarios are only one approach to scenario de-
velopment, and models designed for one set of purposes may not be the most appropriate for
other applications. Thus, the scenarios developed here should be viewed as complementary to
other ways of thinking about the future, such as formal uncertainty analyses, story lines, baselines
for further model-based scenarios, and analyses using other types of models. 
The users of emissions scenarios are many and diverse and include climate modelers and the sci-
ence community; those involved in national public policy formulation; managers of Federal re-
search programs; state and local government officials who face decisions that might be affected
by climate change and mitigation measures; and individual firms, non-governmental organizations,
and members of the public. Such a varied clientele implies an equally diverse set of possible needs,
and no single scenario exercise can hope to satisfy all of them. Scenario analysis is most effective
when its developers can work directly with users, and initial scenarios lead to further what if ques-
tions that can be answered with additional scenarios or by probing more deeply into particular
issues. The Prospectus for this research did not, however, prescribe such an interactive approach
with a focused set of users. Instead, it called for a set of scenarios that provide broad insights into
the energy, economic, and emissions implications of stabilizing radiative forcing. For the issue of
stabilization, these scenarios are an initial offering to potential user communities that, if success-
ful, will generate further questions and more detailed analysis. 
This research focuses on three sets of scenarios, each including a reference scenario and four
scenarios in which the radiative forcing from a common suite of GHGs is stabilized at four alter-
native levels. The stabilization scenarios describe a range of possible long-term goals for global cli-
mate policy. The stabilization levels imply a range of policy efforts and levels of urgency, from
relatively little deviation from reference scenarios over the course of the century to major devi-
ations starting very soon. Although the Prospectus did not mandate a formal treatment of likeli-
hood or uncertainty, such analysis could be a useful follow-on activity. Here, however, the range
of outcomes from the different modeling groups helps to illustrate, if incompletely, the range 
of possibilities.
Findings, Uses, 
and Future Directions
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For this research, a scenario is an illustration of
future developments based on a model of the
economy and the Earth system, applying a plau-
sible set of model parameters and providing a
basis for future work. None of the reference sce-
narios is a prediction or best-judgment forecast
of the future, and none can be said to have the
highest probability of being right. Nor does any
single stabilization scenario provide the most
correct picture of the changes to energy and
other systems that would be required for stabi-
lization. Instead, each scenario in this report is
a thought experiment that helps illuminate the
implications of different long-term policy goals. 
OVERVIEW OF THE SCENARIOS
The scenarios are presented in text and figures
in Chapters 3 and 4, and here a summary is pro-
vided of some of their key characteristics, some
of the magnitudes involved, and the assump-
tions that lie behind them.
Reference Scenarios
The difficulty in achieving any specified radia-
tive forcing stabilization level depends heavily
on the emissions that would occur absent ac-
tions to address GHG emissions. In other words,
the reference scenario strongly influences the
stabilization scenarios. If the reference scenario
has inexpensive fossil fuels and high economic
growth, then larger changes to the energy sector
and other parts of the economy may be required
to stabilize the atmosphere. On the other hand,
if the reference scenario shows lower growth
and emissions, and perhaps increased exploita-
tion of non-fossil sources even in the absence
of climate policy, then the effort required to sta-
bilize radiative forcing will not be as great.
Energy production, transformation, and con-
sumption are central features in all of these sce-
narios, although non-CO2 gases and changes in
land use also make a significant contribution to
aggregate GHG emissions. Demand for energy
over the coming century will be driven by eco-
nomic growth and will also be strongly influ-
enced by the way that energy systems respond
to depletion of resources, changes in prices, and
improvements in technology. Demand for en-
ergy in developed countries remains strong in
all the scenarios and is even stronger in devel-
oping countries, where millions of people seek
greater access to commercial energy. These de-
velopments strongly influence the emissions of
GHGs, their disposition, and the resulting change
in radiative forcing in the reference scenarios. 
The three reference scenarios show the impli-
cations of this increasing demand and the im-
proved access to energy. The variation between
the reference scenarios reflects the differing as-
sumptions used by the modeling groups.
• Global primary energy consumption rises
substantially in all three reference scenarios,
from about 400 EJ/yr in 2000 to between
roughly 1275 EJ/yr and 1500 EJ/yr in 2100
(Figure ES.1). U.S. primary energy con-
sumption also grows substantially, about 1¼
to 2½ times present levels by 2100. Primary
energy consumption growth occurs despite
continued improvements in the efficiency
of energy use and energy production tech-
nologies. For example, the U.S. energy in-
tensity – the ratio of primary energy con-
sumption to economic output – declines 60%
to 75% between 2000 and 2100 across the
three reference scenarios.
• All three reference scenarios include a grad-
ual reduction in the consumption of conven-
tional oil resources. However, in all three, a
range of alternative fossil-based resources,
such as synthetic fuels from coal and un-
conventional oil resources (e.g., tar sands
and oil shales), are available and become
economically viable. Fossil fuels provided al-
most 90% of the global primary energy in
2000, and they remain the dominant energy
source in the three reference scenarios
throughout the twenty-first century, supplying
70% to 80% of total primary energy in 2100.
• Non-fossil fuel energy use also grows over
the century in all three reference scenarios.
Contributions to primary energy consump-
tion in 2100 range from 250 EJ to 450 EJ –
a range that at the hight end exceeds global
primary energy consumption today. Despite
this growth, these sources never supplant
fossil fuels, although they provide an in-
creasing share of the total, particularly in
the second half of the century.
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• Consistent with the characteristics of pri-
mary energy consumption, global and U.S.
electricity production continues to rely on
coal, although this contribution varies among
the reference scenarios. The contribution of
renewable and nuclear energy varies con-
siderably in the different reference scenarios,
depending on resource availability, technol-
ogy, and non-climate policy considerations.
For example, global nuclear power in the
reference scenarios ranges from about 1½
times current levels (if non-climate concerns
such as safety, waste, and proliferation con-
strain its growth as is the case in one refer-
ence scenario), to an expansion of almost an
order of magnitude assuming relative eco-
nomics as the only constraint.
• Oil and natural gas producer prices rise
through the century relative to year 2000
levels, whereas coal and electricity prices
remain relatively stable. It should be em-
phasized that the models used in this re-
search were not designed to simulate short-
term fuel-price spikes, such as those that
occurred in the 1970s, early 1980s, and more
recently in 2005. Thus, price trends in the
scenarios should be interpreted as multi-year
averages.
• As a combined result of all these influences,
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion
and industrial processes in the reference sce-
narios increase from approximately 7 GtC/yr
in 2000 to between 22.5 GtC/yr and 24.0
GtC/yr in 2100; that is, to roughly 3 to 3½
times current levels.
The non-CO2 GHGs, CH4, N2O, SF6, PFCs, and
HFCs, are emitted from various sources includ-
ing agriculture, waste management, biomass
burning, fossil fuel production and consump-
tion, and a number of industrial activities. 
• Future global anthropogenic emissions of
CH4 and N2O vary widely among the refer-
ence scenarios, ranging from flat or declin-
ing emissions to increases of 2 to 2½ times
present levels. These differences reflect al-
ternative assumptions about technological
opportunities and about whether current
emissions rates will be reduced significantly
for non-climate reasons, such as air pollution
control and/or higher natural gas prices that
would further stimulate the capture of CH4
emissions for its fuel value.
Increases in emissions from the global energy
system and other human activities lead to higher
atmospheric GHG concentrations and radiative
forcing. This increase is moderated by natural
biogeochemical removal processes. 
• The oceans are a major sink for CO2, and the
rate at which they take up CO2 generally in-
creases in the reference scenarios as con-
centrations rise early in the century. How-
ever, processes in the ocean can slow this rate
of increase at high concentrations late in the
century. Ocean uptake in the three reference
scenarios is in the range of 2 GtC/yr in 2000,
rising to about 5 GtC/yr to 11 GtC/yr by
2100. The three ocean models behave more
similarly in the stabilization scenarios; for
example, the difference in ocean uptake
among the models at the most stringent sta-
bilization levels is less than 1 GtC/yr in 2100.
• Two of the three participating models in-
clude sub-models of the exchange of CO2
with the terrestrial biosphere, including the
net uptake by plants and soils and the emis-
sions from deforestation. In the reference
scenarios from these modeling groups, the
terrestrial biosphere acts as a small annual
net sink (less than 1 GtC/yr of carbon) in
2000, increasing to an annual net sink of
roughly 2 GtC/yr to 3 GtC/yr by the end of
the century. The third modeling group as-
sumed a zero net exchange. Changes in
emissions from terrestrial systems over time
in the reference scenarios reflect assump-
tions about human activity (including a de-
cline in deforestation) as well as increased
CO2 uptake by vegetation as a result of the
positive effect of CO2 on plant growth. There
remains substantial uncertainty about this
carbon fertilization effect and its evolution
under a changing climate. 
• As a result of the various influences, GHG
concentrations rise substantially over the
century in the reference scenarios. By 2100,
CO2 concentrations range from about 700
ppmv to 900 ppmv, up from 365 ppmv in
1998. CH4 concentrations in 2100 range
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from 2000 ppbv to 4000 ppbv, up from 1745
ppbv in 1998, and N2O concentrations in
2100 range from about 375 ppbv to 500
ppbv, up from 314 ppbv in 1998.
• As a result, radiative forcing in 2100 ranges
from 6.4 W/m2 to 8.6 W/m2 from preindus-
trial, up from a little over 2 W/m2 today. The
non-CO2 GHGs account for about 20% to
25% of radiative forcing at the end of 
the century.
Stabilization Scenarios
Important assumptions underlying the stabi-
lization scenarios include the flexibility that ex-
ists in a policy design, as represented by the
modeling groups, to seek out least cost options
for emissions control regardless of where they
occur, what substances are controlled, or when
they occur. This set of conditions is referred to
as where, what, and when flexibility. Equal mar-
ginal costs of abatement among regions across
time (taking into account discount rates and the
lifetimes of substances), and among substances
(taking into account their relative warming po-
tential and different lifetimes) will, under spec-
ified conditions, lead to least cost abatement.
Each modeling group applied an economic in-
strument that priced GHGs in a manner consis-
tent with the group’s interpretation of where,
what, and when flexibility. The economic char-
acteristics of the scenarios thus assume a policy
designed with the intent of achieving the re-
quired reductions in GHG emissions in a least-
cost way. Key implications of these assumptions
are that: (1) all nations proceed together in re-
stricting GHG emissions from 2012 and con-
tinue together throughout the century, and that
the same marginal cost is applied across sectors
(where flexibility); (2) the marginal cost of
abatement rises over time in these three sets of
scenarios based on each modeling group’s in-
terpretation of when flexibility, with the effect
of linking emissions mitigation efforts over the
time horizon of the scenarios; and (3) stabiliza-
tion of radiative forcing is achieved by combin-
ing control of all GHGs, with differences in how
modeling groups compared them and assessed
the implications of this what flexibility.
Although these assumptions are convenient for
analytical purposes, to gain an impression of the
implications of stabilization, they are idealized
versions of possible outcomes. For the abate-
ment costs in these scenarios to be representa-
tive of actual abatement costs would require,
among other things, that a negotiated interna-
tional agreement include these flexibility mech-
anisms. Failure in that regard could have a
substantial effect on the difficulty of achieving
any of the stabilization levels considered in this
research. For example, a delay of many years in
the participation of some large countries would
require greater effort by the others, and policies
that impose differential burdens on different
sectors without mechanisms to allow for equal-
izing marginal costs across sectors can result in
a many-fold increase in the cost of any environ-
mental gain. Therefore, it is important to view
these scenarios as representing possible futures
under specified conditions, not as forecasts of
the most likely outcome within the national and
international political system. Further, none of
the scenarios considered the extent to which
variation from these least-cost rules might be
improved upon given interactions with existing
taxes, technology spillovers, or other non-mar-
ket externalities.
If the developments in the three reference sce-
narios were to occur, concerted efforts to reduce
GHG emissions would be required to stabilize
radiative forcing at the levels considered in this
research. Such limits would shape technology
deployment throughout the century and have
important economic consequences. The stabi-
lization scenarios demonstrate that there is no
single technology pathway consistent with a
given level of radiative forcing. Furthermore,
there are other possible pathways than those
considered in this research. 
• Stabilization efforts are made more chal-
lenging by the fact that ocean uptake of CO2
declines as the stringency of the stabilization
level increases, and, in the scenarios from
two of the models, because CO2 uptake in
terrestrial systems also declines with the
stringency of the stabilization level. 
• Stabilization of radiative forcing at the lev-
els examined in this research would require
a substantially different energy system glob-
ally, and in the U.S., than what emerges in the
reference scenarios. The degree and timing
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of change in the global energy system de-
pends on the level at which radiative forcing
is stabilized. The lower the radiative forcing
stabilization level, the larger the scale of
change in the global energy system relative
to the reference scenario and the sooner those
changes would need to occur.
• Across the stabilization scenarios, the energy
system relies more heavily on non-fossil en-
ergy sources, such as nuclear, solar, wind,
biomass, and other renewable energy forms,
than in the associated reference scenarios.
The stabilization scenarios differ in the de-
gree to which these technologies are de-
ployed, depending on assumptions about:
technological improvements; the ability to
overcome obstacles, such as intermittency in
the case of solar and wind power, or safety,
waste, and proliferation issues in the case of
nuclear power; and the policy environment
surrounding these technologies. Energy con-
sumption, while still higher than today’s lev-
els, is lower in the stabilization scenarios
than in the reference scenarios.
• CCS is widely deployed in the stabilization
scenarios because each modeling group as-
sumed that the technology can be success-
fully developed and that concerns about stor-
ing large amounts of carbon do not impede
its expansion. Removal of this assumption
would make the stabilization levels more
difficult to achieve and would lead to greater
demand for low-carbon sources such as re-
newable energy and nuclear power, to the ex-
tent that growth of these other sources is not
otherwise constrained.
• Significant fossil fuel use continues across
the stabilization scenarios, both because sta-
bilization allows for some level of carbon
emissions through  2100, depending on the
stabilization level, and because of the pres-
ence of CCS technology in all the stabiliza-
tion scenarios.
• Emissions of non-CO2 GHGs, such as CH4,
N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6, are all reduced
in the stabilization scenarios.
• Increased use is made of biomass energy
crops in all the stabilization scenarios, but
their contribution is ultimately limited by
competition with agriculture and forestry,
and, in one participating model, by the asso-
ciated impacts of biomass expansion on car-
bon emissions from changes in land use.
• The lower the radiative forcing stabilization
level, the larger the scale of change in the
global energy system relative to the reference
scenario required over the coming century
and the sooner those changes would need 
to occur.
• Across the stabilization scenarios, the scale
of the emissions reductions required rela-
tive to the reference scenario increases over
time, with the bulk of emissions reductions
taking place in the second half of the century.
But emissions reductions occur in the first
half of the century in every stabilization sce-
nario.
• The 2100 time horizon of this research lim-
ited examination of the ultimate stabilization
requirements. Further reductions in CO2
emissions after 2100 would be required in all
of the stabilization scenarios, because stabi-
lization of radiative forcing at any of the lev-
els considered in this research requires hu-
man emissions of CO2 in the long term to be
essentially halted. Despite the fact that much
of the carbon emissions will eventually make
its way into oceans and terrestrial sinks,
some will remain in the atmosphere for thou-
sands of years. Only CCS can allow contin-
ued burning of fossil fuels. Higher radiative
forcing limits can delay the point in time at
which emissions must be reduced toward zero,
but this requirement must ultimately be met.
Fuel sources and electricity generation technolo-
gies change substantially, both globally and in the
U.S., in the stabilization scenarios compared to
the reference scenarios. There are a variety of
technological options in the electricity sector that
reduce carbon emissions in these scenarios.
• Nuclear power, renewable energy, and CCS
all play important roles in stabilization sce-
narios. The contribution of each varies, de-
pending on assumptions about technological
improvements, the ability to overcome ob-
stacles such as intermittency of supply, and
the policy environment surrounding them.
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• By the end of the century, electricity pro-
duced by conventional fossil technology that
freely emits CO2 is reduced in the stabiliza-
tion scenarios relative to reference scenarios.
Electricity production from technologies that
emit CO2 varies substantially with the stabi-
lization level; in the lowest stabilization level,
electricity production from these technolo-
gies is reduced toward zero.
The economic effects of stabilization are sub-
stantial in many of the stabilization scenarios,
although much of this cost is borne later in the
century. As noted earlier, each of the modeling
groups assumed that a global policy was imple-
mented after 2012, with universal participation
by the world’s nations, and that the time path of
reductions approximated a least-cost solution.
These assumptions of where, when, and what
flexibility lower the economic consequences of
stabilization relative to what they might be with
other implementation approaches. 
• The stabilization scenarios follow a pattern
where, in most scenarios, the carbon price
rises steadily over time, providing an oppor-
tunity for the energy system to adjust grad-
ually. 
• Although the general shape of the carbon
price trajectory over time is similar across the
models, the carbon prices vary substantially
across the models. For example, two of the
scenarios have prices of $10 or below per
tonne of carbon in 2020 for the less stringent
scenarios, with their prices rising to roughly
$100 per tonne in 2020 for the most stringent
stabilization level. A third scenario shows
higher initial carbon prices in 2020, ranging
from around $20 for the least stringent sta-
bilization level to over $250 for the most
stringent stabilization level.
• Factors contributing to differences in car-
bon prices include (1) differences in as-
sumptions – such as those regarding eco-
nomic growth over the century, the behavior
of the oceans and terrestrial biosphere in
taking up CO2, and opportunities for reduc-
tion in non-CO2 GHG emissions – that de-
termine the amount that CO2 emissions must
be reduced to meet the radiative forcing sta-
bilization levels; and (2) differences in as-
sumptions about technologies, particularly in
the second half of the century, to shift final
demand to low-carbon sources such as bio-
fuels and low-carbon electricity or hydrogen,
in transportation, industrial, and buildings
end uses. Differences among the scenarios
reflect the uncertainty that attends the 
far future.
• Differences in non-CO2 gases also contribute
to differences in abatement costs. Scenarios
that assume relatively better performance of
non-CO2 emissions mitigation require less
CO2 abatement and therefore less stringent
changes in the energy system, to meet the
same overall radiative forcing goal.
• These differences in carbon prices, along
with other model features, lead to similar
variation in the costs of stabilization. At the
most stringent radiative forcing stabilization
level, for example, gross world product (ag-
gregating country figures using market ex-
change rates) is reduced in 2050 by around
1% in the scenarios from two of the model-
ing groups and approximately 5% in the sce-
nario from the third, and in 2100 it is reduced
by less than 2% in two of the scenarios and
over 16% in the third.
• The assumption of when flexibility links el-
ements of the stabilization scenarios through
time. This in turn means that, in addition to
near-term technology availability, differences
in assumptions about technology in the post-
2050 period are also reflected in near-term
emissions reductions and GHG prices.
• In all of the stabilization scenarios, emissions
reductions in electric power sector come at
relatively lower prices than in other sectors
(e.g., buildings, industry, and transport) so
that the electricity sector is essentially de-
carbonized in the most stringent scenarios.
At somewhat higher cost other sectors can
respond to rising carbon prices by reducing
demands for fossil fuels, applying CCS tech-
nologies where possible, and substituting
low-carbon energy sources such as bioenergy
and low-carbon electricity or hydrogen. The
amount of electricity used per unit of total
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primary energy increases in all of the stabi-
lization scenarios, but those scenarios with
the highest relative use of electricity tend to
exhibit lower stabilization costs in part be-
cause of the larger role of decarbonized
power generation. Assumptions regarding
costs and performance of technologies to fa-
cilitate these adjustments, particularly in the
post-2050 period, play an important role in
determining stabilization costs
• As noted earlier, the overall cost levels are
strongly influenced by the idealized policy
scenario that has all countries participating
from the start, the assumption of where flex-
ibility, an efficient pattern of emissions re-
ductions over time, and integrated reduc-
tions in emissions of the different GHGs.
Assumptions in which policies are imple-
mented in a less efficient manner would lead
to higher cost. Thus, these scenarios should
not be interpreted as applying beyond the
particular conditions assumed.
• GHG mitigation would also affect fuel
prices. Generally, producer prices for fossil
fuels fall as demand for them is depressed by
the stabilization measures. Consumers of
fossil fuels, on the other hand, pay for fuel
plus a carbon price if the CO2 emissions are
freely released to the atmosphere. Therefore,
consumer costs of energy rise with more
stringent stabilization levels in these scenarios.
Achieving stabilization of atmospheric GHGs
poses a substantial technological and policy
challenge. It would require important transfor-
mations of the global energy system. The cost
and feasibility of such a goal depends on the
evolution of technology and its ability to over-
come existing limits and barriers to adoption,
and it depends on the efficiency and effective-
ness of the policy instruments employed to
achieve stabilization.
APPLICATION OF THE
SCENARIOS IN FURTHER
ANALYSIS
These scenarios, supported by the accompany-
ing database described in the Appendix, can be
used as the basis of further analysis. There are a
variety of possible applications for these sce-
narios. For example, the scenarios could be used
as the basis for analysis of the climate implica-
tions, and then follow-on studies of potential
climate impacts. Such studies might begin with
the radiative forcing levels of each scenario,
with the individual GHG concentrations (ap-
plying separate radiation codes) or with the
emissions (applying separate models of the car-
bon cycle and of the atmospheric chemistry of
the non-CO2 GHGs). Such applications could be
made directly in climate models that do not in-
corporate a three-dimensional atmosphere and
detailed biosphere model. For the larger models,
some approximation would need to be imposed
to allocate the short-lived gases by latitude or
grid cell. Such an effort would need to include
scenarios of the emissions (or concentrations) of
the reflecting and absorbing aerosols. This could
be achieved by the use of sub-models linked to
scenario for energy use by fuel. 
The scenarios could also be used as a point of
departure for partial equilibrium analysis of
technology development. Because these models
compute energy prices, the scenarios can be
used for analysis of the cost performance of new
technologies and to serve as a basis for analysis
of rates of market penetration. Differences in
the scenarios among the three modeling groups
give an impression of the types of market chal-
lenges that new options will face.
In addition, these studies could form the founda-
tion of analysis of the non-climate environmen-
tal implications of implementing potential new
energy sources at a large scale. Such analysis was
beyond the scope of the present research, but in-
formation is provided that could form a basis for
such analysis, for example, the potential effects
on the U.S. and the globe of implied volumes of
CCS and biomass production or of nuclear power
expansion in some of the scenarios.
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The scenarios could also be used in compara-
tive mode. Just as many lessons were learned by
comparing the differences between the three
modeling groups’ scenarios, still more could be
learned by extending the comparison to scenar-
ios that predate these or come after, including
scenarios developed using entirely different ap-
proaches. For example, some scenario exercises
do not apply economic models with detailed
analysis of energy markets of the type used
here. Such scenarios could be compared against
those presented here to gain insight into the role
of economic factors.
Finally, these scenarios might be used to explore
the economic effects of stabilization at different
levels. Such work was beyond the scope of the
research specified in the Prospectus. However,
the scenarios do contain information that can be
used to calculate indicators of consumer impact
in the U.S., for example, by using the changes in
prices and quantities of fuels in moving from
one stabilization level to another. (The reader is
reminded, however, that these welfare effects do
not include the benefits that alternative stabi-
lization levels might yield in reduced climate
change risk or ancillary effects, such as effects
on air pollution).
MOVING FORWARD
As noted earlier, this work is neither the first
nor is it likely to be the last of its kind. Through-
out the report, a number of limitations to the ap-
proach and the participating models have been
highlighted. Studies such as the one presented
here would benefit from further research and
model development and this section suggests
several productive paths to pursue.
Technology Sensitivity Analysis 
The importance of future technology develop-
ment is clear in this report, and sensitivity test-
ing of key assumptions would be of use. For
example, what are the implications of various
non-climate constraints on nuclear power or on
the large-scale expansion of CCS or biofuels
production?  If particular supply technologies –
nuclear, wind, natural gas combined cycle gen-
eration, and biomass – were assumed to be more
or less expensive, how would that affect market
penetration and policy cost? On the demand
side, what are the effects of alternative views of
the technical developments needed to facilitate
substitution of electricity for liquid and gaseous
fuels in various sectors, particularly in trans-
port? Since technology deployment will be in-
fluenced by the policy environment, how would
the consideration of less optimistic policy
regimes affect this aspect of the scenarios?
Consideration of 
Less Optimistic Policy Regimes
The discussion in Chapter 4 emphasizes that the
difficulty of the stabilization task emerging
from any scenario research is crucially depend-
ent on underlying institutional assumptions, and
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the insight to be gained from a single represen-
tation of control policy such as the one adopted
in this research is limited. The scenarios assume
a wide array of idealized institutions both in in-
dividual nations and in the international com-
munity. Both developed and developing
economies are assumed to possess markets that
efficiently pass price information to decision
makers. Rules and regulations ranging from ac-
counting and property rights to legal and en-
forcement systems are assumed to operate
efficiently. While such assumptions provide a
well-defined reference scenario and lower-
bound information on potential costs, the prob-
ability is low that the world will actually
implement such an idealized architecture. In
that light, a natural direction for future research
is to supplement the analysis presented here
with analyses of policy regimes that are under
discussion by nations and international organi-
zations and that have a greater potential for
being implemented. Such research would
broaden the understanding of the stabilization
challenge in areas ranging from technology de-
velopment to the economics of global mitigation.
Expansion and/or Improvement 
of the Land-Use Components 
of the Models
A significant weakness in this research is the
handling of the role of forest and agricultural
sinks and sources. The major reason for this gap
is that the models employed here were not well
suited to analyze some of the complexities of
this aspect of the carbon cycle. Yet, as this
analysis has shown, agriculture, land-use and
terrestrial carbon cycle issues play an important
role in shaping the long-term radiative charac-
ter of the atmosphere. Research that would im-
prove the characterization of land use and land
cover as well as improve the linkages among en-
ergy and economic systems, land use, land cover,
terrestrial carbon processes, and other bio-geo-
chemical cycles has potentially high payoff. 
Inclusion of other Radiatively
Important Substances
The focus in this research is on the relatively
long-lived GHGs, but shorter-lived substances,
such as ozone and aerosols, have strong radia-
tive effects as well. More complete analysis
would include these short-lived contributors,
and their control possibilities, directly within
the scenario analysis.
Decision Making under Uncertainty
Finally, the problem of how to respond to the
threat of climate change is ultimately a problem
of decision making under uncertainty that re-
quires an assessment of the risks of climate
change and how policies might reduce the odds
of extremely bad outcomes. One would like to
compare the expected benefits of policies to re-
duce GHG emissions against the expected costs
of achieving those reductions. By focusing only
on emission paths that would lead to stabiliza-
tion, this research considers only the costs of
stabilization without consideration of the bene-
fits. Moreover, given the direction provided in
the Prospectus, this research focused on sce-
narios and not on uncertainty analysis. It is not
possible to attach probabilities to scenarios con-
structed in this way; formal probabilities can
only be attached to a range, which requires ex-
ploration of the effects of many uncertain model
parameters.
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Accompanying this report are two databases of scenario information collected from the participating modeling
teams. These databases can be found at http://www.climatescience.gov/.
The database entitled CCSP 2_1A Scenario Information.xls includes all the information that was collected from
the modeling teams to support the development of this report, including the figures and tables presented in the
report. The database entitled CCSP 2_1A Other Species.xls includes additional emissions information for sub-
stances not included in the radiative forcing stabilization levels used in this research, such as ozone precursors
and aerosols. The emissions profiles for these other substances are different from what would emerge in scenarios
in which these substances are explicitly included in stabilizing radiative forcing.
The two data files include the following fields:
Region
Category
Sub Category
Variable
Units
Run Label
Year
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Acronyms
A
C
RO
N
Y
M
S
AEEI autonomous energy efficiency improvement
AOGCMs atmosphere-ocean general circulation models
CCS carbon capture and storage
CCSP Climate Change Science Program
CCTP Climate Change Technology Program
CFCs chlorofluorocarbons
CGE computable general equilibrium
CPDAC Climate Change Science Program Synthesis and Assessment Product
DOE U.S. Department of Energy 
EMF Energy Modeling Forum
EPPA Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis
FCCC U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
GCMs general circulation models
GDP gross domestic product
GHGs greenhouse gases
GWP Global Warming Potential
HFCs hydrofluorocarbons
HCFC hydrochlorofluorocarbons
IAMs Integrated Assessment Models
IGCC Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle
IGSM Integrated Global Systems Model
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MAC marginal abatement cost
MAGICC Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-Gas Induced Climate Change
MER market exchange rate
MERGE Model for Evaluating the Regional and Global Effects
NCAR National Center for Atmospheric Research
NGCC natural gas combined cycle
NMVOCs non-methane volatile organic compounds
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PFCs perfluorocarbons
PPP purchasing power parity
SRES Special Report on Emissions Scenarios
TAR Third Assessment Report
U.N. United Nations
U.S. United States
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Units
$2000 U.S. 2000 dollars
bbl barrel
c/kWh cents per kilowatt hour
EJ exajoule
gal gallon
GJ gigajoule
Gt gigatonne
GtC gigatonne carbon
Mt megatonne
MtC megatonne carbon
Kt kilotonne
PgC petagram carbon
ppbv parts per billion by volume
ppmv parts per million by volume
ppt parts per trillion
Quad quadrillion btu
tcf thousand cubic feet
W/m2 watts per meter squared
yr year
Chemical Formulas
CH4 methane
CO carbon monoxide
CO2 carbon dioxide
N2O nitrous oxide
NOx nitrogen oxides
O3 ozone
SF6 sulfur hexafluoride
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